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ABSTRACT
We present the results of a research programme that 
examined certain aspects of group decision behaviour. 
Specifically, we have identified some dimensions of 
strategic and non-strategic interaction and considered 
the importance of both group and individual-oriented 
purpose as explanatory concepts.
The research indicates that certain 'political* 
models over-stress the importance of self-interest 
motives in organisational group decision-making and 
under-rate the importance of bureaucratic interpretations 
of purpose. The findings also show that much group 
decision-making is characterised by 'non-purpose*, 
when the participants may be indifferent to the 
possible outcomes of the process.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Dr. Colin Eden for his 
encouragement in and assistance with a lengthy 
and tortuous research programme.
Thanks also to Jill Lindquist and Jane Sandland 
for their help in preparing this thesis.
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
Background and Introduction 1
Research Objectives and Methodology 23
A Hypergame Model 69
A Collective Purpose Model 135
A Leader-Driver Model 170
A Personal Interest Model 206
A Satisficing Model 254
Conclusions: Some Determinants




The air was thickening in the elegant, oak-panelled 
committee room. I watched the trails of cigar smoke 
climb slowly and swirl among the crystals of the 
chandelier whose value could probably pay the salaries 
of the fifteen senior bankers disposed around the table 
for two or three months. The stern portraits of their 
forefathers gazed down with approval at the endeavours 
of those present if not at the elusive outcomes of the 
ponderous process of discussion.
The heavy damask curtains muffled the noise of the 
traffic below in Lombard Street. Even so, the droning 
voice of the Head of Property Division was scarcely 
distinguishable from the clatter of taxis backing and 
filling and the bustle of loading and unloading at 
Leadenhall Market just around the corner. On my 
immediate left, at the head of the table, the Director 
of Planning sat erect and attentive, a good chairman 
and an example to us all. His dark pin-striped suit 
was immaculately cut. The silk tie which bore the 
Bank crest was carefully knotted exactly in the centre 
of his starched white collar. To my right, the doodles 
of the Marketing Director had spilled across two-thirds
of his note-pad and I thought I could detect an ever- 
so-slightly pornographic theme.
I caught the gist of another sentence and carefully 
composed a minute note since it was some time since 
my last. In the distance I could hear the rattle of 
a tea trolley and wondered whether it was heading this 
way. When I looked up again, the Head of Property's 
lips had stopped moving and his gin-weathered visage 
was casting around for reactions. Attention turned 
towards the chairman and I noticed for the first time 
his glazed eyes and drooping lids. I tapped my pencil 
gently on the water carafe and he flickered back into 
life.
"Thank you very much, George, you've certainly given 
us something to chew on. There were two points that 
struck me as particularly vital to our brief ..."
He carried on with aplomb, and if it crossed anyone's 
mind that what he was saying didn't really seem to 
relate to those snippets of George's monologue that 
they had managed to decipher, they gave no visible 
recognition of the disparity.
I glanced at the clock. The hands seemed to have 
travelled backwards since the last time I looked, which 
must have been several hours ago . . .
Such was one of my earlier experiences of the making 
of high policy, and it must be admitted that this 
kind of gathering has never since failed to fascinate.
This thesis is about committees and how they operate. 
The study described here involved following the work 
and progress of one particular Local Government 
executive committee for a period of just over a year.
It aims to throw some light on that mysterious process 
by which decisions, action, recommendations, reports 
and sometimes new committees are somehow generated from 
long series of meetings, discussions, arguments, 
presentations and representations. We are, as a 
parallel interest of no lesser importance, concerned 
also with the theoretical and practical problems of 
conducting research into such institutions, and the 
many philosophical questions surrounding the elusive 
process by which a social researcher draws his conclu­
sions from this kind of qualitative study.
1.1 Structure of the Research Programme
At the outset, it was decided to follow the work of an 
existing committee or working group over a significant 
period of time. One of the usual characteristics of 
these institutions is that they tend to meet relatively
infrequently. A long elapsed time is therefore 
necessary for the researcher to feel that he has obtained 
sufficient material. What consitutes sufficiency in 
this context is rather an arbitrary matter, but a 
point appears to be reached in one's association with 
such a group of people when there is no longer much 
surprise at what occurs in the course of the meetings. 
That is not by any means to say that at this stage 
the researcher has finally plumbed the depths of 
knowledge and discovered all there is to be found - 
that is often far from the case. It rather means that 
his acuity is probably beginning to dull from over­
familiarity and possibly boredom and that is arguably 
as good a time as any to stop and take stock.
The Housing Assessment Team is a working committee 
comprising members from a number of departments within 
Bath City Council. The members are all professional 
local government officers. The Team was set up in 
1975 by an active Chief Executive, and was given the 
job of managing the fate of the large number of marginal 
or non-habitable houses that then existed in and around 
the city. Much of this property stemmed from the 
Georgian period, some was built rather later. But 
it was the policy of the council at that time to increase 
the available housing stock - there was then a signifi­
cant shortage - in line with the principles of
conservation that were, and still are, strongly held 
by the city.
Late in 1975, a housing survey was carried out, and 
this resulted in a list of properties which required 
work carried out on them before they could be deemed 
habitable. This list formed the subject matter for 
the Housing Assessment Team. Their job was to decide 
what was to be done with each property, whether it 
should be demolished or converted, how many housing 
units could best be made from each, who was to finance 
the work, and how the result was to fit in with the 
longer term plans for the area (e.g. in relation to 
any proposed road-building, changes in shopping 
facilities, green belt schemes, planned industrial 
development and so on). The work involved the team in 
deciding upon a suitable scheme between themselves and 
then consulting and negotiating with owners, tenants, 
nearby inhabitants, contractors, the planning committee 
and any other interested parties, in order to work 
out how the scheme could best be implemented. All this 
involved quite complicated and dynamic problems of 
choice.
The Housing Assessment Team was selected as a location 
for the fieldwork of this study for a number of reasons:
(i) À multi-disciplinary committee was required, 
since one of the questions of interest of this 
study is the part played by members' perceptions 
of the objectives of such a team. We wanted to 
have a number of different institutional and 
individual views of these objectives and to 
find out something of how they interacted 
together. The Housing Assessment Team comprised 
local government officers from a number of 
different departments and so was ideally suited 
for this particular purpose.
(ii) Two of the members of the team were already 
known to the University of Bath and were also 
accustomed to the presence of field workers.
Since both they and the chairman of the team 
were willing to tolerate yet another inquiring 
force in their midst, the question of convenience 
came to the fore.
(iii) The members of HAT are middle-ranking local 
government officers and are therefore close to 
both decision-making and policy-making within 
their own departments and also the execution of 
decisions and the implementation of policy. It 
was hoped therefore to tap the views of people 
who were neither too low in the organisation to 
be unaware of policy issues, nor so elevated
that they were far removed from the real and 
practical implications of the outcomes of the 
consultative process.
Stages of Involvement with HAT
There were a number of different stages of interaction
with the members of the Housing Assessment Team:
(a) Preliminary discussions with the head of department 
responsible for the operation of HAT, in order to 
obtain his agreement and backing for the research 
programme as a whole.
(b) Discussions with the chairman of the team both to 
obtain his support for the venture, which was 
clearly of vital importance, and also to negotiate 
with him a role for me at the considerable number 
of meetings that 1 would be attending.
(c) The early attendances at the meetings, at which
1 contributed little or nothing to the content of 
of the discussions.
(d) Later attendances at the meetings, at which 1 was 
able to contribute something to the discussion in 
order both to pay my way for being there and also 
to maintain a natural and low-profile presence, 
which would have become increasingly difficult after 
a long period of non-contribution. A silent, 
lurking force can easily be tolerated for a while, 
but it will eventually cause suspicion and tension.
(e) Discussions with individual members outside the 
formal meetings, in order to obtain their own 
views on particular questions of interest.
1.2 Outcomes of the Research Programme
There are two distinct kinds of output from this study, 
both of which are presented later in the form of commen­
tary and discussion;
(i) Conclusions and ideas about the social dynamics of 
committee meetings, formulated on the basis of 
both my association with HAT and also related 
experience of other committees.
(ii) Conclusions and ideas about the process of 
undertaking this kind of qualitative research, 
particularly with respect to the question of how 
it is that conclusions themselves are drawn from 
the mass of diverse material (notes, minutes, tapes, 
interview data, impressions of how the members 
think and how they think other members think, 
off-the-record information acquired at the bar
or over the lunch table) that one quickly 
accumulates in the course of the work.
To the extent to which this programme of research has 
been concerned to examine any one, particular hypothesis
it was that members of decision-making groups such as 
the Housing Assessment Team are not driven principally 
by the kinds of self-advancing motives highlighted by 
many of the contemporary 'political* analyses of 
organisations. Neither, indeed, are they always driven 
in any specific direction at all. We would rather 
incline to argue that 'traditional' bureaucratic 
interpretations of purpose are both pervasive and often 
strong but, at the same time, much of group decision­
making, particularly at relatively low levels of an 
organisation hierarchy, is characterised by a general 
indifference to the outcomes of the process.
We shall examine these linked propositions with reference 
to a set of theme concepts, each important within them­
selves as models for understanding group decision, yet 
all related to each other as representing different 
facets of strategic and non-strategic behaviour.
We move on now to consider some important introductory 
themes that have informed the nature and direction of 
this research. The intention here is to set the scene 
both for the methodological discussion and for the later 
chapters of analysis.
1.3 Introductory Themes
An important idea that returns again and again in the 
later discussion is that what is often called the 
rhetoric of what is produced by committees in action
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ought not to be dismissed merely as such, but should 
rather be considered and evaluated as real and principal 
output from the process. In a sense, perhaps, therein 
lies a major source of disappointment for those waiting 
and hoping for committees to 'produce the goods'. 
Expectations are invariably based upon models of what 
individuals can and do produce when left to their own 
devices. Output from a group of people, however, is 
well-known to be of a qualitatively different kind.
It does not appear to be either meaningful or useful, 
theoretically or practically, to separate conceptually 
what should be "really going on" from the actual words 
and actions of the participants. Thus, we shall 
contend, whatever a committee finally produces is 
what it produces. What that is then labelled and how 
parts of it are packaged and distributed will depend 
largely upon the politics of the situation. But to be 
measuring that against a more "proper" form of output 
i.e. that which ought ideally to have been produced, 
is to misunderstand the whole process and its context.
In emphasising this conceptual standpoint, we shall 
highlight the existence of a series of different types 
of critical social state or period, at which points it 
appears that suitably formed rhetoric can become very 
powerful, when well-timed and apposite interjections 
can launch the proceedings onto a new course favoured
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by the speaker. So that, regardless of both the formal 
and the informal power structure within the group, and 
the organisational pressures upon and ambitions of the 
members, it is often possible to over-ride the apparent 
"physics" of the situation with words designed carefully 
to manipulate the mood of the meeting.
At the same time, we are aware that such disturbances 
can be initiated quite unintentionally by the chance 
flow of discussion and may provide a kind of self­
generated flux for the proceedings which intending 
manipulators have to learn to understand and take 
account of.
Values and Action
A central theme that will concern us is the nature of 
the relationship between dimensions of value and action. 
Each of the case studies in this thesis touches upon 
different aspects of "values", "objectives", "purpose", 
"interests", and we discuss what can be meant by these 
terms in different kinds of circumstances and how what 
people actually do seems to be affected by them. Models 
of behaviour which attempt to explain outcomes by 
reference to values are undoubtedly useful and informa­
tive, but they clearly need to be much more complex 
in conception than straight-forward matrix systems of 
cause and effect.
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The centrality of values within an individual's 
intellectual frame, and their constancy in the face 
of the prospect of different kinds of action, are 
continuing issues of debate (Armstrong and Eden, 1978; 
Arrow, 1951; Becker and McClintock, 1967; Burnstein 
and Vinokur, 1973; Laszlo, 1973; Postman, Bruner and 
McGinnies, 1948; Rokeach, 1972, 1973; Vickers, 1972,
1973; Young, 1977). We shall incline to support the 
case for a rather contextual and contingent definition 
of values, which will always take account of the stimuli 
to which an individual needs to respond and the practical 
options for action or inaction open to him.
This discussion is complicated further when we come 
to talk and think about purposive groups as distinct 
from individuals. The concept of a group objective is 
highly elusive and time and again it has been found 
to be misleading to try and predict the "behaviour" 
of a working group simply with reference to some 
assumed corporate purpose (For example, Ackoff and 
Emery, 1972; Bales and Strodtbeck, 1951; Bennett,
1977(a), 1977(b); Black, 1948; Bonham, 1974; Bonham, 
Shapiro and Heradstveit, 1978; Curtis, 1974; Dando,
1976; Driver and Streufert, 1969; Festinger, Schachter 
and Back, 1959; Haworth, 1959; Janis, 1972; Johnson,
1968; Kuhlman and Marshello 1975a, 1975b; Lewin, 1952; 
Pettigrew, 1973; Sandberg, 1976; Simon, 1964; Vinokur, 
1971). At the same time, in the present study, we
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have found that individual members working within 
committees and teams are often aware of, and are able 
to articulate, some idea of a group objective, have 
referred to this notion in the course of discussions 
and even cited it in written matter such as reports 
and minutes. But whilst there is some evidence to 
support the existence of an individual's perception 
of group objectives, we would prefer to see this as 
standing as yet another item in the usually long list 
of conditions to be satisfied in the search for a 
workable solution to a problem, rather than as a 
central determining precept.
So group objectives appear to be neither entirely 
comprised of empty rhetoric, nor yet are they 
apparently pivotal to the behaviour of group members. 
The articulation of group objectives seems to be 
closely related to the individual's view of the group 
itself. Those who have a strong sense of group 
identity appear apt to operate with significant 
reference to a notion of group purpose. These notions 
can be, and in general appear to be, very different 
for each individual, regardless of any apparent 
similarity in the label which each may use. If such 
labels can first be identified, then clearly the 
understanding of each interpretation is vital to the 
understanding of the behaviour of the group as a whole,
14
It is in this context that such understanding is very 
often particularly difficult for those 'lay-men* who 
commission or set up working groups or committees with 
some apparently clear end product in mind. They may 
themselves have what they think is a well-formed view 
about the brief that they have laid down and are often 
frustrated that much discussion and debate, particularly 
in the early stages of the committee's life, tends 
to focus upon the interpretation, re-interpretation 
and sometimes re-formulation of the brief. Very often, 
the eventual starting point for the 'real work* of the 
committee is somewhere completely different than that 
envisaged by the party or parties who set the thing up 
in the first place. Sometimes that starting point is 
never reached and the final output of much deliberation 
is a new set of terms of reference. It is part of our 
point that this is rather a natural state of affairs 
and that those who would regard such behaviour as 
recalcitrant or inefficient are almost certainly doomed 
to suffer perpetual disappointment in the progress of 
such institutions.
Methods of Analysis
The discipline and methodology that has been employed 
in the course of this study has involved what might be 
called semi-participant observation of a particular 
working team over a considerable period of time. One
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of the most important sources of data has been the 
individual discussions with each team member at his 
own office after the meetings. In this, we have 
essentially been following the thinking of Harre and 
Secord (1973);
"At the heart of the explanation of social behaviour is 
the identification of the meanings that underlie it. 
Part of the approach to discovering them involves the 
obtaining of accounts - the actor's own statements 
about why he performed the acts in question, what 
social meanings he gave to the actions of himself and 
others. These must be collected and analysed, often 
leading to the rules that underlie the behaviour."
People may account for their actions to make them 
intelligible or to justify them or both, but the 
relationship between what was done and what was said 
about that is liable to be complex and problematic. 
However, we would argue that just to watch is not 
enough. The 'pure* anthropological method of 
observation will tell you something, but it will not 
tell you very much at all about the systems of meaning 
that the members of a working team use in their inter­
actions together. For that, the researcher has to 
try and make sense of what the participants tell him 
(and also what he thinks that they are not telling him). 
There are many traps of which he has to be wary
16
however, a few of which are now mentioned briefly 
by way of introduction.
Baffles to Understanding
There may commonly be a deliberate attempt by the 
person giving an account to convey an impression which 
is in some sense deliberately misleading, either to the 
researcher himself, who is the immediate recipient of 
the explanation, or, through him, to a third party. 
Researchers or consultants or anyone who tinkers with 
an organisation from the outside are prime targets 
to be used as unwitting couriers for internal political 
purposes.
At least as important is the phenomenon of what might 
be called 'inaccurate articulation'. An individual 
providing an account of events to a researcher may or 
may not be able to identify to his own satisfaction 
what he thinks were the important determinants of 
behaviour in a given situation, and he will then 
be more or less successful at putting these ideas into 
words. Thus, an individual may produce an account that 
he is not fully satisfied with, but may withold his 
reservations from his audience.
Tidyness and aesthetics are important considerations 
in both the generation and understanding of explanations 
of behaviour. Getting behind the style may be
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problematic. An individual may prefer a particular 
form of account e.g. structured or systematic, 
’balanced-’, elegant, concise, poetic, or scientific.
The style of rhetoric and metaphor employed by a local 
government officer will be different from that employed 
by a bank manager which will be different again from 
that favoured by an actor. It is also often very 
difficult to work out the extent to which an account is 
an attempt to ’repair’ past chaos and provide a tidy 
explanation of what was essentially an untidy event.
The most common characteristic of an explanation 
of behaviour made to a third party is probably its 
function as a justification of a particular course of 
action. In trying to account for what Harre and Secord 
(op. cit) call the propriety of past actions, an actor 
will have in mind some criteria of rightness that he 
may hold himself, or at least believe that his audience 
holds. In trying to understand such an account, the 
researcher first has to recognise that justification 
is taking place and then to try and determine whose 
standards are being referenced. It is always very 
difficult for those being questioned from outside 
their organisation to accept that this third party 
may have no political axe to grind at all, save that 
of getting hold of some data that he can use. This 
fact can, equally, provide very informative interview 
material if the researcher is able to key into the
18
justification that is taking place.
It must in all this be appreciated that verbal 
explanations offered in response to a question will 
often carry their own momentum and will tend to 
exhibit a kind of inevitable indexicality. What is said 
next will in a sense have to follow on from and relate 
to what is said before. A slightly different starting 
point, a different question or shade of emphasis, a 
different response from the listener as the explanation 
proceeds, all these things have a bearing upon what is 
put out. Also, in constructing accounts, different 
degrees of knowledge and different interests are 
assumed for different audiences. Interpreting an 
account successfully involves being aware also of what 
was omitted. Explanations by social actors direct to 
researchers will be similarly constructed on the basis 
of what the latter is assumed to know and not to know.
Circourel (1973) has pointed to the problem of 
indefinite triangulation and the question of partiality. 
There is always something else that could be said.
When is an account to be regarded as complete enough, 
either by the researcher or by the person constructing 
it? Of course the researcher, in constructing his own 
account of behaviour, has to address the issue of 
indefinite triangulation in much the same way as 
anyone else.
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1.4 Presentation of Findings
We have chosen to develop the conclusions and ideas 
arising from this research within the format of five 
case studies. Each draws upon a particular sequence 
of meetings and the discussions that came out of them. 
Each is situated around a different theme, a theme 
intially suggested by the material of each case but 
then taken up and used to generate and focus discussion 
The themes do not represent formal hypotheses in the 
experimental sense, nor do they represent conclusions 
within themselves. They are suggested determinants 
of committee 'behaviour*. The first is also some­
thing rather more than that since it considers the 
validity of a simple model of interaction between 
participants; namely, the notion of a Hypergame, 
developed by Bennett (1977a, 1977b) from the basic 
tenets of game theory. The remaining case themes are 
related to each other and to the concept of a 
Hypergame insofar as they each deal with different 
aspects of an important question posed by this thesis; 
that is, the relationship between a 'corporate* model 
of committees, a molecular view if you like, and a more 
atomic model which sees the output from committee 
discussion as the result of a complex network of 
interactions between the individually motivated 
members.
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The case themes, that comprise the middle five 
chapters of this thesis, have been labelled as 
follows ;
A Hypergame Model 
A Collective Purpose Model 
A Leader-Driver Model 
A Personal Interest Model 
A Satisficing Model
The chapter on methodology that precedes these five 
comprises a series of arguments that attempts to both 
explain and justify the use of case studies and related 
commentaries to present and structure both source 
material and conclusions and ideas deriving from it.
We discuss the extent to which these two forms of 
idea are in any case separable. The case study then 
emerges as a rather natural format of analysis, but 
one in which there is a continuing switching between 
different modes of discourse. We comment upon these 
modes and we also argue the case for a wider definition 
of what it means to be scientific when conducting this 
kind of inquiry. In this context, we consider the 
nature of the process by which 'findings' are generated.
Part of the point of this kind of line of argument is 
a plea for something of a 'liberalization' of academic 
studies such as we are engaged upon here. That is not 
to say that we are not fully supporting the application
21
of -well-established and, in our view, valuable 
principles of scientific inquiry. It is rather that 
we do not agree firstly with the common contemporary 
restriction to certain methods of going about an 
investigation, particularly the literal interpretation 
of the stages of inquiry usually denoted by the 
'classical' experimental method ; nor, secondly, with 
an often corresponding naive view of measurement which 
either depends heavily upon the concept of quantity 
or else adopts a quantitative paradigm for handling 
non-quantitative ideas, often in both cases ignoring 
the rather tenuous and arbitrary nature of the links 
between observed phenomena and concepts that are formed 
to describe and explain them.
In standing by the apparent letter of the inquiry 
methods of the natural scientist, the latterly emerging 
social scientist often ties chains around himself, 
hampers both his thinking and the presentation of his 
ideas, and also loses credibility both with the natural 
scientists that he is trying to emulate and the 
population whose behaviour he is attempting to explain 
and who alone can arbitrate in the matter of the 
validity of certain of his conclusions.
Chapter 2, which looks at our own methodology and, 
in a sense, model of knowledge, now follows. Then we 
present the five central chapters of analysis. The
22
last two chapters draw the ends together, summarise 
the main conclusions that have been drawn and reflect 
upon the final nature of the product.
23
2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
The research programme presented in this thesis had
two principal objectives:
(i) The first was to uncover some empirical determin­
ants of group decision outcomes by analysing 
the work of a particular inter-departmental team 
in Local Government. The broad, guiding hypo­
thesis of the research was that, for many examples 
of group decision-making, politically oriented 
models of behaviour which emphasize the self- 
interest motives of organisation members may 
tend to attribute strategic and competitive 
intentions where none exist. As a corollary to 
this proposition, we argue the extent of bureau­
cratic definitions of goals for both collectives 
and individuals. However, we also suggest that 
much of group decision-making is notable both for 
a lack of significant intention and an essential 
indifierence to the eventual outcome.
It must be made clear that in no sense were we 
attempting to chart the 'physics' of any of the 
decision-making that has formed the material for 
this research. Rather, the object was to examine 
and elaborate a particular set of concepts that 
appear to be important for understanding group 
decision-making. The events of particular decisions 
have been illuminated by the application of these concepts
24
(ii) The second object of the study was to make some 
practical and theoretical observations about 
how a research project such as this should best 
be conducted. Part of this purpose involves 
examining the relationship between source material 
and the things that a researcher then goes on to 
say about it. In this context, we look at some 
of the characteristics of 'scientific* inquiry 
and consider some of the ways in which it is 
similar to and differs from other forms of research 
This is, in part, a justification of the method 
of presentation and analysis that has been used 
to serve our first objective, namely, the case 
study. This format has been employed both as a 
method of organising source material and as a 
means of structuring and explaining the conclusions 
that were drawn from it.
One of the conclusions of our arguments is that a 
researcher need not be over-preoccupied with method 
in order to be able to discover and pass on something 
useful to either a scientific or a lay audience. To 
argue this case has, rather paradoxically, involved 
a considerable emphasis upon method and some of the 
theoretical links between method and results. We look 
at the question of semantics in the process of 
drawing conclusions, examine the arbitrariness of 
these semantic ties and look at how the quality of
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the researcher may often be more important for the 
validity of his conclusions than the discipline or 
methodology that he employs.
Data and Data Collection
What was to count as data for this study was not, 
perforce, fully known at the time of its commencement. 
It was, essentially, to comprise any stimulus, written, 
spoken, pictorial, symbolic, present or historic that 
could help to throw any light upon the progress of the 
discussions of the Housing Assessment Team.
The term 'data* is often used in a misleading way in 
accounts of social studies, and often rather strictly 
following its normal usage in the 'pure', experimental 
sciences. Somehow, 'data' might then seem to connote 
only minutiae observations of social phenomena that 
should be measured and recorded very precisely and 
then related in a logical and structured way to a set 
of conclusions or findings.
We shall not be so restrictive in the use of the term 
'data', but will take it in general to mean any input 
to the cognitive processes of the researcher/analyst 
that may have a bearing upon his subject of the moment. 
We agree with Wootton (1975) who has observed;
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"Much time is spent ... in discussing the ways in which 
what people say can be transformed into data, how the 
context in which a question is being asked influences 
a person's response, and so on. After some consideration 
of such issues, it soon becomes clear that handling 
responses and deciding on the status they can be 
assigned is no easy matter. In fact it is rather 
complex, and by complex I think we usually mean that 
there are problems such as deciding whether a particular 
response counts as an instance of some analytic 
category (the coding problem); deciding whether the 
way in which a response is classified does justice to 
the point of view being expressed in the original 
response; or deciding on the most reliable way of 
classifying responses. Such problems are mainly 
addressed in the context of survey enquiry, but they 
are in fact even more acute in naturalistic enquiry.
In the latter case, for example, there is less chance 
of some standard response elicitation technique, and 
much interpretation will be based on the analyst's 
implicit classification of conversations going on 
around him. On the other hand, the participant observer 
is generally held to be in a position to pick up the 
meanings and nuances of what is going on around him, 
so that the looseness in the handling of data is 
compensated for by the greater validity."
The outputs from this process will be ideas and concepts
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that help third parties to understand what is going on. 
We will argue later in this chapter that we can regard 
an inquiring process as being scientific to the'extent 
that the researcher can identify the relationship 
between his inputs and his outputs.
The method that has been adopted in this study for 
collecting inputs has been based upon a principle of 
* semi-participation* in the decision-making process 
being examined. My initial, and formally introduced, 
role with the Housing Assessment Team was one of 
academic researcher interested in the broad subject of 
decision-making. As soon as possible, however, I 
attempted to dilute that role both by a limited 
participation in the discussions themselves, where I 
was invited or where I thought that I could sensibly 
interject without giving offence, and also by demon­
strating a willingness to talk with any of the team 
members about almost any subject at all outside the 
formal structure of the meetings.
The intention behind this degree of participation in 
the working day of the members was to try and ensure 
my unobtrusiveness, and also trustworthiness, by 
becoming something of a camelion and so blending in 
with the natural background. The consequences of not 
doing this are often over-rated and thought to be dire, 
but it is true that they can complicate the problems
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of data interpretation. One is examining different 
social situations when a researcher is and when he is 
not present, but of course the latter case is rather 
difficult to arrange. Examining the reactions of a 
working team to having a researcher present would 
certainly be an interesting study, and it would be of 
some use no doubt to future researchers. However it 
was not our intention here and so we were keen to 
minimise those reactions in order to be looking at 
and thinking about a set of circumstances that could 
be deemed to be sufficiently like a 'normal* team 
meeting for useful and generally applicable conclusions 
to be drawn. We were hoping to obtain data that had 
just as much bearing upon our questions of interest 
as that which would be in principle 'available* when 
the researcher was not there.
Following Schwartz and Schwartz (1955) we would
**... define participant observation as a process in 
which the observer's presence in a social situation is 
maintained for the purpose of scientific investigation.
The observer is in a face-to-face relationship with 
the observed, and, by participating with them in their 
natural life setting, he gathers data. Thus, the observer 
is part of the context being observed, and he both 
modifies and is influenced by this context. The role 
of participant-observer may be either formal or informal, 
concealed or revealed; the observer may spend a good
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deal or very little time in the research situation; 
the participant-observer may be an integral part of 
the social situation or largely peripheral to it
In our own case, the fact that research was the object 
of my presence was not concealed. My presence itself 
was formally endorsed and I tried to ensure that it 
was soon informally endorsed. I spent a considerable 
amount of time in the research setting and people soon 
got used to having me around.
Collecting Members' Accounts
The concept of an account has been treated formally 
by many sociologists and social psychologists. Broadly 
speaking, we may say that accounts are specific kinds 
of speech-acts that are provided by individuals when 
they attempt to interpret, explicate or justify other 
social acts (including other speech-acts) performed 
by other people or, more commonly, by themselves. 
Accounts essentially seek to make actions intelligible; 
that is, to invest them with socially sensible meanings 
and to locate them within a commonly understood frame­
work. However, they may also attempt to make actions 
warrantable; that is, to display the rightness or 
propriety of what was done.
An important part of the present study was the 
collection of individual team members' own accounts
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of events either at or seemingly relevant to the 
meetings. Data was amassed in the form of interview 
notes, most of which were set down immediately after 
such sessions. A tape recorder was used at some of 
these sessions and at the la ter HAT meetings. This 
is in line with our earlier stated policy of maintain­
ing a low-profile, in order not to set up unintention­
ally special circumstances which would mean that we 
would be researching a different kind of social setting 
from that in which we were principally interested.
Our purpose in obtaining such accounts was to try 
and get at the meanings which the group members gave 
to the Housing Assessment Team, the work that it was 
given to do and their own and other members’ contri­
bution to that work. In this we are to some extent 
following the thinking of Harre (1979) who, as a 
psychologist, has been concerned to use account data 
to make statements about cognitive processes. He has 
stated;
"In account analysis we try to discover both the social 
force and explanatory content of the explanatory speech 
produced by social actors. This then serves as a 
guide to the structure of the cognitive resources 
required for the genesis of intelligible and warrant­
able social action by those actors."
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Harre hypothesises the existence of what he calls 
'template structures' which are created by individuals 
as representations of formal structures which are 
perceived to exist in the world at large. Accounts 
are not taken explicitly to reveal template structures; 
"... instead, the cognitive resources will show 
tacti representation of template structures."
Less relevant to our own purpose, Lyman and Scott 
(1970) have considered accounts in relation to the idea 
of the production and maintenance of smooth social 
interaction. Thus they define 'account' more 
particularly as "... a linguistic device employed 
whenever an action is subjected to valuative inquiry" 
that has the "... ability to shore up the timbers of 
fractured sociation ... to throw bridges between the 
promised and the performed ... to repair the broken and 
restore the estranged." Others have more simply sought 
to use accounts as we ourselves have, that is, as 
additional and complementary forms of data.
Clearly, it is not a straightforward business to 
interpret this kind of information. What people 
tell you in response to a particular question may be 
due to a great many complex and interlocking motives. 
Accounts may provide data not only about the specific 
social act to which they refer, but also about the 
wider intentions of the actor. A person constructing
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an account will almost certainly have some kind of 
model of the expected consequences of the different 
things that he might say. In a sense, this model 
will serve to guide the production of an explanation.
One of the questions that the researcher has to answer 
for himself here is the question of how he is viewed 
by the person that he is interviewing. It is true 
that some researchers in some sets of circumstances 
seem able to take on the role of detached confessional 
and the people to whom he is talking within the 
organization of interest fall over themselves to tell 
him the 'inside story' apparently without reserve.
Most commonly, however, researchers are treated with 
great caution, not least because it is assumed that 
they will be getting about within the organisation and 
talking to a great many people. This can also mean that 
an investigator is likely to be used as a courier to 
pass on a political point to a third party or another 
department.
Even if there is no such manipulation going on, it 
is clear that the meaning of accounts is contextually 
determined. The person giving the account will probably 
assume a certain common stock of knowledge and will have 
his or her own ideas about the practical purpose for 
which the account is required. In this respect, not 
only the content but also the style of response will 
be adjusted in accordance with the respondent's view
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of the sort of material the researcher would like to 
hear and his own preferences for providing such 
material. A given individual may lean towards a 
particular form having particular characteristics.
It may be methodical, systematic, scientific and attach 
importance to detail and accuracy; it may be balanced 
and inconclusive, looking at all possible points of 
view and weighing them against each other; it may 
be anecdotal and graphic, stressing amusing incidents, 
'hot* stories and political intrigue. Getting behind 
the style of accounts that are offered is vital to 
their interpretation. Material will tend to be 
selected for its suitability for the preferred medium, 
and important data that doesn't fit the form may be 
disregarded.
Particular forms of expression may also imply a 
structure to the data that wouldn't exist if the 
researcher had observed the events first-hand. Accounts 
very often succeed in tidying up the past, in making 
a series of fairly haphazard or chance occurrences 
appear to conform to an organised master plan.
Cicourel (1967) has made some important observations 
about the linked questions of indefinite triangulation 
and partiality in the construction of explanations 
of events. He has argued that fixing the point of 
closure is a rather arbitrary process and usually a
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matter of judgment and expedience to suit the particular 
set of circumstances for which the explanation is 
required. A point may often be reached in the con­
struction of an account when either constructor or 
audience or both sense that enough has been said 
(Ramos, 1978). What is said is subject to certain 
forces of internal determinism and will depend both 
on the starting point and the reactions of the 
questioner. Whether or not, for example, a response 
to the question 'why did you do this in those circum­
stances’ is in some sense correct, it will represent 
one of a number of things that could have been said.
If there is a reason that is somehow more important 
or central than others, it may or may not be given 
first. The first item in the response may be suggested 
by the form of the question or some other part of the 
context of the inquiry. Subsequent items may be 
suggested by the first. The initial question draws 
boundaries for the response, but so does any inter­
mediate summing up, request for clarification or 
elaboration, or the feeding back of understanding so 
far.
As far back as 1947, Crawshaw-Williams observed;
"Once an opinion is formed, the strong temptation to 
hold on to it at all costs makes us forget how much 
we originally simplified the issue. The result is
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that in making our selection from all the myriad facts 
which are presented to our attention day-by-day and 
which are nearly all of them evidence for or against 
some opinion of ours, we tend to ignore those which do 
not 'fit in'. If this happens in the case even of 
rational opinions, founded originally on some evidence, 
how much more must it happen in the case of opinions 
which were never anything more than comfortable 
distortions of reality. With such opinions there is 
a great increase both in temptation and also in the amount 
of evidence to be avoided. There seems to be practically 
no limit to the amount of evidence that a man can 
ignore when he feels sufficiently strongly disposed to 
do so. "
The problem for a researcher of working out how much 
evidence his respondent has ignored is often considerable. 
Sometimes this selective perception is quite uncon­
scious . Sometimes the respondent is deliberately 
intending to mislead.
Intentions to Mislead and 'Inaccurate* Articulation
This, perhaps the most common baffle to authentic 
interpretation of how people explain their actions, 
is also the most difficult to deal with. We have 
already noted the possibility of the researcher 
being employed as an unwitting courier of political 
impressions and it is as likely as not that this kind
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of data misleads from what actually happened. In these 
circumstances it isn't even a sufficient solution 
for the researcher to somehow gain the trust of the 
person he is interviewing, even if he knew how to do 
it. If the researcher is perceived as an agent freely 
mobile between different departments or significant 
political actors, then even if he himself is trusted, 
the formation of useful impressions to be 'passed on' 
will be almost automatic for the respondent.
The researcher's best chance of combatting attempts 
to mislead probably lie with adopting some of the tech­
niques favoured by interrogators! In particular, it 
is often useful to adopt a method of gently and 
casually probing around the subject of interest in 
the hope that any strategy to mislead is revealed by 
gradually emerging inconsistencies. What is especially 
difficult in this is to differentiate between such 
strategies and what might be called 'inaccurate 
articulation', where an individual asked to provide 
an account may not be able to work out fully himself 
what he thinks were the causes of the events in 
question and, even if he believes that he knows, he 
may not be completely successful in putting these 
ideas into words. Any doubts he then has about the 
authenticity of his account may be witheld from his 
audience.
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Misleading accounts can also be quite unintentional 
in that they are an almost automatic bureaucratic 
response. Organisations very often have available 
routine, 'prepackaged' account formats for their 
members, as Lyman and Scott (op. cit.) have noted;
"Organisations systematically provide accounts for 
their members in a variety of situations. The rules 
of bureaucracy, for instance, make available accounts 
for actions taken toward clients - actions which, 
from the viewpoint of the client, are untoward."
So the researcher has to beware programmed and 
habitual responses to his inquiries. They can 
usually be identified from their unspontaneous nature 
and it is then necessary to probe behind the rhetoric 
to uncover the richer reasoning that may be there.
All of the interview material obtained in the course 
of the present study has been analysed and interpreted 
with these issues in mind. The intention throughout 
the whole process has been to get behind what people 
have actually said and find out something of what they 
meant, to try and uncover the webs of meaning and 
significance that are the real interactants in social 
groups such as committees.
We have then gone on to derive analytic concepts that
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help to explain certain aspects of how events turned 
out as they did. Ihis process was essentially one of 
almost continuous iteration, testing ideas against the 
data until some goodness of fit was achieved. We now 
go on to describe and discuss that process of analysis 
and to make some suggestions about its nature and 
limitations. We look at some theoretical ideas that 
bear upon the business of creative abstraction. The 
intention here is to provide a scientific underpinning 
for the case studies that later present the main findings 
from the empirical part of this inquiry. What we mean 
by 'scientific* in this context is also illuminated 
in the following section.
2.2 Making Sense of Data
2.2.1 The Derivation of Explanatory Concepts
A principal part of our interest in the process of 
conducting this kind of social research centres upon 
the theoretical foundation of any conclusions that 
we feel able to draw. Therefore, we shall in the 
course of this section be attempting to examine certain 
aspects of the means by which an investigator of social 
phenomena begins to make sense out of whatever he 
comes to regard as his data, the means by which he 
starts to try and explain the unexplained and to set 
up causal links between particular empirical observations
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The derivation of explanatory concepts is clearly not 
an activity that is confined to researchers, scien­
tific or otherwise, nor indeed to any of those curious 
individuals engaged in pursuing lines of inquiry in a 
more or less disciplined manner. Some kind of explana­
tory structure will be created by anyone who is trying 
to understand anything, trying to make sense out of 
events that have confronted them. In the limit, it 
could be argued, all users of language can fall into 
this category, to the extent that language is seen as 
a tool to classify phenomena and delineate concepts 
which are then handled more or less discreetly and 
related to each other as and when necessary. But 
we shall be concerned principally with more conscious 
attempts to define concepts in relation to observed 
phenomena and in relation to other concepts - that is, 
with the process of model construction. Central in 
this debate will be the question of semantics and 
the nature of the relationship between a model and what 
it purports to represent. According to Harre, for 
example (1976);
"A model is a representative device. But it is unlike 
either of the two main traditional classes of sign.
It is unlike a natural sign in that there is no causal 
relationship between a model and its subject, while 
a natural sign like smoke is related causally to the
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fire that it signifies. It is unlike a conventional 
sign, since the choice of a particular model as a 
representation is not wholly arbitrary. The selection 
of a model is based upon real resemblances and differ­
ences between the model and what it represents, and 
decisions as to what are the proper degrees of likeness 
and unlikeness can be the subject of argument."
Mary Hesse has also pointed to this rather complex 
link between observation and explanation (Hesse, 1976):
"... the commonly accepted distinction between literal 
and metaphorical or analogical meanings is as baseless ... 
as is the distinction between theoretical and obser­
vation languages in science. All descriptive terminology 
is learned and subsequently used by a process of 
extension of application and meaning from similars 
to similars. I never re-apply the commonest term, such 
as 'green', in exactly the same circumstances in which 
I learned it, but always by making a (perhaps 
unconscious) judgement that this new situation is 
sufficiently similar to the old to merit application 
of the same universal term. My judgement is not 
arbitrary, since it is based on objective similarities 
which I am able to recognise, and is attested by the 
intersubjective understanding and general agreement 
of my language community."
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There are two important points which emerge at an 
early stage in this discussion. The first is a very 
old question in the philosophy of science and yet very 
often remains an unaddressed issue in the evaluation 
of practical social research; it has to do with whether 
the researcher believes that he is in the business 
of 'discovery', that is of attempting to reveal what 
had previously lain dormant, just waiting to be 
found, or whether he sees himself as trying to overlay 
observations with some kind of explanatory template 
that he has designed specially for this purpose.
The second point, which in a sense follows on from 
the first, concerns the relative idiosyncracy of 
research findings and the relationship between 
particular researchers and the things that they have to 
say about their own small corner of the empirical world. 
The social scientist would perhaps like to think that 
his findings are 'objective'. Conversely, much good 
and interesting social commentary is dismissed on the 
grounds that it is 'merely subjective'. To take this 
latter view surely reflects a naive interpretation 
of the linguistic basis of science. To take the 
former line may be all well and good, but social 
scientists often seem to operate with a rather restricted 
model of what objectivity is. Relativity is a concept 
that has been in circulation for a long time in the 
scientific community, but its full implications for
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the process of model construction and explication are 
not always taken on board. For the purposes of the 
present study and the ideas that derive from it, we 
shall regard 'objectivity* as a valued ideal, but 
take it to mean a secondary use of language which 
attempts to explain, in its own or other terms, the 
relationship between ideas that are generated from 
the research process and the observed phenomena that 
start that process off. Objectivity represents here 
a dialogue between observation and explication. It 
means a continuing attempt to uncover and articulate 
not only the assumptions upon which particular models 
are based, but also the meanings behind the language 
which is used to develop ideas and generate explan­
ations and explanatory concepts. Einstein (1954) made 
this point very clearly even in relation to the 
natural sciences :
"What science strives for is an utmost acuteness and 
clarity of concepts as regards their mutual relation 
and their correspondence to sensory data."
Objectivity in this sense has nothing to do with 
method, but is rather an expression of the basis upon 
which items of knowledge are founded and upon which 
they can then be used to reach into the unknown.
Putnam (1962) has made the following observations:
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"We commonly use formalised objects to serve as models 
for unformalised objects. We talk about a game whose 
rules have never been written down in terms of a model 
of a game whose rules have been agreed upon and codi­
fied, and we talk about natural languages in terms 
of models .of formal languages ... I think that we 
may say that the concept rule of language, as applied 
to natural language, is an "almost full-grown" 
theoretical concept. Linguists, sent out to describe 
a jungle language, describe the language on the model 
of a formal language. The elements of the model are 
the expressions and rules of a formal language, that 
is, a language whose rules are explicitly written down. 
The corresponding elements in the real world are the 
expressions of a natural language and certain of the 
dispositions of the users of that language. The 
model is not only a useful descriptive device but has 
genuinely explanatory power."
The phenomenon to which Putnam alludes takes its 
form in the course of this study as two levels of 
language use. The terminology of the two does not 
differ significantly, except in the occasional use 
and generation of technical terms to stand for pheno­
mena or characteristics that have been identified or 
described in the language of observation and which 
are then discussed and related to others in the 
language of explication.
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The use of case histories as a medium both of analysis 
and communication also involves this duality of 
language. Case histories first describe and then 
comment upon observed events, although the shift between 
these two modes is often not clean. The cases presented 
later in this thesis each have a theme associated 
with them. This theme is used to trigger and focus 
discussion and commentary around the described events, 
representing a kind of working hypothesis in each case. 
Such a theme is almost always necessary as a starting 
point to any discussion and we look now at some of the 
characteristics of how this process can unfold.
2.2.2 On the nature of Case Studies
Case studies can be viewed as amalgams of description 
and commentary and they provide a very natural way 
both of organising source material and of structuring 
its analysis. Popper (1957), evaluating historicism 
as a mode of inquiry, has made the following obser­
vations on the question of the standpoint taken by 
the would-be historian for the purposes of generating 
a commentary*
” ... undoubtedly there can be no history without a 
point of view; like the natural sciences, history must 
be selective unless it is to be choked by a flood of 
poor and unrelated material. The attempt to follow
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causal chains into the remote past would not help in 
the least, for every concrete effect with which we 
might start has a great number of partial causes; 
that is to say, initial conditions are very complex, 
and most of them have little interest for us.
The only way out of this difficulty is, I believe, 
consciously to introduce a preconceived selective 
point of view into one's history; that is, to write 
that history which interests us. This does not 
mean that we may twist the facts until they fit into 
a framework of preconceived ideas, or that we may 
neglect the facts that do not fit. On the contrary, 
all available evidence which has a bearing on our point 
of view should be considered carefully and objectively .. 
But it means that we need not worry about all those 
facts and aspects which have no bearing upon our point 
of view and which therefore do not interest us."
A number of interesting questions are suggested by 
this line of thought. First, what does it really mean 
consciously to introduce a preconceived selective 
point of view, what purpose does this actually serve 
and how is it possible to distinguish between the effects 
of this and any unconscious selective point of view 
that a writer of history may hold. Second, if we are 
not to twist the facts until they fit into a frame­
work of preconceived ideas, what else can we do with 
them? Finally, how in any case do we discriminate
46
between those facts that have a bearing upon a selected 
point of view and those that do not?
On the first question. Popper's advocation of the 
explicit use of initial reference concepts sounds 
rather like a parallel to the use of a hypothesis 
in the classical process of scientific inquiry. What 
is particularly interesting in both these cases is 
the relationship between the hypothesis and the 
material, the question and the observations. If you 
change the hypothesis, switch the question of interest, 
then you presumably glean something different from the 
material. This process could be repeated almost 
indefinitely for a case study. There is practically 
no limit to the things that could be said about it.
A different area of concern suggests new forms of 
commentary and new explanatory concepts. But this is 
a creative process, there is nothing mechanistic or 
automatic about it. The quality of the commentary, 
both with respect to its relevance and its rightness, 
depends upon the mind that is making the links between 
question and material. Ask a different person and 
you will get a different answer. Ask the same person 
another time and he will make different links and they 
may be better and they may be worse, whatever we care 
to mean by that in the context of the case. As Grant 
(1970) has noted:
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"... reality is not only located in the mind, but 
is at the mercy of the moods and caprices of that mind, 
dilates and contracts with the degree of activity of 
the consciousness. Reality is "for the time being'."
What Popper’s initial reference concepts are doing 
is to roughly delineate the area of discourse. It 
does not matter that the boundaries will seem to be 
blurred. In a sense, they cannot be otherwise and it
is the continuing business of the commentary itself,
with its self-conscious use of explanatory language, 
its 'objectivity* in our earlier sense, to clarify 
what is inside and what is outside. This is the 
process of explanation. It is true that the result 
is always subject to debate. What is important is to
know what the result is.
On a straightforward linguistic plane, no coherent 
commentary could possibly be generated without the 
use of a question. Given a set of observed phenomena 
and half-an-hour to fill, a commentator would find 
it difficult to produce other than a sequence of more 
or less disconnected remarks and observations if he 
had no theme or slant to which to relate his thinking. 
He would almost certainly have one available, however, 
or dream one up in order to get going in a 'coherent' 
way. Language must respond to language, thinking 
proceeds indexically.
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But to what extent is this process of generating 
explanations therefore rather circular? In this 
context, Kaplan (1964) has noted:
"... the behavioural scientist often makes use of 
what might be called the circle of interpretation: 
act meanings are inferred from actions and are then 
used in the explanation of the actions, or actions 
are construed from the acts and then used to explain 
the acts. Thus Collingwood (1946) has said about 
the historian that 'when he knows what happened he 
already knows why it happened' ..."
It is often difficult to distinguish between the process 
of appropriately associating new phenomena with 
existing, useful concepts and the process whereby 
the characteristics of existing concepts are searched 
for in a tangle of observed events. Kaplan goes on 
to say:
"After the moment of the observer's birth no 
observation can be undertaken in all innocence. We 
always know something already, and this knowledge is 
intimately involved in what we come to know next, 
whether by observation or in any other way. We see 
what we expect to see, what we believe we have every 
reason for seeing, and while this expectancy can make 
for observational error it is also responsible for
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veridical perception ..."
Clearly, an important skill of the accomplished researcher 
is an ability to somehow be able to step outside the 
connotational constraints of his own and others* 
established language usage. In the process of trying 
to put together a plausible explanation of events and 
behaviour, he will attempt to be creative and to look 
at the possibilities for forging new connotational 
links. The search for such links underlies the very 
nature of inquiry.
It is interesting and instructive to view this search 
as a design activity in Churchman's (1971) sense:
"... design is thinking behaviour which conceptually 
selects among a set of alternatives in order to figure 
out which alternative leads to the desired goal or 
set of goals. In this regard, design is synonymous 
with planning, optimizing, and similar terms that 
connote the use of thought as a precursor to action 
directed at the attainment of goals."
Each time a researcher is confronted by 'data' and 
attempts to make some sense out of what he has seen, 
he undertakes a specific design task. It can be argued 
that he will be driven in this by two levels of goal: 
driven in a rather obvious way by the aim of trying to
50
produce an explanation at all, but more fundamentally 
by the objective of trying to construct a linguistic 
network of concepts and ideas whose meaning character­
istics have a particular correspondence with the 
phenomena he has observed. This is his design 
problem. Of course it is not only the correspondence 
that is important. Just as an engineer might be 
attempting to design a car that has sparkling perform­
ance, moderate fuel consumption, and is comfortable, 
elegant and safe, so will the builder of explanatory 
models operate with a set of more or less conflicting 
criteria. His account will certainly have to 'fit 
the facts', but he may also want it to be 'scientific', 
persuasive, authoritative, coherent, interesting, 
brief, graphic, perhaps demonstrably useful for a 
particular purpose.
As we have argued earlier, if he is concerned with 
scientific explanations, the researcher's constructed 
linguistic network must not only achieve a corres­
pondence with the characteristics of observed events, 
it must also explain and illuminate that correspondence 
itself. Thus, the reader of his account will be able 
to first test it against his own interpretation of 
events and then to examine how the researcher's 
interpretation is constructed. At least in principle 
he ought to be able to; yet it can be argued, conversely, 
that the problem of forcing someone else to accept
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the connotational links that you have proposed 
between an observation and a linguistic explanation 
may be an uphill and sometimes impossible task. In 
Mary Hesse's earlier example, a person will only 
denote something as green if he or she recognises 
it as having the characteristics they recognise as 
greenness. If it doesn't seem to be green, then they 
will call it something else.
However, Michael Overington (1977) has commented that;
"Whether or not there is a relation between things, 
Burke argues that if there is a connotational 
relation between the terms which symbolize these 
things, then the embedment of such a connotational 
relation in the linguistic structures of human mental 
processes is sufficient to influence people to 
translate this symbolic relation into action (by 
providing a sufficient justification, by making sense 
for them of the projected action). For example, 
to call some occurrence of a death 'murder' is to 
justify (explain, motivate) the search for an indi­
vidual who intended to kill."
So that if similar connotational relationships 
between the 'symbols' that constitute an explanatory 
structure exist for both the analyst who devised 
that structure and for his listener, then the listener
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will at least be able to make sense of the explanation 
in its own terms, i.e. it will appear to have a 
consistency and a coherence and will not merely come 
over as gobbledegook. This coherence may of itself 
lend weight to the plausibility of the explanation.
Coherence is added to an account of observed events 
if there is an identifiable linking theme running 
through the argument. For the scientific reporter, 
such a theme often serves to close a circle of 
indexicality and to provide a linguistic starting 
point from which a network of cross-referenced 
meanings can grow. For the present study, we have 
selected particular linking themes after the main 
part of the research activity was completed, themes 
intended to guide and focus the analysis. Some would 
assert that it is not possible to even embark upon 
a programme of research without a well-formulated 
and particular quest, without a theory or a hypo­
thesis to test. Kaplan (op. cit.) for example has 
said thati
"Every theory serves, in part, as a research directive; 
theory guides the collection of data and their sub­
sequent analysis, by showing us beforehand where the 
data are to be fitted, and what we are to make of them 
when we get them. The word 'data* it cannot too often 
be emphasised, is an incomplete term, like 'later than';
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there are only data for some hypothesis or other. 
Without a theory, however provisional or loosely 
formulated, there is only a miscellany of observations, 
having no significance either in themselves or moreover 
against the plenum of fact from which they have been 
arbitrarily or accidentally selected."
There is a counter point of view which asserts that 
by selecting particular observations after they have 
been 'collected* and by describing and arranging 
events in a particular way, the analyst can provide 
for his audience a good understanding of what he 
himself has seen and some insight into why things are 
as they are. Some sociological and anthropological 
commentaries are founded upon these precepts and are 
put together using, intentionally, a rather graphically 
descriptive style. Edgar Morin (1971), a sociologist, 
adopts this technique in his report on a three-year 
study of a village community in south-west Brittany, 
Plodemet %
"... the station square is half empty and barely used 
since the railroad was discontinued and the station 
demolished. A rather lifeless market is set up every 
month on the large rectangular site. The two hotels 
are located in this part of the town because of its 
proximity to the station that was. Both are rustic, 
despite the influx of visitors during the summer ;
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their restaurants refuse parties that are too large 
in summer and parties that are too small in winter ...
The pork butcher makes his own pate and sells factory- 
made meat products, dairy produce and chickens. He 
has an electric spit, and in the last few years he 
has taken up preparing cooked dishes for the summer 
visitors. The electrician floods his planoply of 
gadgets with neon lighting - refrigerators, gas stoves, 
water-heaters, electric mixers (called anthropomorphically 
"Charlotte” and "Marie"), television sets, record 
players, records (Adamo, Johnny Halliday, Hugues 
Auffray in 1965)."
Images selected and strung together in prose, meaning 
deriving essentially from the selection, their 
juxtaposition and the style of description. The 
explanation is not explicit but it is nevertheless 
there. It becomes progressively clear as soon as 
you latch on to the fact that Morin's main focus of 
interest is the process of change wrought upon the 
village by the forward march of the economy.
Appreciation of this theme throws the network of 
'description' into perspective and images are then 
not only graphic in themselves but contribute points 
to a wider argument.
Morin's research techniques were not dissimilar from 
those used by most field investigators of social
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behaviour. Morin notes:
"The inquiry, which lasted one year, was followed 
by a further period lasting eighteen months, in 
which thousands of notes, pages, and yards of recording 
tape were broken down and an attempt made to recreate, 
out of thousands of fragments, clues, and 'snapshots' 
a being which, unlike the paleontologist's dinosaur 
or the archaelogist's Troy, will never have any 
corporeal existence: a changing society. We had to 
compose anddecompose, reconsider and reject, examine 
facts and ideas from a number of different points of 
view, meditate, reflect, in short think, in the 
preindustrial, precybernetic sense ..."
Morin is here referring himself to that creative 
process whereby ideas about data are somehow derived 
from thinking about it. By 'precybernetic' he seems 
to mean that the activity has no prior structured 
rules for arriving at the correspondence between 
data and ideas. However, he does make use of a 
reference concept - "a changing society." This is 
the theme that Morin uses to throw his material into 
perspective. This is the selected 'point-of-view* 
that Popper (op.cit.) deems necessary for generating 
a historical account.
What is curious is that Morin's account hardly seems
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to depend upon a theoretical language, or indeed any 
formal or meta-language for its explanatory power.
It is almost as though the explanation is self- 
explanatory. But it is not true that the commentary 
can be regarded as merely 'description', since there 
is a clearly emerging set of theories about the 
changing society. "An old community in a state of 
metamorphosis" is at once a prior suspicion, an early 
'finding', a reference concept guiding the research 
as it continues, a grand conclusion and an organising 
force behind the narrative.
Medawar (1969) has reflected upon the efficacy of 
what are normally understood by the methods of 
science for this kind of investigation:
"I very much doubt whether a methodology based on 
the intellectual practices of physicists and biologists 
(supposing that method to be sound) would be of any 
great use to sociologists. On the contrary, the 
influence of inductivism ... has in the main been 
mischievous. It has stirred up in some sociologists 
the ambition to ascertain the laws of social change, 
above all by the painstaking accumulation of data 
out of which general principles will in due course 
take shape. The elevated prose and studied postures 
of a flourishing school of social anthropology in France 
today are best explained away as a reaction against
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the crude scientism of those who have urged upon 
sociologists the adoption of a style of investigation 
which they do not use themselves and cannot authen­
ticate from their own experience."
Medawar would prefer to separate the activities of 
sociology from those of natural science, a desire which 
has been expressed by many sociologists and physicists 
alike. Yet both groups are attempting some kind of 
inquiry and both would no doubt argue that they attempt 
to go about this business in a more or less disciplined 
way.
It seems important to draw some kind of distinction 
between the 'methodology* and 'intellectual practices' 
to which Medawar refers. Methodology is commonly used 
to denote the complete baggage of methods and techniques 
that a researcher brings to his work and uses to 
identify issues relevant to a particular quest, to 
collect data in a more or less systematic way, to keep 
a check on the quality of that data and then to draw 
considered conclusions about the quest on the basis 
of that evidence.
This kind of scheme for disciplined inquiry could apply 
in principle to natural scientist and sociologist alike. 
But there are some important operational differences 
and it is these, perhaps, to which Medawar was referring
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as intellectual practices. In particular, the last two 
stages present significantly different problems for 
the sociologist than they do for the natural scientist.
Social phenomena are also fundamentally different 
from material phenomena, as Silverman (1970) has 
noted X
"Matter itself does not understand its own behaviour.
It is literally meaningless until the scientist imposes 
his frame of reference upon it. There is no possibility 
of apprehending its subjective intentions and the logic 
of its behaviour may be understood solely by observation 
of the behaviour itself. The action of men, on the 
other hand, is meaningful to them. While the observer 
perceives water boiling when it has reached a certain 
temperature, men themselves define their situation 
and act in certain ways in order to attain certain 
ends. In doing so, they construct a social world."
The question of whether or not this difference in the 
nature of the material means that the essential 
process of gaining knowledge is different for social 
and natural science is more difficult to resolve. On 
the question of the validity of data, the natural 
scientist is very often concerned with the concept 
of contamination. He would prefer to think that the 
measurements he is taking are related to what he
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thinks they ought to be and that the effects that he 
is observing or otherwise detecting are not partially 
determined by other variables of which he has no 
knowledge or over which he has no control. He 
therefore devises a system of cross-checks designed 
to reveal the presence of such rogues.
The social researcher is in a similar position if 
he has restricted his inquiry to a particular aspect 
of an observed phenomenon which, perforce, he is 
usually obliged to do. But his special difficulty 
is that the 'variables' with which he is dealing are 
not well-defined at the outset. This is partly because 
of the relative newness of the concepts he is using, 
partly because of the sheer complexity and relative 
indeterminacy of social phenomena, partly because the 
inquiry process itself merges with the situation being 
looked at and partly because he is less concerned with 
quantity and more concerned with quality. As a result, 
the social researcher often finds that he is in the 
business of helping to define variables rather than 
measuring them or devising a formal calculus that links 
them causally together.
However, this process of definition is open-ended.
The variables or concepts under construction can 
continue to grow in meaning as more and more data is 
brought into correspondence with them. The question
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of validity becomes problematic since all data may 
be argued to be equally valid, or else none of it is.
To return to our outline of a process of inquiry, 
the stage of drawing conclusions can become the 
equivalent to the addition of meaning to an idea, the 
task of refining and helping to delineate a concept. 
Here we come up against a further complexity, 
surrounding the relationship between 'data' and 
'concept'. This appears to be another dimension to 
the difference in intellectual practices to which 
Medawar refers. It is probably a difference in degree 
rather than of kind, since the natural scientist 
must also forge his own conceptual links between 
observation and finding. But he is often dealing 
with a relatively self-contained 'subject'. The 
sociologist usually feels himself to be dealing with 
the whole world, all that has gone on in it socially, 
all that going on in it, all that people have said 
and thought about that and all that they are currently 
saying and thinking.
Glaser and Strauss (1967) have noted that;
"Generating a theory from data means that most hypo­
theses and concepts not only come from the data, but 
are systematically worked out in relation to the data 
during the course of the research. Generating a
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theory involves a process of research. By contrast, 
the source of certain ideas, or even 'models', can 
come from sources other than the data."
How concepts and data might be related to each other 
they don't go on to say. Glaser and Strauss presume 
that in some sense theory that is derived from data 
is better than theory that isn't. This may often be 
so, but it is the degree of correspondence which 
finally exists between the data and the language of 
theory which is of ultimate importance. The problem 
is that this correspondence is difficult to measure, 
firmly lodged as it is upon linguistic foundations 
which provide the meaning for themselves as well as 
what is built upon them. In this context, Quine (1970) 
has talked about 'grades of theoreticity'%
"The notion of a molecule or positron is more theor­
etical than that of a golf ball or rabbit. By this 
I mean that it is more remote from the data ...
Preparatory to assessing grades of theoreticity, or 
distances from the data, we ought to settle what to 
count as data. They are supposed to be, as nearly as 
possible, the uninterpreted testimony of the senses.
Thus it was that Berkeley and others have conceived 
of our visual data as two-dimensional and looked upon 
three-dimensional vision as the product of interpretation."
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One of the primary concerns of the present research 
has been the interplay between two-dimensional and 
three-dimensional vision in this sense. Our intention 
has been to add meaning to a number of concepts 
that seem to be important for the understanding of some 
of the processes of group-decision making. This 
meaning is added in stages by a process of triangu­
lation. The concepts that we have used have partly 
been suggested by an initial consideration of the 
'data' in Glaser and Strauss's sense, partly from 
one's own past experience of decision-making 
behaviour in groups and partly from the literature. 
Whatever their precise origins, we proceed, by bringing 
data and concepts together, to make sense of the data 
and attempt to understand some of the determining 
forces behind the events that unfolded. By the same 
process, we aim to elaborate the meanings of the 
concepts both by relating them to data and, in certain 
cases, to each other.
The five central chapters of this thesis are each 
associated with a particular theme. This is the concept 








The Hypergame is a recent conceptual development in 
game theory (Bennett, 1977) and is a model of strategic 
interaction. It has some intuitively 'life-like* 
qualities that are missing from many game-based models. 
Specifically, it allows that the various participants 
in a strategic interaction have different perceptions 
of what everyone else is trying to achieve and how. 
Chapter 3 outlines the concept of a Hypergame, 
examines the constituent elements and shows how they 
relate to each other. We then consider the history 
of a particular case of the Housing Assessment Team in 
Hypergame terms, attempting to formulate certain 
aspects of it in strategic form. By this process 
we generate some possible interpretations of events, 
illuminate some of the things that happened and some 
of the things that were said. By the same token, we 
elaborate the meaning of the elements that comprise a 
Hypergame, adding perspective as they are brought 
close to the data.
Chapter 4 looks at some aspects of the concept of 
Collective Purpose, and develops this notion with 
reference to the same case that informs Chapter 3.
We also triangulate this concept against the idea 
of Personal Interest. The two have been argued to
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lie at opposite poles of a continuum (Zander, 1971) 
but we consider in this chapter, and in chapter 6 
which deals particularly with Personal Interests, how 
the two phenomena were manifested in our own data.
Chapter 5 introduces the concept of the Leader-Driver 
in order to explain certain characteristics of those 
decision-making groups which are low both on Collective 
Purpose and Personal Interests. We consider how the 
apparent lack of direction in such cases can leave the 
way clear for determining forces which derive from 
the process of discussion and debate itself. The 
Leader-Driver in this sense refers to the mysterious 
direction that can suddenly appear almost from nowhere 
to push events towards a decision outcome when nobody 
seems to be pushing.
Chapter 6 examines some dimensions of Personal 
Interest that were revealed in the course of a 
particular Housing Assessment Case in which a public 
inquiry caused some of the team's reasoning to be 
externally evaluated. We look at some of the ways 
in which Personal Interests can be expressed within 
an organisational context and consider the scope for 
conflict with aspects of Collective Purpose.
Chapter 7 looks at the concept of satisficing, as 
developed by March and Simon (1963), and it considers
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the events of another case in these terms. In 
particular, we see how satisficing behaviour can be 
associated with policies of 'laisser faire’ and how 
a decision-making process that involves more than one 
person can be seen in terms of a sequence of more or 
less delayed responses to the actions or contributions 
of each of the parties.
Chapter 8 brings together important issues and 
conclusions about group-decision making that emerge from 
the previous chapters. Finally, in chapter 9, we reflect 
upon some of the strategies that were employed for 
collecting data in the course of this study and make 
some final comments upon the nature of the findings 
that were obtained and the way in which they have been 
presented.
Glaser and Strauss (op. cit.) have argued that:
"In discovering theory, one generates conceptual 
categories or their properties from evidence: then 
the evidence from which the category emerged is used 
to illustrate the concept. The evidence may not 
necessarily be accurate beyond a doubt ... but the 
concept is undoubtedly a relevant theoretical 
abstraction about what is going on in the area studied."
The categories represented by the five themes of the
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centre chapters of this thesis were not generated 
purely from the data provided by the Housing Assessment 
Team. They were well developed already and much 
has been written about them. However, the cases 
selected for analysis against each of these theme 
concepts exhibited some indicators of the respective 
concepts and were therefore appropriate vehicles to 
be used for their illumination, whatever the degree 
of fit eventually turned out to be. It is part of our 
thesis that both data and explanatory concept will 
derive meaning from being brought together, even if 
the 'fit* is poor or even negative. Thus, the notion 
of Collective Purpose is lent a further dimension by 
considering the extent to which Personal Interest is 
related to it. Similarly, looking at what turns out 
to be an essentially non-strategic situation with 
reference to concepts of strategy adds further 
refinement to what we mean by strategy as an idea.
It also uncovers a sense in which an interaction 
can be regarded as relating to this concept in a 
negative way, that is if it appears hot to be 
characterised by strategy at all or only in part.
We gain further perspective by considering how the 
concepts relate to each other. The strategic 
structure suggested by a Hypergame has Personal Interest 
as a core component. But it is important to consider 
other ways of looking at interests and the notion of
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Collective Purpose is an important example which is 
also related to Personal Interest as an idea. Strategic 
interaction implies the objective of optimising, but 
it is important to consider other standards of attain­
ment and so we examine the concept of satisficing to 
add further perspective. Finally, if the element of 
strategy is weak and interests are not the major 
driving force in certain examples of group decision 
making, then it is important to consider other factors 
that might be important. Hence our concept of Leader- 
Driver is brought into play.
As a second objective of this research, we have been 
interested in reflecting upon the relationship between 
empirical observations and what can be said about them. 
This theme has been considered in this chapter and is 
also threaded through the rest of the thesis. Part 
of our method of presentation has been to juxtapose 
observation with 'three dimensional' interpretation.
The reader is then able to draw some conclusions 
himself from the data and compare these with what we 
have inferred ourselves. He will not, of course, have 
access to the great quantity of background knowledge 
which has informed our own commentary.
To the extent that we have attempted to remain self- 
conscious about this process of analysis and tried to 
stay aware of what we appear to know about it and what
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we do not, then this inquiry can be said to be 
scientific. We have suggested that one of the hallmarks 
of scientific inquiry is having available some considered 
basis for adjudging the status of the knowledge that 
is produced. We have argued that it is almost 
impossible for this adjudgment to take the form of 
measurement in the social research. The consumer 
of such research must, in the end, consider what is 
said in the light of his own experience, evaluate the 
epistdnology that he believes the commentator to be 
using and evaluate its sensibility and utility 
accordingly.
In our search for an authentic understanding of the 
meanings that lay behind the events discussed in this 
thesis, we have attempted to get to know the main 
participants as well as possible. The fieldwork 
of this research covered a period of well over a year 
and many more conversations and discussions took 
place, particularly with the members of HAT, than could 
be alluded to here. We have attempted to include a 
sensible and representative selection of material, 
but it must be remembered that some of the conclusions 
that have been drawn will, perforce, have been partly 
informed by data of a rather elusive nature imbued, 
and sometimes imbibed, over a considerable period of 
time.
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3 A HYPERGAME MODEL OF GROUP INTERACTION
3.1 Introduction
The Housing Assessment case presented in this chapter 
will be discussed and illuminated with reference to a 
recent development in game theory. Hypergame Analysis 
(Bennett, 1977a, 1977b; Bennett and Dando, 1977, 1979) 
is a method of game modelling which allows that the 
players have, in general, different perceptions of the 
game being played. It is an insightful way of looking 
at group interactions in which the members are assumed, 
in general, to be operating with incongruent motives 
and with more or less inaccurate ideas of the motives 
of everyone else.
We begin by describing the events of a particular case 
that appeared on the HAT agenda for several months.
We then introduce the notion of the hypergame and 
discuss its relationship with and derivation from 
classical game theory. Finally we discuss the stages 
of a hypergame analysis with reference to the case 
itself and draw some conclusions about both the feasi­
bility and the value of this kind of analysis.
3.2 A Summary Case History
The events which formed the subject-matter of this 
particular series of meetings centred around the
70
considerable debate and discussions over the future 
of the site and area surrounding a group of 'preserved' 
artisan cottages. These cottages were located next to 
an empty area of wasteground which had potential as 
both a building and a development site.
The cottages in question form a terrace of four and 
stand at the top of Bedford Street, just off the old 
London Road. They first appeared on the agenda of 
the Housing Assessment Team back in July 1978, having 
been found to fail to meet the minimum standards for 
occupation. Although the lower two cottages stand 
empty, two families live in the larger pair next to 
the London Road, which carries a large volume of traffic.
Bedford Street is a rather shabby cul-de-sac running south 
away from the old London Road and dropping steeply 
down towards the River Avon. The main road at that 
point contains a motley collection of shops inter­
spersed with the occasional seedy looking office, 
usually with a blackened brass plate at the door and 
grey net curtains at the dusty windows. This whole 
area, just on the fringe of the city centre, had 
recently been designated by the Planning Department 
as being in need of 'tidying up'. Property prices 
and rates here are lower than they are a few hundred 
yards up the road.
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Opposite and below the cottages, between the main road 
and the river, is an area of virtual wasteland which 
is currently being used as a free car park by shoppers 
and by the employees of a nearby bank. At the bottom 
of this site, which is about a hundred yards square, 
and down towards the river, an old brewery is now being 
used as a workshop for a small motor repair business. 
The mechanics also occupy a couple of semi-derelict 
corrugated iron sheds. Most of the land on which 
these buildings and the car park stand is owned by a 
Mr. H, who is also the proprietor of a nearby furniture 
store. Mr H, in conjunction with a local firm of 
property developers, B*s Ltd., has recently submitted 
to the Planning Department a set of outline plans for 
the construction of 26 two-bedroomed flats, in blocks 
of three and four high. A number of different parties 
have an interest in this proposal as follows:
(i) First, and forming the basis of our initial 
interest in the case, the Housing Assessment 
Team has its own official brief to try and 
devise a satisfactory and workable future for 
the cottages and their occupants. According 
to this brief, they will collectively attempt 
to weigh such considerations as the well-being 
of the occupants, the condition of the cottages, 
the short and longer term housing requirements 
of the city, the costs and benefits of conser­
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vation, the industrial potential of the site 
and its prospects for providing employment, the 
long term plans of the council for the immediate 
surrounding area and so on. Their main official 
objective is the general improvement of the city 
housing stock and they consider other possible 
or proposed developments in relation to this 
primary purpose.
(ii) The potential developers: Mr H who owns the land 
and B*s Ltd. who would carry out the work. There 
is another possible developer who had once offered 
to buy the site from H and has twice submitted 
outline plans for a multi-storey car park. These 
have both been turned down and it doesn't look 
as though the scheme has much chance of getting 
started. The owners and some occupants of the 
London Road properties that overlook the Bedford 
Street site also have an interest in this case. 
They seem to be concerned that the views of the 
river presently enjoyed from their upper floors 
should not be obstructed by the new development.
A few of them are insisting that if the proposed 
housing plan is approved, then three of the 
planned four storey blocks should be truncated 
to three storeys. This would reduce the number 
of housing units from 26 to 23 and the developers 
are arguing that this threatens the whole financial
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viability of the scheme. They say that in this 
case, they would seriously consider reverting 
to an alternative, light industrial development 
for which outline planning permission has already 
been approved. This may be a piece of negotiating 
bluff against the Planners, who would prefer to 
see the housing rather than the industrial 
development on the Bedford Street site, although 
rough costings carried out by HAT seem to 
indicate that 23 units does indeed represent 
a rather marginal return on the project.
(iii) The councillors who sit on-the Planning Committee 
and the relevant Planning Sub-Committee are by no 
means in agreement themselves over what should be 
done. Most tend to support housing development 
in this part of the city rather than industrial 
development, but even some of these think that 
the proposed scheme detracts environmentally from 
the area. Others believe that the area has, in 
any case, no particularly significant image to 
detract from. One member is especially concerned 
about the height of the planned blocks of flats 
and the effect both aesthetically and upon the 
outlook enjoyed by existing neighbouring 
properties. Another is campaigning for a pair 
of old oak trees which would have to be cut down 
if the builders moved in. Another is worried
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about the general question of over-development 
on the river bank and the risk of gradual 
degredation of this leisure amenity.
Perhaps rather paradoxically, none of those 
members of the council who specifically represent 
the ward in which Bedford Street lies, appear to 
be showing any great interest in any of these 
issues or discussions. None of them sits on 
the Planning Committee and none has made any 
representation to this committee or elsewhere.
None of the ward members or any of the public 
has seemed to be concerned with the case, save 
for those few who have connections with the 
London Road properties that back onto the site 
and, of course, the two families who occupy the 
terrace cottages.
(iv) The Planners have at least an official interest 
in this case. The terraced cottages which 
represent the core of the Housing Assessment 
Team's problem, are listed buildings. The planning 
representative on the team would himself prefer 
them to be maintained. He does concede, however, 
that there are plenty of similar buildings in 
and around Bath and the bit of heritage to which 
they contribute, whatever it represents, would 
not be greatly threatened by their removal. If
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the Planning Department were able to come to a 
suitable arrangement with the contractors, then 
they would probably consider applying to the 
Department of the Environment for listed building 
consent to demolish the cottages. At the same 
time, a local conservation group is pressing for 
the preservation of both the cottages and the old 
brewery at the bottom of the site. Any of the 
proposed development plans would require this to 
be demolished.
(v) The two families who currently occupy the pair
of cottages nearest the main road would probably 
have continued to live there for a considerable 
time undisturbed, but for the fact that the 
properties came to the attention of the Housing 
Assessment Team through one of their preliminary 
surveys. Now that their future is under official 
discussion, someone will probably need to find 
some money to bring them back to the minimum 
standard for occupation. The families themselves 
will almost certainly be unable to raise the 
finance and the job will have to fall either to 
the City Council or to a private developer who 
would be prepared to take them on, perhaps in 
conjunction with a larger scheme.
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This case, then, seems at first sight to be characterised 
by the relatively large set of interested parties 
involved and the extent to which there is an inherent 
conflict between certain of those interests. One of the 
secondary objects of the current research was to try 
to discover to what extent Bennett's Hypergame framework 
of analysis was useful in practice in understanding 
the dynamics of this kind of situation. We now intro­
duce more formally the concept of a Hypergame, discuss 
some of its characteristics and look at how it is 
related to certain of the fundamental ideas in classical 
game theory.
3.3 The Hypergame as a Derivative of Classical Game Theory
We shall not be concerned here with the mathematical 
and logical foundations of game theory as they were 
originally set down and developed by Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1953). A whole algebra has been built 
upon these precepts and it is not part of our purpose 
to become entangled with it. We shall introduce the 
notion of a Hypergame as it was conceived and defined 
by Bennett (op. cit.) because this representation of 
situations of conflict intuitively appears to be able 
to attend to what Berresford and Dando (1978) have 
referred to as 'adequate conceptual complexity*.
As Rapoport (1962) has noted of game theory itself:
"The value of game theory is not in the specific
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solutions it offers in highly simplified and idealised 
situations, which may occur in formalised games but 
hardly ever do in real life. Rather, the prime value 
of the theory is that it lays bare the different kinds 
of reasoning that apply in different kinds of conflict."
Some important assumptions in ’classical' experimental 
gaming were those concerning:
(a) The specificity of the situation being considered 
and
(b) the behaviour of the players in relation to the 
laid-down rules of the game.
First, it was always assumed in the course of experiments 
that the possible outcomes of the game were well 
specified and that each player had a known and consis­
tent pattern of preferences amongst them. It was also 
assumed that variables which controlled the possible 
outcomes were well specified in that one could precisely 
characterise all the variables and all the values that 
they could take. In short, it was held that one was 
dealing with games whose rules were well defined to 
all players. No possibility was allowed that different 
players had different ideas about how the game should 
be played.
Second, game theory traditionally made assumptions 
about the behaviour of players, in that they were
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assumed to be 'rational*, motivated precisely by 
their own utility functions which they understood 
precisely. Players were also assumed to fully 
appreciate their opponents' utility functions.
The rather arbitrary and simplistic nature of these 
assumptions was well appreciated by many of those 
researchers of strategy who were involved with using 
or developing game theory. Luce and Adams (1956) 
observed that:
"A basic assumption of the theory of games is that 
each player correctly perceives the payoff functions 
of the other players. This assumption seems highly 
unrealistic ..."
Nigel Howard, who has done much to extend the mathe­
matical and representative sophistication of game 
models, comments (Howard, 1977):
"A game-theoretic model omits many factors (e.g. 
players' individual psychologies) that affect real- 
world outcomes. It investigates only the strategic 
factors."
The concept of conflict is fundamental to the basis 
of game-related models. Part of the authenticity of 
any particular model will clearly depend upon the
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extent to which the explicit and implicit tenets of 
conflict are in fact reflected in practice. Vickers 
(1968) has argued that we may use the idea of conflict 
in two distinct senses. The first, which might be 
described as 'theoretical* conflict, relates to those 
situations in which the interests of particular indi­
viduals or groups can be demonstrated to be in some 
way incompatible, so that the fulfilment or partial 
fulfilment of one person's aims or objectives would 
mean the denial, to some degree, of those of another. 
It is perfectly conceivable in such instances that 
the individuals concerned may not perceive this 
tension of interests themselves. Whether they do or 
not, the conflict might be highlighted by an observer 
on the basis of some elicited statements about the 
parties' preferences, or inferred from their past 
or present behaviour.
Vickers' second sense of the word 'conflict' is 
commonly used to refer to a clearly observable state 
of animosity between particular individuals or groups. 
We might describe this as 'symptomatic' conflict. 
Symptomatic conflict can arise whether or not there 
is a real theoretical conflict of interests and can 
often confuse any analysis of the forces underlying 
the situation as it is observed. A gaming model that 
is fitted to empirical data is usually attempting to 
map the relationship between players' interests in a
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simple way and, hence, to make explicit any theoretical 
conflict that may exist. The researcher who is using 
such a model to reflect the characteristics of his 
real-life setting is first faced with the problem of 
eliciting or deciding what those interests are. What 
the individuals may tell him or what he may see for 
himself can often be centred around symptomatic conflict, 
which may or may not represent the existence of a real 
disparity of interests.
The 'classical* theory includes mixed-motive games 
such as the Prisoner's Dilemma which account for the 
possibility of 'rational co-operation'; that is, the 
theoretical conflict between the players is not total. 
Both can benefit by co-operating to further the other's 
interests. When such games have been played in an 
experimental sense it has been observed that, not­
withstanding the configuration of the game matrix, the 
extent to which players wholeheartedly pursue their 
own interests depends markedly upon the individual 
concerned, differences in personality and his 
perceptions of his opponent's intentions in this 
direction. Many results have been obtained which bear 
upon these findings (Slack and Cook, 1973; Hottes 
and Kahn, 1974; Kelley and Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman 
and Marshello, 1975a, 1975b).
Trehune (1974) has carried out extensive experiments
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with the Prisoner's Dilemma game and concluded that 
different personality subjects developed significantly 
different levels of conflict by the end of 150 trials 
of the game. He suggests that the main way in which 
personality governs conflict in Prisoner's Dilemma 
and similar games is not through a direct correlation 
of individual predispositions, but rather that the 
joint configuration of actor personalities predisposes 
the social system to develop characteristic forms of 
behaviour during extended interaction among its 
actor-components. The 'group' of players seems to 
build up predictable patterns of responses which can 
be seen to relate to that group alone.
Sermat (1967) has carried out experiments in which 
the behaviour of players, in terms of their disposition 
towards conflict or co-operation, has been modified by 
feeding back information about opponents' strategies. 
More recently, Dando and Bee (1977) have investigated 
the effect of players having different aims in game 
experiments, concluding that;
"... the experimenter cannot assume that his view 
of the situation corresponds with that of the players. 
In particular, he cannot assume that the players will 
necessarily adopt his specification of the aim of the 
game."
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Dando and Bee characterised three types of player in 
the course of their experiments. These were: own 
gain maximisers, joint gain maximisers and relative 
gain maximisers. These types effectively represented 
three different interpretations of the stated aims 
of the game. Clearly, the competitive spirit assumed 
to exist in game participants is not always central 
to their behaviour.
In a preliminary Hypergame Analysis of the fall of 
France to Germany in 1940, Bennett and Dando (1977) 
noted that :
"... one of the most important factors in this case 
was the difference between the opposing High Commands* 
perceptions as to what were the strategic possibilities 
Their choices were based on arguments that apply to 
different games. The assumption of players' 'complete' 
information is clearly violated in this case - and, 
it can be argued, is violated in most interesting 
real-world conflicts. We cannot give a satisfactory 
account in terms of a single 'objective' or 'inter- 
subjective' game, or meta-games based on such a common 
game. Nor is the problem one of decision-making under 
uncertainty, in the sense of the participants being 
aware that their information was incomplete."
A hypergame is essentially viewed as a game in which
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the players are assumed, in general, to be playing 
according to different sets of rules. Each player 
has his own set of strategies, his own perceptions 
of the possible outcomes and his own system of 
preferences relating to those outcomes. He may also, 
though not necessarily, attribute different possible 
strategies, perceived outcomes and preferences to 
each of his opponents.
According to Bennett (1977), a hypergame
"... is a system comprised of a set of games, each 
game being interpreted as expressing a particular 
player's perception of the situation. Players' 
actions are not analysed as moves in some objectively- 
given game, but as simultaneous moves in this linked 
set of perceptual games."
The possibility exists, then, for a player to be 
subject to strategic surprise, in cases where an 
opponent had more strategies than he had perceived. 
Therefore, a completely unforseen result could be 
obtained.
More formally, Bennett offers the following definition;
"An n-person hypergame in normal form is a system 
consisting of the following;
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HI : a set Pn, of n elements
H2 ; for each p, q f Pn, a non-empty finite set sj
H3 : for each p, q f Pn, an ordering relationship 0^
defined over the product space x . . . x s'
The elements of Pn are interpreted as the players of 
the hypergame. SjJ and 0^ are interpreted respect­
ively as the set of strategies for player p, and p's 
preference ordering, as perceived by q . That is, they 
express q's perception of p's options and aims. Just 
as an n-person game can be represented using an 
n-dimensional matrix, so an n-person hypergame can be 
pictured in the form of n n-dimensional matrices.
The sets s' , ... make up q's strategy matrix.
#  Ù
Together with Pn and the orderings 0^  , ... they
will be said to comprise player q's game within the 
hypergame. The hypergame can thus be considered as 
a set of n games, one for each player."
Although we shall intentionally not be concerned here 
with any of the mathematical analyses that can be 
carried out with game matrices, we have included this 
formal definition of a hypergame to help ensure 
complete clarity of the concept. Experience has shown 
(Dando and Sharp, 1977; Wilcox, 1972; Noton, Mitchell 
and Janes, 1974; Bennett and Dando, 1979; Bennett,
1977a, 1977b) that by far the greatest value to be 
obtained from this kind of structural analysis derives
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from the analyst appreciating the structure that is 
proposed and then considering collections of observed 
events in the light of that structure. Game matrix 
analysis is almost prohibitively complex once one moves 
beyond the simple two player system with a very 
limited number of strategies. Even Bennett has not 
been able to make much mathematical sense out of any 
other than two player hypergames. Programming any 
such processing, even if a satisfactory algorithm 
could be agreed, would in any case be a question of 
producing multitudinous incomprehensible variations 
upon a rather simple theme.
The prime value of a hypergame analysis rests with 
its ability to give the researcher a much greater 
range of concept possibilities than he would other­
wise have had. Once he has appreciated the ideas 
proposed in the model, then the nature of his thinking 
about the relation between what he observes and how 
he makes sense of that is significantly changed. He 
is then on the look out for diverse perceptions of the 
situation by the 'players*, which could perhaps help 
to explain otherwise puzzling or 'illogical' outcomes. 
He has at his disposal an improved stock of conceptual 
categories for so doing. We move on now to consider 
the present case in these hypergaming terms.
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3.4 Phases of a Hypergame Analysis
3.4.1 Seeing the Hypergame
The process of attempting to understand some of the 
forces and motives that may have contributed to an 
observed chain of events is necessarily rooted in 
the past experience of the individual concerned. 
Dilthey (1961) has observed that:
"Understanding rests on what we might call an inside 
view of human nature which we all possess. We are 
certainly not all psychologically sophisticated; we 
have not analysed ourselves and traced our motives. 
Indeed, where we think that we know our motives we 
often delude ourselves; a spectator may understand 
them better. Thus we have no privileged psychological 
knowledge. Indeed, we are not talking about psycho­
logical knowledge but about something much more simple 
and fundamental. We know what it is like to be angry 
or happy, to remember or to make an effort towards 
a goal. We also experience certain connections in 
our mental life directly, how a memory may produce 
grief or desire and how such desire may prompt us to 
action.
... The employment of these basic insights allows us 
to understand other people. Such understanding is 
neither mysterious nor infallible. It can be described
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as based on a kind of analogical argument."
Attempting to analyse the events of a case history 
with reference to a particular set of related ideas 
involves this kind of process, and this is partly what 
we mean by ’seeing the hypergame'. We take as a 
starting point some of the things that were said 
about the Bedford Street housing case by some of the 
would-be players.
R is the co-ordinator and chairman of the Housing 
Assessment Team and he had this to say when I asked 
him about the kinds of consideration that he bore in 
mind when trying to work out the best outcomes of 
housing cases in general and the Bedford Street case 
in particular:
"That’s difficult to say. It’s basically a question 
of compromising between all kinds of different 
interests. As far as HAT is concerned, some people 
on the Council and in this department see us as just 
a group of public health inspectors dabbling in 
housing. But we try to look at problems with a wider 
brief than that. The Bedford Street story is a 
good case in point. I mean, as you know, we have 
been following the planning proposals right from 
the beginning and trying to work out our own ideas 
around them. The whole area there has to be
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considered in its entirety, as with all planning 
really, otherwise you get a hotch-potch of develop­
ments with everyone doing their own thing."
I then asked R to what extent he thought that the 
participants in a case such as Bedford Street had 
important personal interests that they would always 
seek to pursue regardless of anyone who was trying 
to mediate in the interests of compromise.
"Everyone has their own hobby-horse of course, 
particularly the councillors. Party politics often 
comes into it, and personalities too. I mean B 
(a labour councillor) will almost always argue with 
anything that G (a woman conservative councillor) 
has to say. And H (a Head of Department) is very 
political with a small p. He is always pushing his 
department in some way, always keen to expand its 
area of influence. I suppose we're the same in a 
way. Nobody likes to appear incompetent do they, so 
we always try to make a professional job of our 
reports and we always try to come down on one side 
or the other and make positive recommendations to 
the committee. Housing Assessment is a comparatively 
new idea as you know, and there are still a number 
of people, particularly around the departments, who 
think that it is all a lot of fuss over nothing.
So naturally I look to my own interests in that way.
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Housing Assessment is now the biggest part of my job 
after all
It is interesting to note from these comments that 
R, although he clearly recognises that individuals 
involved in a particular case will each have their 
own interests to serve (and he doesn't exclude himself 
from this) he at the same time seems to maintain the 
notion that at the middle of it all there is some 
universally recognisable and common problem to be 
solved and that, to a large extent, the people con­
cerned will usually work together, or at least try 
to appear to work together, in trying to thrash it out 
Evidence from other participants in this case suggests 
that this perspective is commonly held. Individuals 
that we spoke to were each
prepared to give and take in the course of both 
formal and informal discussions, on a kind of 
direct transactional basis i.e. to support another 
party in their point of view, always provided that 
this wasn't in direct conflict with their own 
interests and provided that they themselves were 
supported later or had already been supported 
in return.
inclined to hold that, whatever the line that 
they might be vigorously pursuing to further their 
own interests, there was still a common problem 
ground somewhere in the middle that they had some
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kind of official commitment to try and sort out.
This conceptual separation between an individual’s 
and the group's interests is a well researched 
phenomenon (for example, Anderson and Graesser, 1976; 
Black, 1948; Cooper, 1975; Curtis, 1974; Dearborn and 
Simon, 1958; Doise, 1969; Driver and Streufert, 1969; 
Dror, 1968; Hall, Mouton and Blake, 1963; Lewin,
1952; Moscovici, 1969; Shaw, 1932, 1947; Thomas and 
Fink, 1961). Using a gaming analogy, it is almost 
as if an individual and the working group of which he 
is a member could be denoted as separate players in 
the same game. J, the Planning Department's represen­
tative on the Housing Assessment Team alluded to this 
idea in lay terms when I was asking him how he saw 
the outcome of the case developing.
"It is as though I am wearing two completely different 
hats, which is a rather strange idea when you think 
about it. I am a planner by background and also by 
departmental allegiance really. But I also have 
this Housing Assessment part of the job. I mean from 
that point of view this complex of flats that H and 
B are proposing are a good idea. Functional sort 
of housing units and not too expensive - funded by 
private money as well. But they're pretty grim 
looking, you know. It's a terrible shame that people 
have to live in hutches like that. When you think of
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how civilised parts of the city are, and indeed were 
a couple of hundred years ago. We’re going steadily 
backwards really. But people don’t seem to mind.
They queue up for these places actually."
Here, J is reiterating the concept of a bureaucracy 
in the Weberian sense (Weber, 1947). The oft recog­
nised distinction between the individual ’as a person’ 
and ’speaking as a member of ...’ Understanding their 
actions involves understanding these different reference 
points, understanding when you are watching the 
individual and when the member of the organisation.
The two identities can merge together also and indi­
vidual views can be propounded within an organisational 
framework or vice versa. Nowhere is this kind of 
schitzophrenia more common than in the world of 
local government. The officers’ whole training and 
culture rests upon putting aside their own personal 
opinions, aiming to be ’neutral’, ’objective’, ’non­
political ’ . But of course they cannot be and so a 
researcher is always coming up against such 
disclaimers as ’off the record ...’, ’wearing my 
departmental hat ...’, ’speaking as me personally ...’, 
’being non-political now ...’ as markers between the 
bureaucracy and the man.
In the Bedford Street case, the prospective developers 
of the site are perhaps in a clearer cut position
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than anyone else on the question of individual 
interests. They have a plan which they presumably 
believe would be profitable for them to put into 
action. Before they can do this, certain official 
requirements have to be met. Mr H, owner of the 
land in question, saw his objectives quite clearly;
"It's simply business for me. I've had this land 
for a while now - bought it up quite cheaply when 
I had a bit of capital to spare. Then just sat on 
it. I reckoned it couldn't do any harm. I know B 
through the Rotary and he came up with this scheme.
We just want to make a bit of money. You've got to 
find it where you can these days. I think the council 
are basically on our side because the city needs more 
housing in this middle bracket. They've got to be 
seen to going along with the Bath planning principles 
though. It's all hot air though. That whole area is 
not much to write home about. It wouldn't really matter 
a damn what we put up so long as it does the job."
H has a gamelike view of the situation. Conflict 
seems to be part of his analysis; '... the council 
are basically on our side ...' His purpose appears 
to be well-defined; '... We just want to make a bit 
of money ... * He has a model of how an important 
opponent sees the situation; '... got to be seen to 
be going along with the Bath planning principles ... '
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When I spoke with him about the case, he also seemed 
to see it very much in terms of a ’fun' game also 
and was interested in the whole business of weaving 
his way through it much as he might perhaps enjoy a 
game of 'Monopoly'.
The City Council members principally involved with 
this case are those who sit on the Planning Committee 
Disentangling their motives is even more difficult 
than it is for the paid officers. Party politics 
and the rough and tumble of life in the chamber are 
overlaid upon everything else. Some of the comments 
made by the councillors who attended the Planning 
Committee meeting which finally accepted H and B's 
proposals help to throw some light upon this problem;
Councillor H observed;
"If you remember, I was opposed to this scheme at 
our last meeting, but all those residents in the 
area that I have spoken to since then would prefer 
housing development in Bedford Street to industrial 
development. Perhaps it's not such a bad idea after 
all."
Here we seem to have a change of mind apparently 
occasioned by the democratic process of canvassing 
the views of some of the ward members. Perhaps these 
are important participants in Councillor H's view of
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the game. Perhaps her change of mind is a contingent 
strategy to a particular strategy selected by the 
ward members. Unlikely; this would be a far too 
simplistic way to explain her reaction. Firstly, 
to be able to conceive of the ward members as a 
cohesive, strategic group requires stretching the 
imagination a long way. Indeed, one of them that I 
talked to made the following comment:
"Everyone's getting excited over nothing if you ask 
me. Whatever they put on that bit of wasteland would 
be better than the slum it is at the moment. But 
nobody can really see down there anyway, except the 
people in the house next to the Bank. And they're 
such a scruffy shower that they wouldn't really 
notice. Typical council - always getting busy about 
things that don't matter."
Hardly the response of a grand strategist. At the 
same time, having heard Councillor H speak on a 
number of previous occasions, it seems quite likely 
that she is taking the case seriously and does view 
her relationship with the ward members in somewhat 
public-spirited terms. It seems as though she is 
on the council to serve the interests of the public 
and will be largely directed by what they have to say.
Councillor R spoke in favour of the scheme, but his
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view of some of the local residents who had objected 
to the outline proposals was interesting:
"I am sure that this development will improve the 
area for all concerned, even if some of the residents 
don't think so at the moment."
If he sees the residents as participants in some kind 
of game, then he obviously doesn't regard them as 
potentially very influential. It is rather as 
though they are standing on the touchline than actually 
impinging onto the field of play.
Councillor A spoke about her objection to the housing 
proposals;
"Although, as I think I made clear last session,
I am in principle in favour of housing as opposed 
to any industrial development, my objection to this 
particular scheme is about the actual height of the 
proposed blocks of flats. The two main blocks at the 
extreme west end of the site would significantly 
obstruct the view from the nearby properties. Also 
the architecture is frightful and I think that the 
whole question of development on the riverbank is 
one that we ought to be thinking about very seriously 
indeed."
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Here, Councillor A seems to allude to three sets of 
interested parties. The developers themselves, 
residents in nearby houses whose views out to the 
south of the city would be seriously affected by the 
new buildings, and a public at large, who might be 
affected environmentally by uncontrolled development 
along the river bank. In a more immediate sense, 
there is presumably another party figuring somewhere 
in her thinking, i.e. Councillor R, in reply to whose 
last comment she made her own point. At the same time, 
rather like Councillor H, she seems to be operating 
more upon the level of principles than that of strategy. 
Her model of her own role as a councillor is based 
firmly upon the idea of public service. Although, 
as a long serving councillor, she must be attuned to 
the Politics and politics of the chamber, she seems 
to regard these activities as ripples upon the real 
business of deciding upon policy in the public 
interest. As she observed to me;
"Of course you have to get involved in politics, 
with both a large and a small p. But that's not 
really our main business. We are here to work out 
harmonious compromises on behalf of the public. I 
think we all try and bear in mind what is best for 
them in the end."
Following up this line, I asked Councillor A if she
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saw her job as a councillor in terms of a strategist, 
like a general running a war.
"It sometimes feels a bit like that, especially 
when feelings start running a bit high in the chamber. 
You can sometimes be under fire, as it were, from 
everyone at once - your own party, the opposition, 
the public, and they can be pretty ungrateful you 
know. Sometimes you wonder why on earth you're 
doing it all. But in the end, when things calm down,
I think that we're really all on the same side."
It is difficult to conceive of a game of strategy 
in which everyone was on the same side and, hence, 
matching a game-theoretic structure to whatever 
implicit model of interaction that is presumably 
driving Councillor A's behaviour would seem to be 
both difficult and inappropriate.
When we come to consider the reactions of the paid 
officers of the Planning Department, we come across 
similar examples of an apparent unawareness of strategic 
motivations. It is interesting to note a comment 
made to me by one of the planning officers, G, just 
before a meeting of the Planning Committee:
"Well, you'll be able to see some real pantomime 
when the Planning Committee swings into action. If
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you can make any coherent sense out of that bunch 
then you’ll deserve a Ph.D. It's all good slapstick - 
a bit like watching an old film. You're sure you've 
heard those lines somewhere before and you're pretty 
sure what's going to happen next, give or take the 
odd variation."
Any notion of game in his perception of the situation 
was more akin to pantomime than strategic manipulation. 
There are no high stakes with plot and counter plot, 
but only the immediate ramblings of a familiar group 
of people on a Wednesday evening.
J, however, had a different view again;
"Of course, it’s often said that getting something 
through is really a question of who you know. That 
line is over-rated but there's sometimes some truth 
in it. There was a bit of a fracas a couple of years 
back because one of the more influential members had 
been on holiday with a chap who was hoping to get 
clearance to open a small chain of fast-food bars."
When I asked him about the Bedford Street case, though, 
he was inclined to see it in rather uncomplicated terms ;
"I'm sure there is nothing like that going on here, 
though. The stakes are not very high. It doesn't
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really matter to H whether the flats go ahead or not 
I don’t think. The finance side of it sounds a bit 
marginal anyway. What everyone seems to have forgotten 
about in all this are the old cottages themselves, 
which are listed, after all. But they can’t seem 
to hold the councillors’ interest for more than a 
few seconds at a time."
M, another HAT member from the Planning Department, 
had obviously given this question some thought himself. 
He was prepared to offer a theory about how discussants 
appeared to maintain stances which were clearly 
juxtaposed but without any apparent reasons why 
anything other than a state of entropy ought to 
preside.
"It’s a funny thing. You talk about individual 
motives and so on. Most of the time, whether at the 
HAT sessions or at committee meetings or at our own 
departmental gatherings, nobody has much to gain or 
lose one way or the other. But the tension often 
builds up as though it was a summit conference or 
something. It almost seems as though the participants 
are competing for their identities. It's as if their 
own ideas and points of view need to be accepted by 
the others as some kind of confirmation that they 
are real people."
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Here is the suggestion that strategic interactions 
can also include those in which the potential payoffs 
and costs are essentially represented by the support 
or denial of debating positions, even though no 
money or material values attach to or are implied 
by these positions. This seems to be something 
different from the kind of transaction between 
discussion contributions that have, for example, 
been examined in some detail at the Harvard Laboratory 
of Social Relations (Bales, 1950a, 1950b, 1951, 1953; 
Bales, Strodtbeck, Mills and Roseborough, 1951). It 
is not just that we appear to be observing the mutual 
support of points framed in the course of discussion, 
a support that is characterised by an immediate 
gratification of acceptance within the group. It 
is also that individual members may act in a sense 
strategically, in order to maintain and develop a 
system of beliefs and ideas that is vital to them 
personally because it is central to their sense of 
self, and to their ability to understand what is 
happening around them and locate their own efforts 
relative to the activities of everyone else. The 
general purpose is to dispel and to minimise the 
possibilities for 'cognitive dissonance' (Festinger, 
1957).
M also observed that t
"Of course sometimes it just seems as though people
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are competing just for the fun of it or because it 
seems to be the natural thing to do."
This is in support of a view propounded by Goffman 
(1970);
"... persons often don't know what game they are in or 
whom they are playing for until they have already 
played. Even when they know about their own position, 
they may be unclear as to whom, if anybody, they are 
playing against, and, if anyone, what his game is, 
let alone his framework of possible moves. Knowing 
their own possible moves, they may be quite unable 
to make any estimate of the likelihood of the various 
outcomes or the value to be placed on each of them.
And bad moves often lead not to clear-cut penalties 
conceptualized as such, but rather to diffuse and 
straggling undesired consequences - consequences which 
result when persons do something that throws them 
out of gear with the social system."
So that in a working world that is recognised to 
be more or less competitive, perhaps what might be 
called a strategic stance is taken up almost out of 
habit. The strategy is not clearly formulated or 
thought out, those of the dimly observed opponents 
not analysed in careful preparation, the values and 
purpose guiding behaviour and responses not in any
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case at all clear. But each is on his guard against 
attack of some kind, eager to score a point when it 
is possible, anxious to validate his own ideas and 
opinions and to have them recognised by the rest.
When I talked to the tenant of one of the Bedford 
Street cottages, Mr T, he seemed to be expressing a 
view that supported this hypothesis. When I asked 
him whether he felt that his interests were being 
adequately represented by HAT (R had been to see him 
a number of times) and by the Planning Committee 
(two of the member councillors had come round one 
evening), he was both annoyed and resigned:
"I don't know what they're all up to. The chap from 
Housing (R) wanted to know what the councillors had 
asked. The councillors wanted to know if I would be 
interested in moving out to Oldfield Park. And then 
H came along and suggested I might like to move into 
one of his flats. They might never be built, I told 
him, and anyway I couldn't afford his sort of prices. 
It seems to me that everyone's chasing each other's 
tail just for the hell of it and nobody knows what 
they want to do. Even the builder isn't sure whether 
to go ahead or not. Trouble is, we're in the middle 
and we don't know whether we're going to have a roof 
over our heads this time next week."
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We have been concerned in this section of Chapter 3 
with the question of the extent to which the particular 
case under discussion does or does not exhibit any 
of the characteristics associated with Bennett's 
(op. cit.) notion of a Hypergame. As we have explained 
earlier, it is not our intention here formally to 
construct such a system. This is not only a tortuous 
and rather artificial process, but it is also our 
belief that a model like this with the spaces 'filled 
in* is of considerably less explanatory value than a 
discursive interplay between its fundamental concepts 
and the observed events of a case. Bennett (1978) 
noted himself that:
"... it could be objected that the games and stability
criteria were constructed and chosen in such a way
that they had to give the expected and desired results.
Clearly it is impossible to completely disperse this 
suspicion, but it is hoped that the sometimes rather 
lengthy descriptions of players' perceptions do provide 
a basis for critical scrutiny of the problem formu­
lation."
We would argue that it is precisely his 'sometimes 
rather lengthy descriptions of players' perceptions' 
taken together with the concepts surrounding the 
Hypergame, that throw light upon the situation. On 
its own, the bald and necessarily simplistic game
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matrix structure is intriguing but not revealing.
Thus, in the present case, we have brought concepts 
and observations close together to see how each can 
illuminate the other. We are interested to try and 
see the events in the terms of Hypergame and vice 
versa. We continue this process more specifically in 
the next section by considering the question of deciding 
upon the players of a hypergame, and then go on in 
similar vein to look at the definition of outcomes 
and the attribution of aims and strategies.
3.4.2 Selecting the Players
Typically, in game-based analyses of empirically 
observed events, the issue of who are to be taken 
as players of the game is regarded as completely non­
problematic. The traditional game-theoretic frame­
work has as one of its primitive requirements a 
precisely-defined set of participants and the 'analysis' 
proceeds by attributing options, aims and strategies 
to each.
This particular primitive is also a formal requirement 
of the Hypergame. Although this more generalised 
extension of the basic mathematical concept of a game 
allows for players' differing perceptions of their 
opponents* situations, it does not allow that they 
have different ideas about who the players of the game 
are. Yet, in real-life examples of strategic
105
interaction, although individual players may themselves 
have very clear views about who the important partici­
pants are, there need not be either a complete or 
even partial overlap of player sets in this respect.
So that, for example, A may include B in his set of 
players, but B may not necessarily regard A as a 
participant in the same terms. Also, there may be 
a third party, C, known to A but not to B, who is 
having a significant determining effect upon the 
situation in which A and B have an interest. Or D, 
regarded by B but not by A as an important person 
in the affair, may actually be totally without 
material influence, except in so far as B*s belief 
in his power affects his own actions and responses.
So that different "players* may have different ideas 
about who the other players are, and events which 
are highly germane to a particular individual's 
objectives may be triggered by people of whose 
existence he was entirely unaware, i.e. by unknown 
players. The effects of this kind of configuration 
may be quite complex, in that such a participant may 
be forced either to revise his ideas about the 
players, or to attribute unexplained events to 
'chance*, or to assume that one of his set of players 
was responsible.
By the same token, a particular player may have no
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very clear idea about who are the important 'signifi­
cant others’ within a given set of circumstances. He 
may be unsure, that is, about who the rest of the 
players are.
We shall look now at the different and rather loosely 
defined, player sets as they seem to be perceived 
by the five groups of interested parties that we have 
been discussing in 3.4.1.,
i.e. - The members of the Housing Assessment Team; 
R, J and M in particular.
The potential developers of the block of 
flats, Mr H and B ’s Ltd.
The Councillors who sit on the Planning 
Committee; particularly H, R and A.
The officers from the City Planning 
Department, J, G and M.
The families who live in the Bedford Street 
cottages, represented by Mr T.
(i) Players perceived by Members of HAT 
When I asked R who he thought were the people who 
would be significant contributors to the outcome of 
this case, he made the following observations:
"We've got quite a lot of power between us here on 
the team. J and M are the professional planners and 
the committee takes notice of whatever they have to
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say, particularly J, and if the Housing Assessment 
Report also ties in with that, it represents a lot of 
weight. The developers can't do very much themselves 
except keep an eye on how the land is lying and make 
adjustments to their detailed plans as necessary.
At the end of the line is Mr T and the others next 
door who can’t do anything at all except put their 
case when asked. The whole business is really being 
handled by the bureaucrats."
R seems to see 'the professionals' as being the most 
important players within this situation. The 
Councillors have the final say, but will be guided 
by what the officers recommend. J, in particular, he 
sees as a key man whose judgement and opinions will 
carry a lot of weight. R sees the developers as 
players, but players who have essentially to react 
to the moves of the officers and councillors. The 
families who live in the Bedford Street cottages he 
sees as being almost completely powerless. About them, 
R went on to say:
"It's HAT'S business to look after their interests.
We are their representatives and are here to act on 
their behalf. We try to take what we think they 
would like into account in any schemes that we draw 
up."
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In R's terms, the families are subsumed as players 
under the auspices of HAT. They don't really exist 
as separate 'strategic entities' except in so far as 
HAT or the Planners will react to their requests or 
perceived needs.
When I asked J about the players in the case, he
was inclined to attribute more power than R did to the
councillors:
"Sometimes they listen to what we say and sometimes 
they don't. It's a bit of a game of chance and really 
depends on how they feel on the night. One or two of 
them are quite capable of disregarding anything that 
the officers say and going their own sweet way."
J also regarded developers in general as having plenty 
of room to swing events:
"These are the people who in the end can get things 
done after all. They have the money and the motivation 
If we can work with them to design a scheme that is 
beneficial to all concerned, including the city area 
in a very general sense, then that is good news for 
the council. People with proposals like that often 
don't realise how much say they could have. The 
councillors in particular always make it seem as 
though they have the whip hand. But there is often
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quite a bit of room for manoeuvre."
So that it is interesting to note that, even 
between the two most senior and active members of 
the Housing Assessment Team, there is a significant 
difference in who they regard as being the most 
influential players in the game. M, the second 
planning member of HAT, was concerned about the 
power of the families who lived in the cottages;
"They could make a mark in theory, but they don't 
realise it. T could easily start kicking up about 
how the interests of the underprivileged were being 
trodden on by business. The local press would 
lap it up and the council would soon take notice. 
Whereas T could be at the centre of the stage he's 
actually condemned to be a member of the audience."
Here M agrees with R that Mr T cannot be regarded as 
an important player within the system, although he 
does believe that T has the potential to make himself 
one.
(ii) Players perceived by the Developers 
When I asked Mr H about who was likely to be helping 
to determine the future of his scheme, he seemed to 
see the situation as a rather straightforward 
competition between himself and the Planning Committee;
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"It's just a question of whether they take to the 
idea and whether they've got anything to lose or 
gain by it themselves. I don't think they have 
actually in this case. But one or two friends of mine 
who've been in a similar situation have told me a 
few interesting stories. Course you can swing 
things your own way if you know someone on the 
committee, but I don't know any of them."
Bearing J's earlier observations in mind, I asked 
H how he thought the officers in the Planning 
Department could effect the outcome of his application 
He didn't seem to attribute any influence to them 
at allI
"They're just a load of civil servants really, 
shuffling papers about and coming round with a tape 
measure every so often. The councillors do what they 
feel like in the end."
Whereas J had been regarded by R as a significant 
influence upon events, here was H dismissing him as 
a paper shuffler who took the odd measurement now and 
again.
(iii) Players perceived by the Councillors 
One of the characteristics of the Councillor's 
responses to my inquiries was a certain formality
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of response and a general reluctance to stray from 
talking in terms of the 'proper' channels of communi­
cation. Their replies are, nevertheless, informative. 
Councillor H was perhaps the most formal;
"We are sitting in committee to represent the electorate, 
that is, all the inhabitants of the city whatever 
their persuasion, colour or creed. We try to evaluate 
every proposal on its own merits and take into account 
how it contributes to the overall well-being of Bath.
The officers are there to give us impartial professional 
advice although, between you and me, some of them have 
got some pretty weird ideas. They may have planning 
diplomas and this, that and the other, but when it all 
comes down to it, common sense, judgement and a broad 
view are what is required."
Here, it is possible to observe some tension between 
councillor and professional, the latter perhaps being 
regarded by the former as over-theoretical or not 
sufficiently practical. Also, Councillor H sees the 
planning process as principally an interchange between 
the elected representatives and those that they represent 
Those that are applying for any form of planning 
consent are seen as having their case judged in the 
light of an implied set of community standards which 
comprise a diverse set of criteria that requires 
breadth of vision and experience to balance.
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Councillor H has a somewhat paternal view of his 
elected role and does not appear to regard any of 
the participants in cases that come his way as standing 
on strictly equal terms with the committee members. In 
a hypergame sense, he would probably not accord such 
participants the status of 'players'.
Councillor R operates with a similar kind of perspec­
tive. The elected representatives are seen to mediate 
within the melee of conflicting interests that would 
otherwise be pursued anarchically in the community 
'outside*. But her view was different from that of H 
in that she appears to have a sense of strategy as it 
is operated by members of the electorate (although not, 
apparently, by the councillors themselves). When I 
asked her about how the various parties that comprise 
a planning case interact with each other, she gave a 
characteristically 'balanced' reply;
"It .is up to us to try and see fair play and to 
make sure that every relevant interest is taken into 
account. Most of us are aligned with certain party 
views of course, but Local Government tends to be 
more tolerant of different sects than does Central 
Government. We like to give the officers a good 
hearing because they are the professionals and devote 
a lot of time and thinking to their subject. But lay 
opinions are just as important, even if they are often
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not particularly well-considered or thought through. 
What we have to be careful of is business interests, 
because then you can start getting people trampled 
on for the demon profit. It’s still amazing to me 
how devious individuals can become once there is 
some money at stake."
For Councillor R, the 'players’ are the business 
men 'out there' whose behaviour has to be carefully 
watched.
Councillor A's position was that of protector of the 
underdog and, in common with Councillor R, believed 
that business objectives would usually prevail over 
everything else unless there was some specific 
machinery set up to prevent them from doing so. The 
Planning Committee was part of that machinery;
"If everyone had their own way, Bath would not only 
look pretty sordid but the strong would be taking 
advantage over the weak in all sorts of ways. I 
mean in the case you've mentioned, although it 
wouldn't be proper for me to talk about it in any 
detail, I am sure you realise that someone's living 
space is being strongly threatened by a commercial 
development. Commerce must go on of course for us 
all to survive, but at what price, that is what we 
have to decide. The home environment of two families
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is worth an awful lot, to them and, ultimately, to 
everyone else."
None of the councillors that I spoke to about the 
Bedford Street case would discuss the details, since 
the application by Mr H and B's Ltd. was still current 
and sub judice. Their general views of the planning 
process and their own part in it was illuminating, 
however, and there seemed to be some important common 
threads running through each of their perceptions of 
possible players of a hypergame.
Firstly, they tended to dissociate themselves from 
the events of a case. They were the people who looked 
at all the facts and arguments and arrived at some 
compromise 'solution' that took into account the 
variety of interests of those that they represented.
Secondly, strategy and deviousness tended to be 
associated with business and the pursuit of profit. 
Conversely, the ordinary man-in-the-street was 
regarded as basically a good chap, if a little 
helpless, and his interests clearly needed to be 
protected from the inexorable march of commerce, 
which in turn was seen as a necessary evil that 
needed a tight rein.
Thirdly, they, the councillors themselves, were seen
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as having the ultimate power.to decide upon the outcome 
of a case. They were not seen to be negotiating with 
other parties so much as pronouncing verdicts upon 
them.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly from the point 
of view of looking at events with reference to the 
notion of a hypergame, none of the councillors that 
I talked with mentioned any ideas which suggested 
how 'outsiders' might regard the Planning Committee 
and its members. There was no articulated corporate 
self-image and no sense that what they were presented 
to deal with might have something to do with how they 
were perceived both as individuals and as a body.
(iv) Players perceived by the Planners
We have partly covered this category in considering 
J's and M's comments as members of the Housing 
Assessment Team itself. But it was interesting to 
discover some of J's views about his dual involvement 
in this case i.e. as a member of HAT and as a planning 
officer whose professional opinion was being consulted 
in its own right. He seemed to see HAT as a separate 
entity from himself the planner. Could they be, in a 
sense, regarded as two different players?
"HAT takes up about 15% of my time. It is a sort of 
day-to-day, sharp end planning activity really.
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although I'm sure that R would call it something 
different. Each small case gets the same treatment 
and, bit by bit, the city gets tidied up and the 
housing stock improved and increased. Our Housing 
Assessment involves a lot of attention to detail - 
the building regulations, the most tedious tome ever 
written incidentally; tenancy agreements, conditions 
for receiving grants. All that is none of my business. 
I really oughtn't to be there for most of the meetings.
J is distancing himself from the more mundane 
activities of HAT and reinforcing his identity as a 
skilled professional with a wider brief. He went on 
to say;
"If there is ever any conflict between me the planner 
and me the HAT member, it is the planner that prevails. 
Not that it ever comes to that really, since we are 
all working closely together all the time."
It does not appear that J sees HAT and Planning as 
opposing or even distinct forces in any strategic 
sense. But G is not so sure. He is one of the more 
junior planners as regards his location within the 
hierarchy, although not one of the youngest. He has 
some caustic opinions of Local Government Departments 
which he is not slow to voice. He is generally 
popular with the main body of the staff, but not so
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much with the managers;
"Housing Assessment is a bit of a non-job really.
All this fuss about the 'Team' and the departments 
working together. All they're doing is repairing 
a few broken-down houses. M seems to quite enjoy 
it, but then he's a bit of a conservation crank.
J would rather not have anything to do with it. I 
mean with this Bedford Street business, all they're 
doing is whistling in the breeze. The developers 
probably know a couple of the councillors and they'll 
all sort it out between them. The people in the two 
cottages probably don't even want to stay there.
It's a pretty grotty area, let's face it."
On the one hand, G is inclined to the view that R 
and J are in opposing camps of some kind, or at least 
not in the same camp. But on the other, he doesn't 
really believe that there is very much to be opposed 
about. His two significant groups of players in the 
Bedford Street case are the developers and the 
councillors on the planning committee. Even then, 
he sees them as likely to be working together towards 
a mutually acceptable solution rather than being at 
odds with each other. There are no real stakes, he 
seems to be saying, so there is nothing worth getting 
strategic about.
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(V ) Players perceived by the residents of the cottages
The only member of the families that I was able to talk 
to at any length was Mr T, a retired lorry driver who 
lived with his wife and youngest son in the house 
furthest away from the main road and therefore closest 
to the proposed development. He saw almost everyone 
as players except himself, in a game that he couldn't 
begin to understand.
"Nobody tells us what's going on. They're all arguing 
it out among themselves. If they decide to pull these 
cottages down I expect someone will drop in and let us 
know the day before the bulldozers arrive. Heaven 
knows who ever thought of putting a block of flats
down there anyway. It's a bloody crazy idea. I've
told them that the land all along this part of the
river is soggy but nobody listens to me. It's all a
storm in a teacup except they're talking of knocking 
our house down."
T has no strategy himself, no sense of having any 
hand to play. He is only free to observe events and 
fit in with whatever is decided. His view of the 
key figures in the case, H, whom he knows, the planning 
officers, the councillors, is not that they are 
cunningly manoeuvring in pursit of their own interests 
but rather that they are locked into argument for the 
sake of argument. He had already suggested that H
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wasn’t even sure himself whether he wanted to go 
ahead with the scheme or whether it was financially 
viable.
We have been concerned here to consider how each of 
the set of potential players that have selected 
have perceived 'significant others’ (Jones, 1982) to 
be part of the case. We move on now to look at how 
the same group of people visualise some of the possible 
aims and strategies of these significant others and 
how they see the scope for various outcomes to the 
case.
3.4.3 Aims and Strategies
For each of the groups covered in the previous section, 
we have sought to draw together some of their ideas 
about the objectives and likely plans of the other 
participants in the case. It must be understood that 
these all represent our interpretations of what the 
people concerned have said, and even these have been 
summarised for the sake of brevity. As aforementioned, 
we have deliberately avoided the arbitrarily constrain­
ing strategy structure of the hypergame, but have rather 
attempted to use the basic concepts proposed by 
Bennett (op. cit.) to give some perspective to the 
material.
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(i) Aims and Strategies perceived by members of HAT
R's group of main players comprises the local 
government officers, the councillors and the developers 
in probably that order of importance. The officers 
he sees as having essentially bureaucratic aims, laid 
down by their job descriptions and possibly overlaid 
by the desire to do well in order to maintain promotion 
chances. R gets job satisfaction from his own work 
and also attributes that to his colleagues. He 
therefore believes that in making any decisions or 
recommendations, both the planners and the members of 
the Housing Assessment Team will be guided by their 
own professional codes, each of which will influence 
the content of what they will have to say. That is, 
the planners will make planning oriented contributions, 
R and his environmental health officers will be 
concerned with public health issues and the building 
surveyors will confine their recommendations to 
structural matters and the interpretation of the 
building regulations.
R seems to think that the councillors will be guided 
by what the officers have to say. The only personal 
aims that he sees for them are to do with appearing 
competent as councillors and scoring debating points 
at committee meetings, neither of which he believes 
will have much tangible effect upon the eventual 
outcome of the case. The developers he sees as
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having a more or less clearly defined personal interest, 
but as having very little scope for action within 
the confines of the planning regulations. He 
believes that they would like to get their plans 
passed with as little amendment as possible and 
without incurring any significant costs to do with 
any housing provisions for the two families.
J has a less optimistic view of the power of the 
officers than R does. He sees the councillors as 
being rather unpredictable in their reactions to 
recommendations from the departments, "depends on 
how they feel on the night." He believes, like R, 
that their main personal motivations come from a 
desire to put on good performances and have their 
contributions taken seriously and, preferably, agreed 
with. At the same time, he sees most of them as 
being essentially public spirited. As he remarked 
to me :
"They're basically a good bunch, even if some of them 
do go on rather. I think you've got to be a little 
arrogant to be a councillor and it's a real ego trip 
for one or two of them. But I can't really understand 
why they do it. Just as well that somebody does, I 
suppose."
J's perception of the Developers is tinged with
122
scepticism. Although he would like to see some 
improving development in Lhe Bedford '^ t^reet area, 
he doesn't believe that the present scheme is quite 
right or that it is financially sound.
"I reckon that it's all a bit marginal, despite R's 
calculations. I think B knows that as well, but 
they're going for the planning permission to get it 
under their belt. That site is a bit dodgy though.
I wouldn't like to say how far down you'd have to 
pile to reach something solid. That could be quite 
an expensive business."
J ’s view of the officers’ objectives concurs broadly 
with that of R i.e. that they operate within the formal 
guidelines laid down by their departments and 
professionals, much as proposed in Weber's 'Bureau­
cratic Administration' (op. cit.). He differs from 
R in believing that there is considerable scope for 
the interpretation of these guidelines and that 
developers with valuable proposals and good backing 
have the power to negotiate favourable terms with the 
planners. This seems to imply the existence of some 
pressure upon the planners from somewhere to 'get 
things done', a pressure which R does not feel in 
his own line of work.
Finally, h has a view of ti.e situation which might be
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summed up by a comment with which he once finished 
a long plea for the families at one of ihe HAT 
meet i ngs :
"Once again, it seems to be business against the 
innocent rnan-in-t he-street . H and B want to turn a 
bit of profit. T and his family want to live in peace. 
Since T cannot stand up for himself, it's up to us to 
do it for him."
Commerce against the underdog. M believes that the 
developers are out to make a fast pound and don't 
mind who they interfere with along the way. He believes 
that they have the power to lobby both councillors 
and officers in a way that T cannot. T ’s best plan 
is to align himself with the Housing Assessment Team 
who in turn, ought to mediate in his favour. M regards 
the councillors themselves as being fickle, no more 
likely to take one party’s side than any other.
(ii) Aims and Strategies perceived by the Developers
It is probably true to say that Mr H regards the 
officers of the Planning Department as being, to all 
intents and purposes, aimless, "... They're just a 
load of civil servants really, shuffling papers about 
and coming round with a tape measure every so often."
He doesn't believe that they can have any serious 
influence on the out come of the case at all. The
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c'ouiK'i 11 o rs arc his rna in stumbling block, as he sees 
ll . Mil il dig ;;ot S( >( la I o ! ia\'e any c lea r idea about 
what motivated l Iw la . He clearly found it difficult to 
comprehend the satisfactions of local government 
politics :
"Can’t fathom what they're up to at all. Hours and 
hours talking about the same old sorts of subjects.
It has got to be done I suppose, but it doesn’t seem 
that important and some of them get so worked up.
It wasn't as if they got paid. Perhaps they just like 
hearing the sounds of their own voices."
B, proprietor of B ’s Ltd., had had a lot of dealings 
with the council in his many years working in and 
about the city. His line was that it is all really a 
guestion of getting on with the people concerned:
"Very occasionally you come across a councillor with 
business interests that may clash or coincide with 
yours. But it doesn't happen very often, and even when 
it does they tend to declare themselves and not get 
involved. But if they take to you and you can get on 
with them, then what would otherwise be obstacles can 
be eased away. They’re an OK crowd really, one or 
two are a bit pompous but usually their hearts are 
in the right place."
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B's own strategy for dealing witli the councillors 
is to get to know se\'e rri 1 of i hr'iii and then t o ca rry 
out his gentle di pic; mac y tlirongf, lh('se personal 
contacts. There is no suggestion here that there 
is any kind of improper collaboration over the scheme. 
It is simply that B believes that if some of the 
councillors know and like him, then the chances of his 
scheme being passed will be significantly increased.
His implicit model of how the councillors carry out 
their evaluation seems to assume that they are 
inclined to favour a well thought through proposal 
which has been carefully put together by a decent sort 
of citizen who seems to know what he is talking about.
"If the thing first of all looks tasteful, or fits in 
with the general area, that's the first hurdle. Then 
it needs to seem to make financial sense, be well 
backed and look as though it will get finished. One 
of the most important bits of that guestion is what 
sort of bloke they reckon they're dealing with."
Here B is imputing to the councillors a way of 
thinking that is often associated with the small 
business man i.e. that the most important aspect of 
any working deal is to know your man. This is partly 
a guestion of whether there is a basis for mutual trust 
and, hence, whether both parties feel comfortable 
about going ahead with the arrangement, since both
12b
will presumably be taking sonu' risks. But il is also 
a qiK'Stitjn ol L'f : icit -ncy i n  t he mat  l o t  o ;  c U ' a l i n o  wi. I h 
complexity. If each side ' knows his m<m , ’ i hen a lot 
of details can be left to each other to handle without 
their having to be raised explicitly.
When I asked B about the families in t lie two cottages, 
not only did he not regard them as a problem; he seemed 
to think that they would benefit significantly from 
being forced to move out:
"Those places are damp and crumbling and nobody ought 
to be living in them. They're well under the regu­
lations and, to be quite honest, it isn't worth
anybody's money to bring them up to scratch. Listed
they may be, but then so is most of the older stuff in
this city. Quite a lot of that is not worth keeping 
either. I'd lay you a case of Scotch that both T and 
the family next door would be happy for an excuse to 
be moved at someone else's expense."
(iii) Aims and Strategies perceived by the Councillors
We have seen how the councillors on the Planning 
Committee maintain a degree of distance from those 
involved in presenting them with proposals, or recom­
mendations about proposals. The likely strategists 
as far as they are concerned seem to be businessmen 
submit liny planning proposals that endeavour !o
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minimise any costs assoc:iatc'd with unnecessary 
aesl-hetics or malcliincj ! o I ho 1 mmeci i n t o on v L ronmeni .
Some of t:;e gamesmanslii.p in such cases lies in how 
the schemes are presented. Making a proposed develop­
ment look stunning on paper is an important skill of 
the architect. Enticing graphics and c 1 C'Ver advert­
ising are what the councillors have to take in and 
visualise in practice. On this subject, Councillor R 
commented that;
"Some of them can make the most boxy, thrown together, 
cut-to-the-bone development look like something out of 
Country Life. And the imagination of the copy-writers 
knows no bounds. That is what we're really trying to 
get behind, that and some idea of the backing so as we 
can estimate the likelihood of the thing being finished. 
There's nothing more unsightly than building work 
standing for ages half-finished because of lack of 
finance."
For Councillor R , the gloss on a written proposal is 
a form of strategy that it is her business to interpret. 
For Councillor H, a different kind of gloss coming 
from the planning officers also represents strategy 
in a similar kind of way. In his view, the professional 
planners are often trying to score points over the lay 
councillors by dressing their recommendations and 
( 'omment s in technical jargon;
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"They'll often try and appear a bit cleverer than us. 
Some of my colleagues are intimidated by some of the 
planning department reports, but a lot of it is just 
hot air. I mean, not only do we have to get behind 
the blarney of the architects, but the people who 
are supposed to be there to help us are at it as 
well. I sometimes think they're a bit desperate to 
justify their jobs."
Councillor A did not appear to have the same sense 
of being surrounded on all sides by deception, although 
she was strongly aware of the pressures from business 
interests and was mindful of a need to keep them 
under control. Her view of such interests was not 
that they would always per se involve some deception 
on the part of the protagonists, but that the built-in 
incentives to succeed would somehow almost automatically 
ensure that those interests were cast as vitally 
important to all concerned and always presented in a 
favourable light against all other lobbies:
"The developers that we come across have a way of 
putting things that is almost second nature to them.
It is salesmanship I suppose, but it seems to carry 
forward into everything that they do. They don't 
even know that they're doing it half the time. But 
we must never allow ourselves to be taken in by it."
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Not necessarily strategists, but salesmen whose 
slippery line needs to be handled with care. Whatever 
the intentions of the developers are, the councillors 
believe that their representations need careful 
decoding.
(iv) Aims and Strategies perceived by the Planners
We consider only G here, as J and M were covered under 
the Housing Assessment Team. As was noted in 3.4.2 (iv), 
G's two significant players in the Bedford Street case 
are the developers and the councillors on the planning 
committee. But he did not, apparently, see the inter­
action in strategic terms. He did, however, regard the 
two parties as having different, although not irrecon­
cilable, interests*
"The developers want to get their plans passed, even 
if they're not too sure at the moment whether they 
would want to go ahead. It always adds to the value 
of the land anyway. They'd rather not have to make 
lots of resubmissions because that's all expense, 
what with the admin, and the architect's fees and so 
on. Then the councillors would like to see something 
that is an improvement over what is already there.
They are the guardians of the public standards. But 
in a way, they're on the developers' side as well 
if the scheme looks good enough."
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G's view of tlie developers' scope for action was 
tliat t ie-y conld presenL t hoi r ease more or lopir 
convincingly or professionally, but that that was 
about the extent of their room for manoeuvre. When 
I asked him about the difference that it might make 
by knowing some of the councillors personally, he 
was inclined to think that the effect was marginal;
"It doesn't seem to make much odds. In fact with 
the sort of people that you've got on the council, 
you can find that they'll bend over backwards to seem 
to be impartial and you might actually get a better 
deal if you din't know any of them."
(v) Aims and Strategies perceived by the Families
1 asked Mr T who he thought was trying to get what 
out of this case;
"I'm not sure that anyone really knows. 1 suppose 
B and H thought they might be able to make a bit - 
1 mean it's always good to have property isn't it.
1 don't think that H knew what he was letting himself 
in for though. If he knew he was going to have this 
much hassle, he wouldn't have bothered 1 reckon. B's 
a bit different of course, it's his bread and butter 
after all."
1 then asked him what he thought, toe council would like
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to see happen on the Bedford Street site:
"They can't make up their minds, that's the truth of 
it. But so long as there's something there to argue 
about, they'll keep on at it. It doesn't really matter 
to them one way or the other."
It is difficult to attribute any sense of strategy 
to Mr. T. It is not just that he cannot work out what 
everyone else is trying to achieve. He also doesn't 
believe that the other 'participants' know themselves. 
His view of the councillors is that they will continue 
to keep on talking just so long as there is something 
on the agenda, but that none of them has any real 
interest in the outcome of the case.
3.5 Summary Conclusions
We now summarise below some important conclusions 
arising from our application of Hypergame concepts 
to the empirical data provided by this particular 
HAT case. Further discussion and consideration is 
given in chapter 8, section 8.3.
Explanatory Description
The principal and significant value of the Hypergame 
model from a research point of view is that it 
provides a systematic framework for generating 
commentary, description and conclusions from raw data.
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Each primitive element of the Hypergame focuses 
attention on a different aspect of the material and 
provides a triangulation point for the generation 
of meaning.
The Structure of Conflict
The Hypergame framework posits the basic elements of 
a strategic interaction. The 'gaps' are not filled 
in however. This can only happen when the data and 
the structure are brought together. Although it is 
probably true to say that there is a presumption of 
conflict in the formulation of the model, it is not 
true that by using the model we can only see and 
deal with conflict. The notion provides a kind of 
base-line from which aspects of conflict, non-conflict 
and degrees of conflict can be given perspective.
Definitions of the Situation
Probably the most valuable contribution that Bennett's 
notion of a Hypergame makes to the game theory and 
conflict literature is to formally recognise that 
different participants in a strategic interaction 
will have, in general, different perceptions of the 
circumstances of the interaction and different ideas 
about the aims, strategies and preferences of each 
other. This is an important starting point for useful 
and realistic analysis, but one which has not been 
reached hitherto in game theory.
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What the structure then demands, of course, is an 
informed basis for filling in the gaps, that is, 
for attributing purpose, preferences and strategies 
to the players. This is the difficult part of the 
process, but one for which game theory itself has no 
hint of a solution. We are thrown away from the 
structure, which represents an initial statement of 
a research problem, and back towards the task of 
discovering the social meanings contained within the 
data. For that we need plenty of good data, which 
game theorists have in the past been more or less 
content to do without.
Definition of Player Sets
We find empirically that, in order to correspond 
more closely with real-life situations, the Hypergame 
model requires a further extension of its perceptual 
'degrees of freedom' . It was apparent in the present 
research that the various participants had different 
ideas about who were the other significant parties in 
the interaction. Hence the Hypergame needs, strictly, 
to define a number of, in general, non-congruent player 
sets. Any possibility of a meaningful mathematic 
analysis, based upon the manipulation of strategy 
matrices, would probably then have to be given up for 
good. Bennett has suggested that this is difficult 
enough for straightforward two player hypergames.
The further insight from applying the idea qualitatively
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could be valuable, however, and we have demonstrated 
this in our own analysis.
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4. A COLLECTIVE PURPOSE MODEL FOR THE HOUSING ASSESSMENT
TEAM
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will examine the hypothesis that 
a decision-making group such as the Housing Assessment 
Team carries out its work against a pervading sense of 
both collective and corporate purpose; that the indi­
vidual members will largely concur in their understanding 
of these purposes; and that they will act and debate 
in a more or less 'rational* way to further these 
objectives that are principally associated with 
official or group functions outside their own 
personal domain.
We look first at some of the dimensions of the concepts 
of collective and corporate purpose and consider how 
they might relate to more individually based objectives. 
In particular, we consider some of the ways in which 
these concepts seem to be applied in different circum­
stances within the world at large.
We then go on to extract some formulations of collective 
and corporate purpose for the Housing Assessment Team, 
drawing on some of the discussions relating to the 
Bedford Street case set out in the last chapter. The 
intention here is to try and uncover the part that 
these notions may play in determining the choices
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and judgements made by the team members. Searching, 
as it does, for various points of congruence of 
the motives of some of the participants, this chapter 
attempts to add perspective to the last which, 
conversely, was more concerned to highlight differences 
of interest that might be expressed in terms of strat­
egic behaviour.
4.2 On the nature of Collective and Corporate Purpose
It is clearly important to consider the distinction 
between corporate or bureaucratic purpose in Weber's 
organisational sense (Weber, op. cit.) and the kind 
of formulation of group objectives that may occur 
either completely outside the context of formal 
administrations or within a local sub-group convened 
under the auspices of an existing bureaucracy. March 
and Simon (1958) have noted that;
"The bureaucracy is a set of relationships between 
offices, or roles. The official reacts to other 
members of the organisation not as more or less unique 
individuals but as representatives of positions that 
have specified rights and duties. Competition within 
the organisation occurs within closely defined limits; 
evaluation and promotion are relatively independent 
of individual achievement."
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This pure concept of bureaucracy must be regarded as 
an analytical type and appears in practice in various 
stages of dilution. Its most fundamental characteristic 
is the backing and demands of a ’legal' authority, 
of which Weber (op. cit.) has observed;
"... obedience is owed to the legally established 
impersonal order. It extends to the persons exer­
cising the authority of office under it only by virtue 
of the formal legality of their commands and only 
within the scope of authority of the office."
Corporate objectives which have no foundation in a 
formal organisation but which are rather understood 
and recognised in terms of either collective interests 
or of group membership have a more elusive nature.
The allegiance accorded them by participating indi­
viduals and the ways in which they are referenced are 
much more difficult to uncover than explicit or implied 
rules of bureaucracy.
Collective purpose models of group decision-making 
are of particular interest insofar as they coincide 
with many popular and widely held views of how groups 
at work do and, even more pervasively, how they should 
go about their business. Political rhetoric bandied 
about by politicians and men-in-the-street alike is 
rife with such expressions as 'what Britain ought to
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be doing,’ ’industry now needs to move forwards,' 'the 
union has now decided.' There is the implicit assump­
tion, at least in the formulation of such expressions 
if not in their understanding, that the people of 
Britain, those who are involved in industry, the 
members of the union, each recognise a common corporate 
policy and are then able and willing to act in concert 
in its execution. A quotation taken almost at random 
from a recent edition of The Guardian illustrates this 
point further:
"It has transpired that the internal accord was not 
the panacea to the country's political ailments. Some 
would say that it has worsened the plight of the 
country's seven million people. Fragmentation of the 
nationalist movement has continued until, today, there 
are a plethora of political groupings whose policies 
militate against a 'national' solution. Party 
politics among the blacks have degenerated into 
intimidation and thuggery, some of the culprits 
proving an embarrassment to their party leaders in 
the courts."
Perusal of this short extract will reveal a number 
of notions and assumptions about corporate objectives. 
First, there is the idea of the corporate body 
'country', as expressed in 'the country's political 
ailments', an idea with numerous parallels in
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contemporary political discourse within the UK, for 
example in the commonly used expression 'the state 
of Britain today'.
'The plight of the country's seven million people' is 
another such expression, as is 'a plethora of political 
groupings whose policies (my emphasis) militate against 
a national solution'. '
It is of course easy enough to case such concepts in 
a somewhat illusory light to underline the apparent 
crassness of grouping seven million people together 
and giving them a plight, to enquire caustically what 
it really means to talk about a country's political 
ailments, or to point to the real inherent conflicts 
that exist between many of those individuals working 
to generate 'the state of Britain today'. Yet it is 
a part of our thesis that, vague and simplistic as 
such ideas can be argued to be, they nevertheless 
hold a significant position in everyday discourse 
and therefore can hardly be ignored as being unreal.
In the present context, they appear to be effective 
currency with the members of countless decision-making 
groups such as the Housing Assessment Team and clearly 
cannot be dismissed, therefore, as mere abstract ideals.
It is interesting to consider one or two hypothetical
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examples of groups in action and to suggest how or 
if a group objective might have meaning for the 
members or for an outside observer.
'Survival' groups are rather extreme examples of 
collectives which might ostensibly operate with a 
clearly recognizable common purpose. Half a dozen 
survivors from a shipwreck, say, drifting about the 
ocean in a liferaft with a limited supply of food 
and water. Is it possible for an outside observer 
to formulate a common purpose for the group and how 
reasonable would it be to attribute such a purpose 
to the members? On the face of it, each individual 
is at least likely to hold for himself the objective 
of survival. This is a particularly human trait, 
although it could still possibly be the case that one 
or any of the members would regard the prospect of 
death in this way with some relief. He might be 
suffering from an incurable and increasingly painful 
disease, or perhaps he was previously in such a state 
of depression as to have been in any case contemplating 
suicide. Such a member would have a fundamentally 
different orientation to his circumstances than the 
others who were desperate to live, and the notion of 
a group objective would be difficult to define.
Even granted, though, that each person in the lifeboat 
was keen to survive, it is not immediately clear that
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ve can formulate this simply as a collective purpose. 
Theoretical conflicts of interest in Vickers' sense 
(op. cit.) can be perceived by an outsider but these 
may or may not be perceived by the members. Each, 
for example, is clearly in competition with the others 
for the limited reserves of food and water. If a 
member were to kill the rest of his companions in the 
lifeboat, he would be able to live for very much 
longer than if he were to share these resources in the 
normal, morally acceptable way. On the other hand, 
notwithstanding the question of food and water, it 
might be the case that the increased morale to be 
gained from having companions to talk to is, and would 
be perceived as being, an important survival factor.
Individual differences in the definition of the situ­
ation can complicate the concept of a group objective 
although they never seem to quite dissolve it. The 
ship's padre, a member of the lifeboat party, might 
not perceive any conflict between the members of the 
group, and could even be thinking in terms of sacri­
ficing himself for the good of the others. Someone 
else may have calculated very coldly and precisely 
his best chances of survival with respect to each of 
the others.
There are situations in which it is clearly in most 
of the members' interests that a particular action is
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carried out. When a ship is sighted on the horizon, 
all who are keen to survive would probably agree that 
they ought to try and attract its attention. Yet 
although we might interpret this as a realistic piece 
of corporate policy, the execution of this policy 
might be a considerable source of disagreement. Should 
they let off all their flares together in the hope 
of creating a significant effect? Should they let 
off one flare first and see what happens? Is the 
ship in any case too far off to see any flares and 
so should these be saved against the occasion of another 
ship passing closer to the liferaft?
It is not always easy for members of groups (or 
theorists about groups) to conceptually separate what 
looks like a corporate objective which none will 
dispute, from executive strategies which are a matter 
of policy interpretation and a potential source of 
disagreement.
Another example of a survival group is an army platoon 
on active service. Again, the threat of death is 
common to those members as it was in the previous 
example and a 'common enemy* might be recognised in 
both situations - the sea in the former case, the 
opposing forces perhaps in the latter. But here, the 
notion of the opposing army is itself a somewhat 
reified and collective concept. Writers about war
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have often discussed the strange disparity between the 
abstract 'enemy* and the man 'just like you' but from 
the opposite side who stands before the soldier when 
the time for action comes. The notion of 'the enemy' 
does presumably provide some cohesion when used in the 
abstract for training purposes within the armed forces, 
and it is clearly a concept of some significance to 
troops contemplating a period of real action. It 
might well be a widely shared objective of a fighting 
company to * destroy the enemy*. An articulated task 
such as this provides a basic raison d*etre for the 
group. Yet, when an individual soldier is faced with 
one of 'the enemy' firing back at him, what then 
happens to any notion he might have of the group 
objective and, indeed, to his notion of the group. 
Self-interest may then predominate, although there 
are many examples of heroic behaviour which are 
difficult to explain except in terms of some ideal 
group objective taking priority over self-interest 
(unless self-interest is itself defined in such a way 
as to incorporate the satisfaction of an important 
'heroic value').
The board of directors of a company provides a closer- 
to-home example of the kind of situation that can 
engender complex relationships between self-interest 
and group interest. In many analyses of political 
behaviour in such committees, what might be described
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as a naive cynical perspective often pays close attention 
to the inherent conflict between, say, company board 
members, to the diversity of their individual interests 
and to the *politicking * that is carried out to try and 
ensure that these interests prevail.
Yet in very few such meetings will it be impossible 
to identify abstract 'personalities' founded within a 
bureaucratic framework and with demands that require 
attention. The Company, the Department, the Shareholders, 
the Public, even the Board, may appear as referents in 
the discussion, referents which carry a significant 
amount of authority.
The marketing director may well have strong personal 
interests relating to career, status, private wealth 
and so on, but may recognise that these can be pursued, 
may probably be best pursued and possibly even only 
pursued by paying attention to the requirements of 
the corporation. Almost all of those who work within 
organisations appear to have some conception of the 
identity of 'the organisation', if only as a triangu­
lation point for their own position. "When asked, many 
may apparently be working to further what they believe 
to be the 'good of the company'. It is always possible, 
of course, to link definitions of self and corporate 
interest by asserting, for example, that the conscien­
tious secretary who works unpaid overtime and doesn't
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even have the satisfaction of having someone know about 
it, is acting in a self-interested way because by 
doing the overtime she keeps ahead of her work and 
hence reduces personal stress, or perhaps, one could 
even argue, to indulge a personal 'value* for good 
hard protestant endeavour.
Our board of directors, like the shipwrecked mariners, 
may also have some conception of a 'common enemy' and 
recognise that there will be situations in which they 
will be better off individually by sticking together 
and presenting some kind of common front to, say, a 
threat from the shareholders, or a union, or the press.
"What we have been trying to point to thus far is the 
apparently complicated relationship between a group 
member's self-interest and his conceptions of and 
reaction to a corporate or collective interest.
Haworth (1959) has discussed this issue, which is at 
once an important philosophical question and a real 
practical problem in trying to uncover the predominant 
determinants of a group decision.
"One of the levels on which the long-standing dispute 
between reductivists and non-reductivists is going on 
is the level of social organisations. In a general 
way, the problem concerns the relation of men with 
organisations of men. On one side, it is contended
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that only individuals act, and organisations are only 
men organised. On the other side, we find what is 
often felt to be a mystical insistence that organis­
ations are entities in themselves apart from the men 
who make them up, and that these organisations act."
One of the important assertions of our own thesis is 
that these two perspectives ought not to be regarded 
in dichotomous or mutually exclusive terms. That,is, 
it is quite possible for self interest to be pursued 
by members of a group who have, at the same time, a 
strong conception of the group and of group objectives, 
together with the motivation to achieve group 
objectives, sometimes at their individual expense.
Haworth (op. cit.) goes on to say something about the 
obligations which an individual may feel towards 
'his organisation'I
"When an individual becomes involved with an organis­
ation, his involvement is not totally indefinite. It 
is, rather, specific in the sense that he acquires 
a function which is integral with the organisation's 
system of functions. The relation with the organis­
ation which is thereby realised has, from the 
standpoint of the organisation, two complementary 
sides. Looking in one direction, we can say that 
the relation creates a duty (my emphasis). In the
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first case, the specific involvement with the 
organisation implies that the individual will be 
provided with all of the means for the performance 
of his function which the organisation has to offer. 
Provision of these means grounds a right to perform 
that function, where 'right' means both capacity and 
authority. In the second case, the specific involve­
ment with the organisation implies that the individual's 
performance of his function is anticipated by the 
system of functions in the sense that it can achieve 
its characteristic result only on condition that he 
does perform that function. The expectation is struc­
tured (my emphasis) and thereby grounds a duty to do 
that which his specific involvement entails."
A decision-making group such as the Housing Assessment 
Team clearly cannot sustain itself on the basis of 
self-interest alone. Each of the members has entered 
into and, more significantly, believes himself to have 
entered into contract with 'the organisation' . He has 
been provided with certain rights and there is the 
expectation, even if sometimes only in himself, that 
he will perform certain duties. This contract will 
be difficult to disregard in the course of daily 
business.
Simon (1964) has noted that:
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"... we often have occasion to observe that the goals 
that actually underlie the decisions made in an 
organisation do not coincide with the goals of the 
owners, or of top management, but have been modified 
by managers and employees at all echelons. Must we 
conclude, then, that it is the goals of the latter - 
of subordinate managers and employees - that are 
governing organisational behaviour? Presumably not, 
because the kinds of behaviour taking place are not 
those we would expect if the managers and employees 
were consulting only their personal goals. The whole 
concept of an informal organisation, modified by, but 
not identical with, the goals either of management 
or of individual employees, becomes hazy and ambiguous 
if we follow this path."
Simon here reinforces our point that the relationship 
between self-interest and group or corporate interest 
may be a complicated one. In this discussion of complex 
motives, it is also appropriate to question the extent 
to which individuals are, in any case, motive-driven 
and, if they are, to consider the nature of the 
relationship between motives and action. There is 
the theoretical danger here that the concept of motive 
can be constructed as an intermediary explanatory 
variable that has no empirical reference.
Simon (op. cit.) goes on to say that:
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"If by motivation we mean whatever it is that causes 
someone to follow a particular course of action, then 
every action is motivated - by definition. But in 
most human behaviour the relation between motives and 
action is not simple: it is mediated by a whole chain 
of events and surrounding conditions."
Parsons (1965) highlights the interactive and dynamic 
nature of the relationship between motives and actions 
when he says:
"The essentials of the interaction situation can be 
illustrated by any two-player game, such as chess.
Each player is presumed to have some motivation to 
participate in the game, including a "desire to win". 
Hence, he has a goal, and relative to this, some 
conception of effective "strategies". He may plan an 
opening gambit but he cannot carry advance planning 
too far, because the situation is not stable* it is 
contingent on the moves made both by himself and by 
his opponent as the game proceeds. The basic facilities 
at his command consist of his knowledge of the 
opportunities implicit in the changing situation; his 
command of these opportunities means performance of 
the adaptive function. Hence, at the goal attainment 
and adaptive levels, goals are defined and facilities 
are provided, but specific acts are not prescribed."
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An implication here is further uncertainty for the 
social researcher trying to relate the complex motives 
of a decision-making group to the outcomes that he 
observes. Parsons underlines the notion of contingency, 
and the kind of model that he thereby implies for 
explaining group-generated outcomes is almost a 
parallel to the statistical notion of the Markov 
Chain. The researcher is then faced with such questions 
as:
"If A had spoken before B, would C have then said 
something different and not reacted in the way that 
he did? and would D then have remained silent instead 
of disagreeing with B?"
Or
"Supposing that B*s car had broken down this morning 
and he had been unable to get to the meeting. Would 
D have made his point so strongly? How might that 
have affected the final decision?"
It is important here to highlight the difference 
between what the statics and the dynamics of the 
situation are. In thinking about the nature of group 
objectives, it is on the one hand necessary to ask 
whether or not we think the concept has any empirical 
meaning and then what form group objectives take
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for the members of the team. These are part of the 
statics of the group, what have been called elsewhere 
its purpose characteristics (Cumberlidge, 1978). Then, 
on the other hand, we can examine the way in which 
the statics relate to each other in the process of 
determining an outcome, i.e. the dynamics of a 
particular decision. As Gross (1969) has pointed out, 
there may be difficulties in matching the statics 
with the dynamics or, in his terms, the intentions 
with the activities.
"... measurement of the gaols of the organisation 
requires a combination of the two measures of 
intentions and activities. We start with intentions 
as the basic measure and compare intentions with data 
on activities. In the usual condition they should 
support each other. Actual goals will then represent 
a type of average between these two measures when they 
are not too far apart. It is possible that there will 
be two kinds of divergence;
1. A goal may rank high as an intention but be only 
minimally evident in activities. Such a goal we 
call utopian. This condition indicates something 
that the members say they are trying to attain 
but are doing little actually to achieve it ...
2. A goal may be rated low as an intention but be 
much in evidence in activities. Such a condition 
indicates the presence of an unstated goal. Persons
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may be unaware of this goal, be ashamed of it, or 
be unable or unwilling to talk about it."
Gross's last point again raises two important problems. 
First, that of drawing inferences about intentions 
from actions and, second, that of the status of 'goal' 
or 'motive' as a determinant of outcomes. Is it 
meaningful or useful to suggest that an individual might 
have a goal of which he is unaware?
Following on from this introductory discussion of the 
possible nature of a 'group objective' we turn back 
now to the case study outlined in 2.2 of the previous 
section and attempt, for a number of different groups 
involved in that case, to explain events in terms of 
a driving corporate rationale.
In order to lend substance to some of these ideas, 
we move on now to consider some articulations of 
corporate and collective purpose by members of the 
Housing Assessment Team. These expressions emerged 
in the course of the series of HAT meetings dealing 
with the Bedford Street case and from subsequent 
discussions with individual members.
4.3 Discovering Collective Purpose
The objectives of the Housing Assessment Team do not 
appear anywhere in any formal form, unlike most committees
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which invariably have some kind of terms of reference 
set down somewhere, usually in the minutes of the first 
meeting. R, who had an important hand in starting 
the team, supplied the following list of objectives 
that he said that he works to both in an executive 
sense and as the chairman controlling the discussions 
at the HAT meetings.
4.3.1 R's statement of the objectives of HAT
(i) To keep up to date with properties within the 
city area that require attention by the Housing 
Assessment Team.
(ii) For each property on this list;
(a) classify as fit or unfit for housing in 
accordance with the criteria contained in 
Section 4 of the Housing Act 1957.
(b) If fit for housing, report to that effect and 
remove from the list. If unfit for housing, 
catalogue defects, suggest alternative 
means by which these defects could be made 
good and select the best alternative with 
reference to (iii)
(iii) When deciding upon the best way in which to bring 
unfit housing up to the standard required by the 
Act, to try and weigh up the following;
the cost to the council, including rehousing
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costs.
The quality of the renovation, with respect 
to the body carrying out the works. 
the well-being of the occupants of the 
property.
the middle and long-term housing requirements 
of the city, as defined at the time, 
the value of conservation versus demolition 
the overall quality of the surrounding 
environment.
building regulations, as laid down by the Act. 
aesthetic considerations.
When R presented me with this statement, he also made 
the following supporting comments;
"All these criteria have got to be balanced and 
weighed according to the individual circumstances.
That is our job, it's where the skill and experience 
come in. We're all professional really, answerable 
to our own departments and what their objectives are.
But we are also working for the people of the City and 
we bear this in mind all the time. Sometimes it's 
possible to cut through a lot of red tape in particular 
cases."
Here, R seems to be accepting the bureaucratic 
objectives of his own department as important guidelines
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for action, but he will ’interpret' these if they 
appear not to best further the interest of 'the City’ 
in particular situations. The City appears here almost 
as a second authority to which he feels obliged to 
defer, within the principal constraints imposed by 
the authority of his own department.
It is instructive to consider similar statements by 
J and D. J is the senior planning department represen­
tative on HAT and D the senior valuer. We have singled 
out these members for individual analysis since they do 
much of the talking at HAT meetings and carry most 
of the authority; they are, with R, the most significant 
contributors to the output of the team.
4.3.2 J's statement of the objectives of HAT
J provided the following structure when I asked him 
for some thoughts on the purpose of the Housing 
Assessment Team:
(1) HAT'S basic function is to see that property in 
Bath that is unfit for habitation is brought up 
to the standard required by the 1957 Housing 
Act and its subsequent amendments.
(2) There are usually a number of alternative ways 
that I
(a) necessary work can be financed and
(b) the 'conversion* itself can be carried out.
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Although the Act itself provides the primary
guidelines for action, other considerations need
to be borne in mind viz»
(a) The particular needs of existing inhabitants
(b) The size of the City's housing stock e.g.
if a complete terrace of six houses is deemed 
to be unfit, considerable flexibility may 
exist as to how many housing units can be 
produced in the final scheme and how many 
bedrooms can be contained within each unit.
(c) The planned future for the area in which the 
property lies. If a particular zone has 
been set aside for light industrial develop­
ment, then this may well affect the way in 
which HAT deals with the future of housing 
units standing within that zone. (J also 
commented that in the City of Bath and its 
environs there are many examples of 'mixed 
development* e.g. short terraces of Artisan* 
housing tucked in behind factories, or light 
industrial workshops standing in ostensibly 
residential areas.)
(d) The aesthetics of the area in which the 
property stands and of the property itself 
as a building.
(e) The cost of the various alternatives, 
bearing in mind the total 'economic* cost 
to the community and the actual cost to
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the council itself, including consideration 
of any rehousing that may be necessary, 
either temporary or permanent.
J appears to see the appropriate Housing Acts as 
providing the core 'purpose* of the team (i.e. item 
(1) above) and that within any flexibility allowed by 
the Act, or by money available, or wherever there is 
a non-f inancially-dependent choice between ways of doing 
things, then the considerations summarised in (2) 
should be satisfied as far as possible.
Further discussion with J revealed that he saw his 
professional concern and the concern of his department 
as resting primarily with (c) and (d). He later 
revealed that he had a particular personal interest 
in (d) and interpreted aesthetics to include a 
historical perspective i.e. he has an interest in 
maintaining properties which have about them 'signi­
ficant* architectural singularities.
Although J was prepared to formulate a set of corporate 
objectives for the Housing Assessment Team, the 
institution with which he seems to identify is not 
HAT, not Local Government in general, not the City 
of Bath, but is rather the planning profession itself 
and the principles that he believes that it stands for. 
Planning provides his work identity and also some of
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his 'extra-curricula' interests. He commented to 
me that ;
"I'm a Planner first and foremost. It's always been 
what I wanted to do. I think it becomes more and more 
important as our society becomes more developed and 
complicated. It's difficult to say who the Planners 
are working for. The community as a whole I suppose. 
We're trying to fit in everyone's interests in the 
best possible way. An impossible task really."
J's reference to The Community is in some ways similar 
to R's concern with The City. These stated goals may, 
perhaps, be Utopian in Gross's sense, but they seem 
pervasive in what these two members have to say about 
their jobs.
In order to articulate ideas relating to collective 
purpose J, like R, refers back to a formal and author­
itative source, the Housing Act. When he then starts 
to elaborate on this purpose he draws upon his own 
interpretation of the principles of his profession.
His personal view of his job becomes blurred with 
a perhaps rather abstract sense of what HAT ought to 
be doing and his contribution to that.
4.3.3 P's statement of the objectives of HAT
(i) P and I provide a back-up service for the
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Housing Assessment Team. The main purpose of 
HAT is to turn unfit housing into fit housing, 
fitness being determined by the Housing Acts.
We advise on the financial implications of any 
schemes that are discussed.
(ii) Two other kinds of consideration have to be taken 
into account :
(a) Structural practicalities: The Building
Engineer, L, and his assistant, C, both 
members of HAT, give advice here on what 
can and cannot be done.
(b) Planning: J and M advise on matters of 
planning and aesthetics.
So that D*s initial statement of how he saw the 'purpose 
of the Housing Assessment Team' is comparatively short. 
His first point is both simple and macroscopic, simple 
in the sense that his formulation of the main purpose 
of HAT seems to be a readily understandable function, 
a summary of the outcome that he believes ought to 
result from the application of the team's resources to 
a particular initial state; macroscopic in the sense 
that he later reveals his understanding of this rather 
bald statement to incorporate some of the issues that 
R and J talked about straight away.
It is clearly vital to be able to differentiate 
between a respondent's understanding of a particular
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issue and the articulated response that he makes to 
a question or a series of questions. J's style of 
replying to the questions that I put to him and the 
issues thereby raised was straight away discursive, 
divergent and cognisant of complexity. A question 
asked by me was usually opened up by him into a number 
of other questions which were then discussed as 
questions and sometimes left as questions. D's style, 
on the other hand, was first of all more reserved 
but also inclined towards closure. He would 
listen to my questions and respond with "an answer* . 
Nevertheless D's later performance at team meetings 
suggested that his conception of the work of the team 
was as subtle as J's, which belied the impression 
he gave at my early interviews.
4.3.4 Synthesising Corporate Purpose 
We move on now to compare and contrast these three 
statements and attempt to construe the basis of a team 
objective, at least in so far as it might be understood 
by these significant contributors.
The major similarity between these statements appears 
in the reiteration of the almost text-book-like 
formulation of a corporate function which identifies 
property which is unfit as living accommodation and 
makes sure that it is turned into housing of a standard 
laid down by the relevant Housing Act. Yet there are
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even differences between R's, J's and D's initial 
statements in this respect. R prefaces his recognition 
of this basic function with a recognition of an 
administrative task for which he, in fact, is respon­
sible; namely monitoring the housing stock in Bath, 
maintaining a Housing Assessment List, adding to it 
as properties are discovered to be unfit for habi­
tation or become unfit for one reason or another, 
and striking off properties which have been renovated 
either because of HAT's activities or for any other 
reason. Neither J nor D refer to this function, since 
they only become aware of problem properties when these 
are presented by R as items on the agenda of team 
meetings.
Both R and D ostensibly share the assumption that 
unfit housing will be turned into corresponding fit 
housing, and it is only J who initially articulates 
the possibility of changes in the overall housing 
stock i.e. that unfit housing units may be demolished 
and thus removed from stock or that the capacity of 
unfit properties may be increased at the same time as 
they are renovated. It is particularly interesting 
that it is J, the planner, who first raises the issue 
of demolition since he also holds that there should 
be a general presumption in favour of restoration.
R, as co-ordinator of the team, seems himself to
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operate with a presumption in favour of retention.
His track-record as one concerned with the housing 
situation in Bath would probably not be regarded as 
satisfactory if he were to be associated with a 
continuing net decline in the housing stock. But it 
is also part of his interpretation of HAT's brief 
that the stock should gradually be building up over 
time.
D articulates the unfit to fit conversion function 
as the basis of the Housing Assessment Team's work, 
but tends to set himself aside from this primary 
function, casting himself in the role of specialist 
advisor to those who have the principal responsibility. 
This is part of D's personal style. He often prefers 
to avoid responsibility for events. So that on the 
few occasions when HAT attracted criticism from either 
the Housing Committee or from the press D appeared 
able to conceptually separate himself from this, on 
such occasions almost alluding to the team in the 
third person, although he is a full member of it.
D's distancing from HAT can perhaps be seen in terms 
of his viewing the team as an 'inefficient' sub­
bureaucracy with its own formal rules, objectives, 
and limitations. It is almost as if D believes that 
the given structure of the team can never achieve
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the ’right’ sort of results by virtue of the fact that 
it is, per se, an institution. A particular comment 
that he made to me, as an aside from our discussion 
about objectives, seemed to support this idea:
"Trouble is, when you create a committee like HAT, it 
suddenly seems more difficult to get things done. When 
R was doing the job on his own, he used to ring me up 
from time to time and I ’d give him an opinion, dig 
out some information and I even went on a couple of 
visits with him. He got what he wanted and it didn't 
take up much of my time. Now the thing is all formal­
ised, we seem to spend hours talking round the point. 
And we've all got different ideas of what we're 
supposed to be doing."
It is D who is apt to highlight differences in 
members' views of the purpose of the team, whilst R 
and J tend to see HAT as relatively cohesive in this 
respect. Note that D is also the only one of the three 
who differentiates functionally between the various 
kinds of expertise to be found on the team - himself 
and his assistant as financial advisors, J and his 
assistant as planning specialists and the engineers 
L and C .
In their statements both R and J refer to the long­
term aspects of the Housing Assessment Team’s function.
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R includes in his list the middle and long term housing 
requirements of the city and J alludes to 'the size of 
the City’s housing stock’, and 'the planned future 
for the area*. D, on the other hand, views HAT 
principally as a processor of current problems, 
rather than as a policy aware body concerned with 
strategy.
In the course of the series of HAT meetings relating 
to the Bedford Street case, each of these three 
members had quite distinct preoccupations. It will 
be remembered that HAT's official or bureaucratic 
interest in Bedford Street was with the terrace 
cottages which form the approach to the proposed 
development site. R, however, whenever he referred 
to the Bedford Street case, usually seemed to incor­
porate the whole of the debate and when he talked 
about 'resolving the Bedford Street case' he had in 
mind the whole complex of the development problem. 
Clearly it is almost impossible in thinking and talking 
about such a situation to try and attend to the 
various aspects piecemeal, but R's viewpoint always 
seemed to be that of the grand strategist, who had a 
wider interest than just the renovation of a few 
terraced cottages.
J was, perhaps rather surprisingly, almost entirely 
focused on the particular question of whether or not
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the cottages, which were listed for preservation, -would 
need to be demolished if the development went ahead.
He was rarely heard to express an opinion about the 
block of flats themselves, which would have made a 
considerable visual and environmental impact to the 
surrounding area. The historical and finer architectural 
characteristics of the terrace, difficult for most 
people to appreciate, and in an obvious sense less 
noticeable, weighed more heavily on J's mind. In a 
sense, this tends to confuse our earlier model of J 
holding a housing improvement view of HAT's objectives 
and a broader planning view of his own as part of HAT.
D was largely unmoved by the Bedford Street case. He 
did not express a strong preference for either removing 
or retaining the terrace and neither did he pass a 
definitive judgement on the suitability of the proposed 
development for that area. His habit of distancing 
himself from the recommendations of the team was 
observed throughout this case. Some of this distance 
can possibly be explained by a particular model of 
professionalism which holds that Local Government 
Officers should make clear distinction between 
'Politics' and 'professional advice'. Officers, it 
is often said, are there to advise the Politicians 
on specialist matters and should not involve them­
selves in Politics (which is usually written and spoken 
with a capital P). The Political contribution of 
officers to Local Government debate is an interesting
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and complex issue, but it is not our concern here.
However, the power of Local Government professionalisation 
may well be an important factor in D being able to 
say ’if this scheme, then these costs' or 'if these 
cottages are converted by the private sector then 
these costs, if by the public sector ...’ and so on, 
in a seemingly detached and disinterested way.
This trait is one which R, J and D all exhibit when 
it comes to reporting to the Housing Committee.
They each regard HAT as in business to make recommenda­
tions - the buck, in their eyes. Stops with the 
politicians and not with them, although R as chairman 
is aware of the dangers of taking no stand at all.
4.3.5 Some Summary Conclusions on Collective Purpose
(i) Notions of collective purpose held and used by 
members of the Housing Assessment Team appear to be 
strongly related to individual bureaucratic inter­
pretation of job roles. The senior members of HAT 
take their briefs from the organisation which they 
see above them; these directives come down not in 
any formal sense because no such objectives have been 
set out; the authority and ideas derive from E, who 
has responsibility for the team, and are backed by 
members' perceptions of the generally recognised aims 
of Local Government and its constituent professions.
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(ii) Apart from the ties within the team caused by 
such more or less common purpose references, some 
members experience a sense of cohesion in the sense 
that HAT appears to constitute a kind of sub-bureaucracy 
in its own right, with sufficiently strongly absorbed 
institutional authority to lend it its own official 
status.
(iii) The bureaucratic ties that the members have 
with the team are further highlighted by the 
distinction that some of them draw between themselves 
the professionals and themselves in the role of members. 
This distance seems to contribute to the fact that
the intensity of commitment and feeling at meetings 
is generally not high.
(iv) It is difficult to perceive any significant 
forces of self-interest that can operate within the 
structure of the Housing Assessment Team and the work 
that it carries out. All members of the team are 
jointly signatory to the final recommendations that 
it makes and, in this sense, the eventual consumer
of these could be said to represent a 'common adversary* 
for them. Each member has some unique and valuable 
expertise that is apt to lend him some security within 
the group. No member appears to be more * expert * in 
any of the fields than the officially recognised 
expert. There is no seniority gap between the three
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significant contributors and so there are no pressures 
of discipline. Because each of these three is in any 
case attached to a different department, the question 
of fighting for promotion does not arise. In any case, 
as we have observed, promotion within Local Government 
at the levels of seniority we are dealing with here 
is not so much a function of achievement as of 
longevity.
The only dimension of self-interest which it seems 
possible to attribute to HAT members is perhaps that 
to do with the wish for each to appear competent at 
meetings and to make "good*, cogent, and professional 
contributions. Even so, the members know each other 
so well that the atmosphere within the meetings is 
relaxed enough for almost any kind of contribution 
to be made without reserve.
It appears that self-interest runs parallel with 
group or collective interest to the extent that 
members recognise that it is a good thing for all 
concerned if the business of HAT is conducted as 
quickly and pleasantly as possible. In that respect, 
there is a high level of co-operation amongst the 
members and a high level of mutual support at the 
meetings.
In the following chapter, we move on from considering
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some of the various dimensions of purpose that may 
operate to determine the outcomes of group decision­
making to look at some of the more elusive forces 
they derive from the processes of debate and discussion
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5 A LEADER-DRIVER MODEL FOR GROUP *DECISION-MAKING *
5.1 Introduction
We examine here a Housing Assessment case in which 
a particular member of HAT was predominant in moving 
the discussions, not altogether intentionally, towards 
the final outcome. We discuss and discount the utility 
of an explanatory model based upon notions of strategy 
and postulate a much more passive context for the 
'decision-making', a context characterised by routine­
ness, where ennui is never far away; a context in which 
the moods of the day and the chance run of discussion 
may have more impact than anything else upon what 
f inally happens.
5.2 A Summary Case Study
This case concerns a series of Housing Assessment Team 
discussions about the future of a collection of 
properties known as Rock Cottages, which are situated 
within an old disused quarry at Combe Down, a small 
suburb of Bath.
In May 1978, two unoccupied houses on this rambling 
site came to the attention of R, co-ordinator of the 
Housing Assessment Team. One of these houses was in 
a particularly precarious structural position as it 
backed directly onto the old quarry face at the north 
end of the ground. This face was steadily crumbling
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and slipping away and, hence, threatening the north 
wall of the cottage. Both this property and the one 
adjoining it were in a generally poor state of repair. 
They were also suffering from the damp that from time 
to time seeped down the quarry face from the field 
above.
The owner of both the empty cottages was resident in 
the Midlands and had inherited them several years 
ago as part of a relative's estate. R had been in 
touch with the owner, Mrs. Y, over a period of months, 
in an attempt to come to some agreement about putting 
the cottages into habitable order. She appeared to 
have no real interest in them however. Although she 
seemed to regard the cottages as a long-term invest­
ment and wanted to retain ownership, she was either 
unwilling or unable to spend the money necessary for 
their maintenance.
The owner-occupier of the larger of the two sound 
houses, Mr P, was a retired market gardener, and the 
greater part of his strip of land was cultivated with 
fruit and vegetables. There was always an air of 
busyness about his comer of the quarry, a small 
farmland oasis flourishing in the heart of suburbia. 
Mr. P originally wanted to buy one of the empty 
cottages and convert it into accommodation for his 
daughter, a recent widow. But he was now beginning
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to think that they had been too far neglected to be 
a good buy.
The owner of the second of these two sound semis, a 
plumber, was more or less retired, although he still 
did occasional jobs to keep himself occupied and 
supplement his pension. He lived alone. His house 
was well kept, the garden tidy. He and Mr P would 
pass the time of day amicably, chatting across the 
fence.
Separated from the two sets of semi-detached cottages 
was a detached house standing in its own walled square 
of land. This was occupied by its owner, an old woman 
now well into her eighties, and her three large red 
setter dogs. She had, until recently, managed to keep 
her house in good decorative order, but her health was 
beginning to fail, the outside of the house was 
gradually looking more derelict week by week and the 
grounds were slowly becoming over-run with weeds.
The quarry site on which all these properties stood 
was large, about two hundred yards by a hundred yards. 
More than one builder has considered the possibility 
of developing the site with readily marketable 'town* 
houses. Access to the site was good and the land 
itself firmly founded upon a rocky base. At the time 
of the HAT discussions, however, much of the site had
173
run to grass and the existing properties had a 
pleasant rural if somewhat neglected outlook, with 
a better view and more breathing space than the 
occupants of the recently developed and expensive 
estate behind the quarry.
I first visited the quarry myself one evening in early 
summer. R and I had been talking at his office during 
the afternoon, running over the events of the last HAT 
meeting. This had been a rather extraordinary 
gathering, notable for an unusually intense and 
far-ranging discussion on the purpose of and constraints 
imposed upon environmental planning and development 
by Local Government. M, from the planning department, 
had been standing in as senior representative for J, 
who was on holiday somwhere in Cornwall. M is a 
Canadian in his mid-thirties, an enthusiastic, indeed 
almost fanatical conservationist of anything 'natural', 
'traditional' and 'rustic'. He will argue fervently 
and sometimes eloquently in support of such diverse 
institutions as vintage cars, country churches, cottage 
industry and real ales brewed in the wood.
D, the Estates Management member of HAT, is rather 
inclined to go along with M's general outlook, although 
he has no great affinity for vintage cars, but he does 
at the same time regard himself as a realist. "You
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cannot ignore the economic facts of life," he is apt 
to say. "Efficiency must be attended to if we want 
to make any kind of material progress." M's new 
five-door hatch-back, he pointed out, was not exactly 
hewn by dedicated craftsmen who were keenly in tune 
with their working environment. Neither, he argued, 
were these people particularly concerned that the 
foaming sleeves of keg bitter that were no doubt 
served in the cavernous pub outside their factory 
gates, had started life an optimum number of weeks 
ago in huge vats of stainless steel.
"It is all a compromise" asserted R, "A balance 
between what we would like and what we can actually 
have." Compromise seems to be one of his key operating 
concepts. He is admirably suited to the task of 
co-ordinating the activities of the Housing Assessment 
Team. Balanced, reasonable, yet willing to put forward 
a point of view if the situation demands, he pulls 
in contributions from the other members and weaves 
them into recommendations for action. Sensible, 
piecemeal progress from an unsatisfactory state into 
something a bit better. He lives his life and does 
his job according to this incrementalist doctrine.
L, one of the Building Surveyors, is more pessimistic. 
"There is nothing much we can do in any case. Events 
sort themselves out in the end. Local Government
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doesn't actually achieve very much in itself, it is 
just there, and it's large enough to make some people 
take account of its presence in what they do in the 
world outside."
And so it went on. Rock Cottages had been the starting 
point for this discussion. They were just number 3 
on the agenda; two of the houses were unoccupied, one 
of these decaying fast, and what was to be done about 
them? R reported his correspondence to date with their 
owner, Mrs Y, and his attempts to persuade her to do 
something to make the properties habitable. Mrs Y was 
obviously playing a stonewall innings and each of her 
letters had picked up and expanded a detail of R's 
last, but drawn no conclusions. Between them they 
had built up a considerable file of material which 
had nevertheless had no effect at all upon the state 
of affairs that R wished to change.
Then D had said;
"Well they're not particularly interesting houses 
anyway. That quarry is a bit of a backwater."
M had then leapt to the defence of the cottages and 
the quarry itself, and started to argue about the 
preservation of living communities, saying that this 
was what planning was all about.
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We never actually reached agenda item 4. R arranged 
another meeting for the following week and the group 
disbanded. R and I walked back to his office, 
stopping off on the way for the customary beer and 
sandwich. Over lunch and into the afternoon I asked 
him about what he thought of the various members' 
attitudes to their jobs and their views about 
planning, conservation and housing assessment. He 
made one particular comment that, as I reflected upon 
it much later, seemed to help explain the eventual 
direction and outcome of this particular case;
"For most of us, most of the time, it is just a job - 
middle of the road, poorly paid really, but fairly 
respectable and pleasant enough from a day to day 
point of view. It's not exciting, in fact most of 
the detail is rather boring, but from time to time 
you get a case which seems more real somehow than 
most. It seems to click with the sort of person you 
are. Do you remember when J was so enthusiastic 
about that tumble-down house out at Ashley? That 
is the sort of place that he would like to own and 
do up and so it interested him particularly. It was 
the same with M this morning. He just felt a 
sympathy with the people living out at Rock Cottages, 
with the atmosphere of the place and so on."
I left R towards the end of the afternoon and took a
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bus up to the quarry to look at the place for myself.
I alighted in the middle of a small shopping street 
which was like dozens of others in the area - a 
couple of model banks, a 'family' butcher, diminutive 
supermarket, chemist, tobacconist and paper shop. We 
had just travelled up from the city through two miles 
of similar, unremarkable suburb. Neither really town 
nor village, not built up yet hardly verdant either, 
neither personal nor impersonal, friendly or unfriendly, 
but each of these pockets of the community was known 
in some depth, no doubt, to those that lived and grew 
older there, year upon year.
I was directed to the quarry itself by the bus driver 
and was surprised to find that it was only fifty 
yards or so from the bus stop. An unmade track ran 
in between the bank and a large detached house, and 
I followed it away from the main street. The track 
curved round behind a group of trees and then the 
quarry lay set out ahead of me. It was vaguely 
reminiscent of a wild west film set, a miniature 
canyon almost, with two pairs.of cottages at the 
far end under the shelter of the rock face. A small 
pond lay between me and the villas, and two or three 
ducks were paddling, rather proprietorially, round 
in circles. A larger four square house stood within 
a walled piece of ground to the right and I could see 
two large dogs lying in the long grass. To the left.
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a shallow incline covered with scrub was topped by 
some aged pine trees that creaked heavily in the 
freshening wind. The quarry itself was quite 
sheltered, however, and the evening sun was warm.
In front of the most lived-in looking cottage a man 
of about seventy was digging over a strip of garden 
with practised efficiency. I ambled in his direction.
He looked up as I approached and nodded.
"Lot of visitors about this afternoon."
A broad Bristol accent, as if in parody of a rural 
encounter over work on the land, like a scene from the 
Archers.
"You're from the Council too, I suppose."
I disclaimed and asked who else had been disturbing him. 
"Chap from the planning department was here after lunch. 
American too."
He obviously found these two ideas disjunctive.
"Nice fellow though," he compounded, although whether 
his visitor was nice in spite of his being a bureaucrat 
or from across the Atlantic it was difficult to say.
It sounded as though M had been out in the field too.
I asked the old man what the planning department had 
been interested in.
"Wanted to know whether I liked living here. Asked me 
where I would like to live if I ever moved. Told him 
I'd never thought about it, but that I'd been here
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for thirty years and was quite settled."
I asked him then about the two empty cottages right 
next to the rock face. He said that these had been 
empty for the last two years or so and the owner lived 
up North somewhere. He didn't know what was going 
to happen to them but said that if they didn't have 
some work done to them pretty soon they'd be in a 
bad way.
"The damp from the cliff, that's the trouble. And 
a bit of slippage as well. That field up there wants 
draining properly really."
He pointed up to a piece of scrubland - field was 
rather a flattering designation - which apparently 
drained directly down the old quarry face onto the 
back of the two cottages.
"Hope they don't fall down altogether. Might get the 
developers in if that happens. One or two of 'em have 
been interested in this bit of ground for a long while. 
You could get quite a few modern-sized houses in 
here you see."
I supposed that you could, but agreed that that would 
change the character of the whole place for the worse.
I admired his garden, mostly of vegetables, which was 
laid out in a highly organised and methodical way. We 
exchanged weather forecasts for the coming summer and
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I took my leave.
At the next meeting, the subject of Rock Cottages was 
once again on the agenda. R floated a proposal to 
encourage private development. "We are aware," 
he pointed out, "that one or two builders have shown 
interest in the site in the past. It is a substantial 
area and could support ten or a dozen modern semis or 
lines of town houses. The council does own part of 
the land anyway and might be prepared to give planning 
permission for a suitable scheme. We could also put 
any prospective developer in touch with the owner of 
the two cottages, who might then be prepared to sell 
out."
M was highly critical of the idea;
"That would be a monstrous thing to do. The whole 
character of the place would be lost. We're not just 
in the business of providing housing units you know. 
That quarry is an amazingly peaceful place to live in.
I was up there the other day. Think about the people 
who are living there already. It would turn their 
world upside down."
D chimed in and said that from the Council's and indeed 
from HAT'S point of view, to have the site built upon 
by a private developer would be a highly efficient
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outcome. No council finance would be involved, the 
number of housing units in the area would be increased 
and the site would be tidied up from its present rather 
delapidated state to something more in keeping with a 
residential area. In the process, he said, the drainage 
from the scrub-land above the quarry could be properly 
provided for.
M reacted strongly against the idea of 'tidying up'.
He argued that tidyness was a much overworked idea in 
planning and not one which HAT ought slavishly to 
pursue. R took, a certain exception to this and pointed 
out that, to a large extent, they were in exactly the 
business of 'tidying up' properties that had been 
allowed to become run down.
"But I agree that tidyness shouldn't necessarily 
extend to how a development is laid out. I must admit 
I can see pros and cons for both arguments. Something 
has got to be done about those two empty cottages 
though. Somehow we've got to get Mrs Y to do the work, 
or get her to sell them to someone who will."
"They're not particularly marketable," said D. "No 
private buyer who would want to live there would be 
able to afford to pay what Mrs Y would want, and anyone 
who could afford it wouldn't really want to live there."
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"It's difficult to imagine who would ever live there,"
R agreed. "The only people who seem to fit are those 
who have always been there. It would be quite a good 
place for a largish family. There's quite a bit of 
ground to spread around in."
"That's just the sort of place it is." This from an 
enthusiastic M. "If you do have to live in a built-up 
suburb at all, what better surroundings to have kids 
playing about in."
This discussion on Rock Cottages continued in this vein 
for a while and eventually ended with M volunteering 
to ring Mrs Y and talk with her himself about what ought 
to be done. I went to see M myself a couple of days 
later. He had not yet been able to contact Mrs Y . I 
asked him what he thought about the Rock Cottages case.
"It's quite a fun spot, that quarry." His Canadian 
drawl lent a certain cinematic drama to the line.
"It would be a pity if it was all built over. We 
ought to take care of little pockets of quaintness 
like that."
What did he think about using the land to supply 
much-needed housing units?
"They're not much-needed actually, not now anyway.
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and certainly not in the middle of the market. The 
pressure for new housing has been slowing down for 
several months, except right at the bottom end. We 
still have a lot of sub-standard housing in Bath, and 
people needing basic homes, but we couldn't use the quarry 
to help that situation. Any developer would be 
looking to build smartish commuter houses. That's 
what he could sell."
That all sounded reasonable enough and it more or less 
tied in with R's recent statistics, some of which he 
had been showing me the other day.
"This is one of those situations where there isn't much 
scope for action anyway," M went on. "When I get 
through to Mrs Y, I shall suggest to her that, 
whether she wants to sell the properties or to maintain 
them as assets, she will have to carry out repairs to 
the back of the houses and to the roof, at the very 
least. She could do all that on a modest bank loan 
easily securable. That loan could then be serviced 
by short-term lets. The houses would be. maintained 
in good order, would be self-financing, and she could 
get them back at relatively short notice."
If Mrs. Y was to accept that line of argument from M, 
the case would soon draw to a close. I suggested to 
M that the circumstances were not actually all that
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complicated ;
"It's amazing what feeling those meetings can generate 
at the time though. The issues are small enough as 
you say, hardly affairs of state. Yet you can get 
carried away on a flow of expansive argument. I can 
anyway," he qualified with a grin, "But in the end, 
what actually happens is not very much, couldn't 
really be very much, and happens that way out of pure 
chance more often than not."
We nattered on for a while longer as I couldn't resist 
debating with him the idea of pure chance. Finally, 
he said that he should have something to report by 
the next meeting, and I left him to his business.
At the next meeting M reported that he had managed to 
telephone Mrs Y and have a long conversation about 
the houses. She had apparently been very uncertain 
about what she wanted to do with the properties and 
had left them empty more or less by default while 
she made up her mind. She had no great need of the 
capital at the moment and thought it a good idea in 
principle to hold onto the houses. At the same time 
she didn't want to spend much money on them. M 
outlined his own scheme, which gave her some flexi­
bility of action in the medium term, and recommended 
a reliable local estate agent who could act as a
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letting agent. Mrs Y had agreed that this was a good 
plan and she fixed up a date to travel down to Bath, 
meet R and M and discuss what work needed to be 
carried out. This meeting took place some weeks 
later and the work was put in hand shortly afterwards.
5.3 Some Leader-Driver Characteristics
The notion arising from this case that we are concerned 
to examine here is that a working group such as the 
Housing Assessment Team, particularly when it is 
dealing with issues which seem familiar and unexcep­
tional, can easily be moved in sometimes apparently 
arbitrary directions if any one member adopts, for 
whatever reason, a singularly strong or convincing 
line of argument, or exhibits enthusiasm which is 
uncharacteristic.
At one level of analysis this is almost a common­
place. It is intuitively rather obvious and also 
well researched (e.g. Axelrod, 1976; Bales, 1953;
Bass, 1949; Mangham, 1978; Lukes, 1975) that indi­
viduals who occupy positions of power within a group, 
or have strong oratory and reasoning skills, can 
push events in directions in which they would like 
them to move. What is less well researched is what 
happens in circumstances where there is a fairly even 
distribution of a low quantity of organisational power, 
where relatively well-rehearsed and familiar business
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is being transacted and the majority of the members 
of the group have no great personal or organisational 
stake in the outcomes of the decision-making process.
In the course of the last twenty years or so there 
have been many styles of reaction to, first, the 
classical bureaucratic models of organisations such 
as were proposed and developed by Weber (op. cit.), 
and then later the various systemic views with their 
mapped-out hierarchies of interlocking and corporate 
goals (Selznick, 1948; Ashby, 1956; Emery and Trist,
1960; Simon, 1956).
In the Management Sciences, and particularly in 
O.D. and O.R., a counter school of thought has 
gradually become identifiable and associated with 
analyses of organisational politics. This school is 
founded upon what might be termed a * real-life* view 
of organisations as ferments of political intrigue, 
where grand strategies are continually being planned 
and enacted, personal and departmental conflict is 
a way of life and paramount in most individuals* 
thinking is a desire to claw their way up the hierarchy 
or build up their empire by the quickest and cleverest 
means possible. Some recent representatives of 
this school have been Argyris and Schon (1974),
Axelrod (1977), Brewer (1973), Eden (1978), Lerner 
(1976), Mangham (op. cit.), Mumford and Pettigrew (1975),
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Perrow (1972), Pettigrew (1973), Radford (1977) and 
Zaleznik (1970).
Whilst we would agree that such politically oriented 
models of organisations are widely applicable and 
contribute important real-life dimensions that are 
lacking in bureaucratic and systems representations, 
nevertheless they do not account for all types of 
situation. An important characteristic of the 
content and procedure of the meetings of the Housing 
Assessment Team is routineness. The members know each 
other well, they are approximately contemporary and 
each is situated towards the centre of his available 
career hierarchy. They are men of modest ambition, 
doing a job for reasons which perhaps they can't 
really call to mind, having arrived where they are 
simply by following the path as it has appeared in 
front of them, rather as one might wander through a 
wood. Family men, bar one, with all the concerns and 
obligations that implies. Thankful enough for a job 
with relative security, a job which is white collar 
and respectable. Unfulfilled yet phlegmatic, 
sometimes annoyed by this or that bureaucratic 
restraint, yet working peaceably for the most part 
within close limits of power and discretion. Each 
has some expertise in one field or another, all are 
reserved about forming judgements and pronouncing 
opinions.
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To understand more fully the outcomes determined by 
a team so compiled, it is necessary to take account 
of a kind of organisational ennui against which 
professional judgements are often made. That is not 
necessarily to imply high levels of cynicism and 
world-weariness, but rather to suggest that, commonly, 
energy will not be mobilised beyond a certain point 
to argue for and support with action organisational 
or professional causes.
It is possible to identify some important parameters 
relating to group meetings conducted within this kind 
of structure, parameters which become the more signi­
ficant as the potential for the differential distri­
bution of powers of reason and rhetoric is reduced. 
These may be labelled:
critical elapsed sequences 




and we now examine these ideas individually in the 
context of the meetings of the Housing Assessment 
Team.
(i) Critical Elapsed Sequences
These are essentially conceived as particular sequences
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of contributions which of themselves give rise to 
particular other contributions, conclusion points or 
actions by contributors. This is a similar idea to 
the concept of Act to Act Tendencies proposed by 
Bales (1953), although he was principally concerned 
with the juxtaposition of classes of behaviour rather 
than with the content of strings of spoken contributions 
It is possible to differentiate between powerful 
sequences of content and sequences in which the 
potential power is somehow diffused. D, for example, 
followed up R's suggestion of encouraging private 
development with his own thoughts on 'tidying up' 
the site. The two taken together form a kind of 
increasing gradient against which M reacts strongly.
Had D made a point which essentially disagreed with 
R, the two taken together might have neutralised each 
other and M might not have put his own view so 
strongly or, indeed, might not have put it at all.
The apposition and juxtaposition of contributions 
creates increased or decreased potential for new 
contributions. This is a similar idea to that of 
semantic determinism discussed elsewhere (Cumberlidge, 
1978). It was argued then that the generation of 
text or dialogue may follow something like a 
Markovian process. That is to say, what has just 
been said determines a set of probabilities for what 
will be said next and that once a writer or speaker 
sets off from a particular starting point he quickly
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builds up a structure which constrains and helps to 
shape the finished contribution.
Common examples of critical elapsed sequences occur 
when arguments escalate to hostility in the form of 
tempers lost, or when, conversely, humour builds upon 
humour and a particular line of discussion breaks down 
into laughter and flippancy. Part of the skill of 
managing meetings and conversations to some desired 
end probably lies in anticipating critical sequences 
and their likely effect and then attempting either to 
construct such sequences or to block them, depending 
upon how the consequences are valued.
If none of the contributors has any particularly strong 
or salient objectives, then the process becomes much 
more of a game of chance, where the Markovian proba­
bility distributions are relatively flat. It is a 
well known feeling to many committee men to have been 
involved in a collective decision that has emerged from 
nobody knows where.
(ii) Stock Polarities and Agreements
Where, as in the case of HAT, the members of a meeting 
are well known to each other, stock reactions to 
particular contributions may become accepted into 
the culture of the group. These commonly take the
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form either of polarities or agreements. So that 
whenever D says, as he is apt, that "That doesn’t 
make commercial sense," then J is likely to respond 
with something like "Our measures of profit and loss 
are not so clear cut here." These two ideas frequently 
come up in pairs and therefore tend to stand alone 
in the proceedings, effectively neutralising each 
other, forming a kind of standard diversion neither 
connected strongly to what has gone before nor forming 
a clear foundation for what is about to come; the 
main sequence of contributions tends to restart 
after the occurence of stock polarities.
Stock agreements are common and well-recognised pairs 
of reinforcing contributions. When R, for example, 
confronted as chairman by a maze of uncertainties 
and conflicting objectives and opinions, reminds the 
meeting that "All we've got to do is to find a workable 
compromise," L will very often concur by saying "If 
we try and find the very best solution we shall 
probably be here all year. Let's just get something 
done." This is a familiar pair of contributions as 
well known as phrases in a popular melody.
Stock agreements can have the effect of raising the 
power of a line of argument to a strong climax, 
depending upon the mood of the meeting and what has 
gone before. Alternatively, by their very familiarity
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and air of cliche, they can sap the force of otherwise 
strong rhetoric by introducing an awareness of deja 
vu and banality.
(iii) Discounted Standpoints
We refer here to the occasions when stock contributions 
are made, however prompted, but are easily recognised 
as being hobby horses and hence regarded with indul­
gence and discounted as significant items of force 
in debate. Even if the line of reasoning is clear 
and sound, even if the rhetoric is powerful, discounting 
will take place if it is a repeat performance, and 
known as such.
One of L*s favourite subjects is what he regards as 
the impotence of Local Government to effect fundamental 
changes in the provision of services, how it can only 
hope to work incrementally and painfully slowly on the 
status quo. Such was the tenor of his comment, quoted 
earlier from a meeting about Rock Cottages.
"Local Government doesn't actually achieve very much 
in itself, it is just there, and large enough to make 
some people take account of its presence in what they 
do."
Whenever L comes in with this theme, eyebrows are 
raised, everyone sits back in their chairs, D grins
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and the proceedings come to a momentary halt. L is 
not providing a dramatic oratory climax, but quite 
simply an interlude during which members can sit back 
and relax, formulate their next point, write notes on 
the conclusions reached so far, or think about what 
they are going to do during the coming weekend.
(iv) Novel Standpoints
In apposition to the notion of a line of argument 
discounted by familiarity is the idea of a standpoint 
that has impact by virtue of its novelty and freshness. 
New ideas, new themes have an undeniable attraction for 
most people whose business is discussion and argument• 
M, for example, as a relatively recent HAT member and 
as a foreigner, clearly had some power of novelty in 
the series of meetings relating to the Rock Cottages 
case. He had the advantage of a new face and unknown 
personality, of an unfamiliar voice and style of 
argument, and of the somewhat radical stand he took 
on some of the issues in the case.
The value of novelty in a rather different context is 
affirmed by the research findings of Axelrod (1976) 
who studied in some depth a number of high-level, 
international, foreign policy meetings.
"The data refute a bombardment model of argumentation 
in which the participants support their own arguments
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to make them resistant to attack, while attacking the 
weak spots in others' stated positions. In fact, there 
are few assertions which are supported by specific 
evidence, almost no mutually supported causal argu­
ments, and the assertions which were attacked were 
no less emphasised than the assertions which were not 
attacked. More in accord with the data is the 'novel 
arguments' approach in which the key factor in 
persuasive argumentation is the development of argu­
ments which others have not already taken into account.'
But it seemed, in the course of Housing Assessment 
Team meetings, that the novelty did not serve exactly 
the same purpose that it did during Axelrod's high 
level foreign policy discussions. In the latter case 
the novelty appeared to indicate to the recipient of 
the argument that the speaker had obviously considered 
some aspects of the question that he himself had not. 
The recipient here is brought up short by the new 
argument, first of all because it strikes him as new, 
second because he may be doing a bit of fast thinking 
in order to follow the argument at all, third, perhaps, 
in order to work out how this new line relates to what 
he himself has said and, finally, to consider any 
further implications of the argument and to revalue 
his opinion of the speaker and his case.
Some of this may have been going on as M made his
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contributions, bringing as he did new perspectives 
to bear upon the scene. But an equally important 
effect of the modest enough novelty here was simply 
to stir some life back into the proceedings and to 
move the meeting out of one of its characteristic ruts.
(v) Extraordinary Commitment
Genuine enthusiasm is invariably infectious. Not 
only does it tend to be uplifting of itself, but in 
a group it can also help to convince flagging spirits 
that the activity they are engaged upon is worthwhile 
undertaking and that it can be carried forward to a 
successful conclusion. There is indeed more likelihood, 
if there is an enthusiast present, that it will be.
Extraordinary commitment is also an asset to a group 
in a rather obvious way. Clearly someone who is 
prepared to do some ground-work and also take responsi­
bility for initiating action, will push up the output 
of the collective as a whole. He or she may then, 
having started a move forward, be able to mobilise 
other members of the group who were not significant 
contributors previously, and who could not be until 
events started to occur and tasks become mapped out.
Extraordinary commitment is particularly striking in 
its effect when it occurs against a background of 
unexciting hackwork and routineness. It can also.
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however, have an effect which is quite unintended by 
the person showing it, such as often happens when 
somebody joins a new job and shows an exaggerated 
keenness to become interested and involved in what 
his colleagues are doing. Their keenness can often 
get them carried away and they can find themselves 
involved with work that they'd rather not be doing, 
simply because their enthusiasm was taken at face 
value.
5.4. A Leader-Driver Model
What we are suggesting here then, as an explanatory 
model of some of the dynamics of HAT meetings, 
comprises two distinct levels of analysis. First, 
it seems important to underline the broad nature of 
the relationship that the members have with their 
organisation as a whole and with the housing assessment 
team in particular. Then, within that framework, we 
have identified certain parameters that have to do 
with the way in which the observed content of meetings 
unfolds.
We touched earlier upon the question of the authen­
ticity of models of organisational politics in the 
context of the routine and humdrum. This point 
requires some elaboration.
Pettigrew (1973, 1977) has been particularly concerned
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with the reasons underlying political behaviour in 
companies and the extent to which individuals attempt 
to lead affairs in a selected direction in order to 
further their own ends.
Mumford and Pettigrew (1975) have noted;
"We would stress the importance of individual goals 
in decision-making behaviour. It is not always 
recognised that the desire of individuals to increase 
or maintain their power position may have as much 
influence on the decision-making process as departmen­
tal or other subunit goals ...
... Politics c^n be seen as one of the mechanisms by 
which individuals and groups seek to obtain power over 
others. They do this in order to secure some advantages 
which they believe will assist the achievement of 
personal and group goals."
Implicit in Pettigrew's view of politics here are, 
first, the existence of individual goals which are 
more or less clearly defined, or at least recognisable 
when choices have to be made, and second an assumption 
that these can be pursued fruitfully at the place of 
work, and, more specifically, within an organisation.
Burns (1965) also has some views on political behaviour.
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"The notion either of a hierarchy of sub-goals which, 
although generated within, and by the existence of, the 
organisation, wander out of line so far as organisational 
goals are concerned, or of an organisational goal 
generated by the concensus reached by individuals, 
each with personal goals, bargaining and learning their 
way towards a satisfactory equilibrium between their 
goals and those of the working community can itself 
only be realised and made operational if we accept 
the fact that the organisation represents only one of 
several means - and systems for realising the goals 
of the individual."
B u m s  has a somewhat different emphasis to that of 
Mumford and Pettigrew. He is essentially saying that 
individuals have personal commitments, some of which 
may be realised through the membership of an organis­
ation. Mumford and Pettigrew are rather suggesting 
that within a given organisational framework, individuals 
are apt to have strong career commitments that bear 
heavily upon any decision-making processes to which 
they are party.
Pettigrew draws a distinction too between political 
and non-political behaviour and tends to make implicitly 
a rather complex ethical judgement about the former.
That is to say, at the same time as regarding the 
pursuit of power as being in some sense not really
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quite proper, he also seems rather to relish it as 
'real life', the true stuff of organisations. This 
is partly witnessed by his quotation from Bannester 
(1969)t
"It is immaterial who owns the gun and is licensed 
to carry it ; the question is, who has his finger on 
the trigger?"
This conception of strategy and politics, whilst 
possibly having some applicability for understanding 
individual HAT members' dealings with their own 
departments, is not considered to provide an 
authentic model of the workings of the Housing 
Assessment Team itself, for a number of important 
reasons;
(a) HAT is essentially an interdepartmental working 
group which has the most loosely defined lines 
of reporting. Suggested originally by a previous 
Chief Executive, the function was at first carried 
out by R alone. R's present senior, the Director 
of Environmental Health, later proposed that 
representatives from the various other departments 
be brought in and the function run on a committee 
basis. This idea was approved by the various 
Heads of Department and 'volunteers' were 
appointed. So HAT was started more or less
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because 'it seemed a good idea at the time.' It 
undoubtedly serves and is also believed to serve 
a useful function and it uses relatively little 
in the way of resources; but its results are 
of a piecemeal and undramatic kind, not the sorts 
of material from which dynamic career progressions 
are made. The members are aware of this and 
regard HAT business as just another part of the 
job, and something of a change from their partic­
ular departmental affairs, and to be conducted as 
quickly and pleasantly as possible.
(b) There is a clearly discernible culture amongst the 
foot soldiers of Local Government in Bath which is 
somehow 'anti-political*. That is not to say 
that individual officers show no concern for 
their own career progressions, but rather that 
there exists a strong ethos of 'playing a 
straight bat' within the organisation, which 
naturally attenuates competitive strategy in 
Pettigrew's sense.
(c) There are implicit but strong rules of precedence 
which govern the career progressions of Local 
Government Officers, and these curtail the advan­
tages to be gained from competitive strategy.
That is to say, there is little enough scope for 
an officer to improve his career position by
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dramatic action. The opportunities for dramatic 
action are themselves few and far between and 
in any case the impact would have to be very 
considerable for it to outweigh the prevailing 
corporate sense of when it was appropriate to 
promote.
The situation changes, it is true, among the upper 
echelons of the paid officers. The jockeying for 
position and competition for resources is marked at 
Director level and the battle for power a major pre­
occupation. Here, Pettigrew's political model has 
much salience.
"... the power distribution within an organisation 
at any one moment will be an important factor in 
determining who shall gain a disproportionate share 
in new resources as they become available." (Mumford 
and Pettigrew, op.cit.)
But the Housing Assessment Team members do not touch 
this world. They have little discretion; they are 
receivers not writers of memoranda.
In thinking about what we have labelled the Leader- 
Driver model, we have used the term leader in rather 
a singular way, much in the same sense that it is 
used in the phrase 'lead astray'; that is, to connote
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a state of affairs in which there are not great a 
priori forces to push events in any particular direction 
and therefore the moods and preoccupations of the day 
that members bring to the meetings and the order in 
which contributions happen to be made are significant 
determinants of the final outcome. This formulation 
is at odds with models that pay great attention to 
strategy and also those that would view the process 
as being essentially driven by a sense of public 
service and professional responsibility.
We are underlining here an essential indeterminacy 
surrounding the outcomes of the deliberations of working 
groups such as the Housing Assessment Team; groups 
whose business is characterised by discussion that 
searches for a workable solution to what has been 
broadly defined, by the team or by somebody else, as 
a problem area.
The problems here are typically not complex structurally. 
A particular housing unit (or group of units) fails 
to meet the minimum standards for habitation laid 
down in the Housing Acts and represents, therefore, 
a waste in the use of resources, in a total community 
sense. The team is charged with the job of engineering 
an improved use of resources and the restoration of 
the housing unit to a working standard.
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Often, what needs physically to be done is hardly a 
matter for debate. The question is usually one of 
financing - who is to pay for what and how. Sometimes, 
though, a number of possible schemes are proposed.
The alternatives that come up for discussion in the 
course of the Rock Cottages case were renovation by 
the owner, purchase and renovation by the Council, 
purchase and either renovation or demolition and 
development by a private contractor. Only the first 
and the last of these options was considered seriously 
as the Council budget for property improvement was 
small and likely to get smaller. Wherever possible 
HAT was instructed to act as facilitator for external 
financing.
Either of the remaining schemes could have been the 
outcome. An important reason for the final result 
was a particularly strong stand taken by a relatively 
new member of the group who also took some initiative 
in facilitating action.
This stand was partly due to a belief in certain 
principles, but it was also the result of a debating 
reaction to other contributions in the meeting. There 
is a sense in which what fina]^ happened was "nothing 
but words" that became transformed into action.
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Part of the power of such words derives, we have 
argued, from the background of routineness and famili­
arity which characterises the team's business. Against 
this background events, contributors or contributions 
of novelty can generate unaccustomed interest and 
lead decision making away in a particular direction.
Even outside the team, Mrs Y was galvanised into 
some sort of action by M's personal attention and 
common sense suggestions. She probably would have 
continued to reply to R's rather official letters for 
months without coming to any decision about what to 
do with the house, but an enthusiastic Canadian at 
the other end of the line was something that she could 
more easily respond to.
Bruner (1979) has looked at some of the implications 
of regarding decision-making as discourse.
"... the making of decisions must be regarded not 
only as an individual intrapsychic process but also 
as a way of communicating something in a social 
context ... decision theory tends to concentrate upon 
those cognitive processes that operate in the mind of 
a detached speaker to guide him to a well-formed 
performance: knowing the alternatives, knowing their 
estimated values and likelihoods, knowing the kinds 
of pay off matrices that govern choice, being able
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to make Bayesian transformations of empirical proba­
bilities, etc. But 1 wish to argue that a social or 
political decision is not made with these rational 
considerations as sole or even primary considerations 
Rather, it is made as a vehicle for carrying out the 
intentions of those empowered to make the decision, 
and the process of reaching a decision among those 
involved is more like a conversation than like the 
rational calculus. It usually results from the inter­
action of a set of speech acts."
We would go further than this in suggesting that it 
is possible also to over-emphasise the significance 
of intentions. Mrs Y herself didn't appear to have 
any strong intentions, just a once articulated 
preference for keeping the cottages if possible but 
for not spending much money on them either. We are 
suggesting that our leader in this model in a sense 
doesn't really exist. He or it could have turned up 
at any time to swing events away in any direction.
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6 A PERSONAL INTEREST MODEL OF GROUP DECISION MAKING
6.1 Introduction
The analysis contained within this chapter examines 
the hypothesis that individuals participating in a 
collective decision-making process will be primarily 
concerned with furthering their own interests, however 
they define them, rather than with pursuing for the 
group whatever they might regard as the objectives of 
the group. Arising from this assumption is the notion 
that the outcome or outcomes of a collective decision­
making process can be regarded as a complex function 
of the personal interests of the group members.
We illustrate this model with reference to a Housing 
Assessment Team case which involved a public inquiry. 
The fact of having to give formal evidence and to 
account officially for their points of view, threw 
into highlight some of the individual interests of R, 
the co-ordinator of HAT, and E, the Director of 
Department to whom R is responsible. The events of 
the case itself are of secondary concern here, but 
are relevant in that they provided a stimulus and 
backdrop for discussions that I was able to have with 
R and E about how they perceived their involvement with 
HAT.
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We first summarise the events of the case and then 
present an analysis of the personal interests that 
gradually emerged in the course of the discussions. 
Finally, we draw some conclusions about the utility 
of adopting such a perspective and suggest aspects 
of collective decision-making that can be highlighted 
but, also, that can be missed in the process.
6.2 A Summary Case History
The case described here centres upon the future of a 
terrace of ten, three-storey, 18th century, 'artisan* 
cottages and an adjoining terrace of two cottages 
which date from the early 19th century. All these 
properties lie within what is known as the Bath 
Conservation Area and also the Widcombe Priority Area. 
One of these cottages was included in the List of 
Buildings of Special Architectural and Historic 
Interest issued in August 1973, and two others were 
'spot-listed' in a Department of the Environment inspec­
tion carried out in January 1973. These cottages 
became the subject of a public inquiry that was set 
up when the County of Avon applied for listed 
building consent to demolish them in order to accommo­
date a road-widening scheme. An extract from the 
evidence presented to the inquiry by S, the Assistant 
County Surveyor, serves to sketch in some background 
to this proposal:
208
"In February 1968, Circular 1/68 issued by the then 
Minister of Transport, asked urban authorities to 
prepare traffic and transport plans showing how they 
intended to relate their traffic and parking policies 
to available road capacities and to immediate and 
longer term policy objectives. The plans were used 
as a background for consideration of investment and 
grant applications.
"The Bath Traffic and Transport Plan was substantially 
based on the Buchanan Planning and Transport Study 
published in 1965 and was inherited by the County 
Council on the reorganisation of Local Government 
in 1974."
This plan contained the proposals to widen the road on 
which the aforementioned cottages stood. These 
proposals involved demolishing the cottages and, in 
accordance with established procedure, the advice of 
what was then the Medical Officer of Health was 
sought. S*s statement continued:
"In December 1970 the City Council received and 
accepted the official representation of the Medical 
Officer of Health concerning (the cottages), that:
(a) the houses in the area were unfit for human 
habitation
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(b) the most satisfactory method of dealing with the 
conditions in the area was the demolition of all 
the buildings ...
"The City Council accordingly declared a Clearance 
Area and made a Compulsory Purchase Order under the 
Housing Acts which was submitted to the Secretary of 
State for confirmation. At the same time as the 
Compulsory Purchase Order was made a Statement of 
Reasons was served on all owners. The reasons were 
all related to the proposed widening scheme that had 
crystallised in the Traffic and Transport Plan and the 
opportunity was taken by the City Council to prescribe 
a detailed road widening line. In order to implement 
the widening it was necessary to acquire and demolish 
all the properties in the Compulsory Purchase Order.
No objections were made to the Compulsory Purchase 
Order and it was confirmed by the Secretary of State 
in 1971.
"After inheriting the scheme from the City Council, 
the County Council reviewed the proposals and resolved 
to pursue the road widening scheme and it is the 
formal application for Listed Building consent to 
demolish, that has led to this public inquiry."
A public inquiry is almost always necessary before 
consent can be given to demolish listed buildings.
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In opposition to this particular application, made 
by the Avon County Council, is the conservation lobby 
who argue that the historical associations and archi­
tectural characteristics of the cottages make them 
worth preserving, even at the cost of some inconvenience 
to road-users. The County Planning Officer for Avon 
made the following observations in his evidence to 
the public inquiry;
"In addition to the documentary evidence available 
to support the historical associations of the cottages 
with John Wood and his employer Ralph Allen, the 
architectural features of the design reinforce the 
impression that the cottages were consciously designed 
to create an impression of dignity and solidity 
appropriate to their location at the entrance to 
Ralph Allen's private carriage road
"The cottages are unusual for their date in that while 
intended as 'artisan housing' they are designed to a 
high standard incorporating architectural features 
not normally found in such housing, and are extremely 
well-built. The ten cottages Nos 6-24, are linked 
visually in pairs by the grouping of doors and windows 
so that there is a more stately rhythm to the elevation 
than would be achieved by identical placing of doors 
and windows in each elevation. The upper storeys 
are dignified by pilasters rising through two storeys
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on the line of the party walls, and by the massive 
chimneys and raked copings. The door hoods and 
brackets, and the band course and cornice are well 
detailed. These features combine to indicate that 
the buildings were considered to be something of an 
architectural and sociological 'show-piece* by their 
owner and architect.
"Other extant examples of artisan housing of the 18th 
and 19th century date in Bath do not possess similar 
architectural features or comparable homogeneity of 
design, nor do any surviving on a similar scale retain 
their original features to the same extent."
The main point of interest in this case, as it relates 
to our analysis of the Housing Assessment Team, is 
that the City Council, who were originally party to 
proposing the road-widening scheme and who instituted 
the compulsory purchase order on the cottages, are 
now, after reorganisation, defending the retention 
of the terrace on conservation grounds. In this they 
are supported by the Bath Preservation Trust and the 
Bath Society. It is true that the Buchanan Study 
predicted a significant increase in traffic flow 
along the road on which the cottages stand, which 
has not taken place because a proposed development 
of the Admiralty premises nearby at Foxhill was 
subsequently shelved. It is also, presumably.
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perfectly reasonable for Council policy and priorities 
on conservation, traffic and housing to change 
with passage of time. The Housing Assessment Team 
was itself set up in the period between the original 
Compulsory Purchase Order and the current public 
inquiry and brought with it new ways of evaluating 
housing potential. Nevertheless, the apparent turn­
around generated some strong feeling and, incidentally, 
gave rise to some interesting data relevant to the 
personal interest analysis that we now go on to 
discuss.
6.3 An Analysis of Personal Interests
There are a number of key individuals concerned with 
this case who could have been singled out for consider­
ation in an analysis of personal interests. For 
example;
(a) L, County Engineer and Surveyor and Head of the 
Department of Highways and Engineering, County 
of Avon.
(b) S, the Assistant County Surveyor who has in the 
past carried out a considerable amount of work 
in measuring and elaborately analysing the 
traffic flows in the road network adjacent to 
the cottages.
(c) B, a leading member of the Bath Society, himself 
a practising architect.
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(d) D, managing director of the M Construction 
Company, who has drawn up a scheme for the con­
version of the terraces into two and three 
bedroomed units particularly suitable for first­
time buyers.
(e) E, the now Director of Environmental Health for 
the City Council, who as Medical Officer of 
Health recommended the demolition of the cottages 
in 1970 and is now maintaining that they could 
and ought to be preserved.
(f) R, co-ordinator of the Housing Assessment Team, 
responsible to E, and at the time of this case 
very much concerned with demonstrating the success 
of HAT as a mechanism for saving housing units that 
would otherwise have been lost.
We shall restrict discussion to those directly concerned 
with the Housing Assessment Team and concentrate here 
upon R, the co-ordinator of HAT, and E, the Director 
of Environmental Health to whom R reports.
In trying to understand the meaning and causes of any 
social action, particularly that which occurs within 
organisations, with reference to the concept of 
interests, it is important to construe the notion 
widely enough to take account of more than merely 
selfish behaviour on the part of the actors concerned. 
Parsons (1960) has referred to this point in considering
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the variety of causes that may lie behind directed 
action;
"1 do not think it is useful to postulate a deep 
dichotomy between theories which give importance 
to beliefs and values on the one hand, to allegedly 
'realistic* interests, e.g. economic, on the other. 
Beliefs and values are actualised, partially and 
imperfectly, in realistic situations of social inter­
action and the outcomes are always codetermined by 
the values and the realistic exigencies; conversely 
what on concrete levels are called 'interests* are 
by no means independent of the values which have been 
institutionalised in the relevant groups. Thus churches 
have 'interests* just as definitely as do business 
firms or trade unions though of course the content 
is different."
So that within the context of an organisation, 
personal interests commonly have an organisational 
reference. Although entirely external interests may 
often be important and significant in determining 
behaviour, they usually represent only a sub-set 
of that which is of concern to the individual. It 
is also useful to differentiate between means and 
ends, so that we may attempt to make some judgement 
about when to stop probing behind what people tell 
us. Maslow (1954) has observed that;
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"If we examine carefully the average desires that 
we have in daily life, we find that they have at 
least one important characteristic, i.e. that they are 
usually means to an end rather than ends in themselves. 
We want money so that we may have an automobile.
In turn we want an automobile because the neighbours 
have one and we do not wish to feel inferior to them, 
so that we can retain our own self-respect and so that 
we can be loved and respected by others. Usually when 
a conscious desire is analysed we find that we can 
go behind it, so to speak, to other, more fundamental 
aims of the individual."
Interests, aims, values, desires; it is not our 
intention here to become embroiled in the exclusive 
definitions of overlapping concepts. We are using 
the term Personal Interest in this chapter to represent 
either end states or more intermediary means that have 
salience for an individual and therefore give rise 
to purposive behaviour when he is faced with situations 
of choice.
(i) R ; Some Dimensions of Personal Interest 
R has been co-rodinator of HAT since the team was 
set up in 1975. The formation of this team, and 
indeed of many similar teams in Local Government, 
followed upon the reorganisation of 1974 and the 
then current trend towards what has been broadly
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labelled corporate management thinking. Interdisci­
plinarity was a key idea at that time and HAT was 
conceived very much in those terms, its members 
having diverse backgrounds in planning, surveying, 
architecture, estate agency, costing and environmental 
health. R, then a Senior Inspector of Environmental 
Health, found himself caught up in this new inter­
disciplinary thinking and was given the task of 
acting as chairman and administrator for the Housing 
Assessment Team. He threw himself into his new job 
with enthusiasm, initiated an extensive survey of 
property in the City and ended up with a long list 
of 'marginal* houses, that is, houses that are con­
sidered by the official standards for environmental 
health to be unfit or almost unfit for habitation 
and which will need either to be brought up to standard, 
converted for non-residential use or else demolished.
The selection of actual team members was largely 
out of R's hands, although he was able to contribute 
some suggestions where two or more people appeared 
to qualify more or less equally for membership. He 
was, however, responsible to E for working out the 
modus operandi of the team, for deciding upon the 
procedures for meetings, the frequency of meetings, 
for drawing up the agendas and writing the minutes, 
for allocating executive, out-of-meeting work amongst 
members, and for the progress of this work against
217
the team’s timetable.
The original proposals about HAT conceived the team 
as having a limited life, in that it was to be set up 
rather as an interdepartmental working party to carry 
out a particular task, and would disband when this 
task had been achieved. A review date was suggested 
and agreed, and was six weeks away at the time of the 
public inquiry. R was at that time in the course of 
preparing a review of HAT's work and was concerned 
to argue three main points therein;
(a) That HAT had been instrumental in adding significantly 
to the City's housing stock and, at the same
time, in helping to preserve its architectural 
heritage.
(b) That, in achieving these objectives, it has 
managed to mobilise private sector finance to
a large extent, by negotiating each case carefully 
with the interested parties and finding common 
interests between them and the team.
(c) That there is a continuing need for this kind
of work as ageing properties fall into disrepair 
and that HAT or something like it ought to be 
maintained on a permanent basis to deal with this 
need.
The timing of the public inquiry was rather apposite.
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As R observed to me:
"Housing Assessment is normally pretty low-profile. 
Not many people are very clear what we do and some 
don't know that we exist. If we can make a good 
case at the inquiry and are seen to be taking a 
broad view of things, then we might get the team 
established on a permanent basis."
1 asked him then whether that was something that he 
would like to happen.
"Oh, certainly. Apart from the fact that I'm a bit 
higher on the scale than I would otherwise be, it 
makes the work much more interesting. I get about 
a lot more than 1 ever used to."
During the course of a number of discussions I had 
with R about his position as co-ordinator of HAT, a 
number of personal objectives emerged which seem also 
to be, for him, important positive attributes of the 
job. These are as follows;
(a) Increased job satisfaction; R seems to derive
a considerable amount of interest and satisfaction 
from this position. He says that he enjoys 
being based in Bath, he gets on well with his 
colleagues and likes being able to 'get out of 
the office', visit properties and meet the public.
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He finds the ambiance of his occupational 
status quo congenial and -would not like it to 
change.
(b) Increased chances of internal promotion; R 
believes that making a success out of HAT must 
improve his chances of promotion within his own 
department, not just as a direct result of the 
team's achievements being 'officially recognised', 
but also because as co-ordinator of the team
he is able to move within a wider circle of 
potentially influential people, both Local 
Government officers and elected council members.
(c) Increased job mobility; R considers that the 
experience accumulated during his association 
with the team will provide him with more career 
options if he ever decides to change his job.
He sees the value of this experience as deriving 
both from the actual business of managing the 
team and from the fact that the work involves him 
in meeting people with a wide variety of back­
grounds, expertise and seniority.
(d) Increased organisational status; from that attach­
ing to his normal Local Government grade of 
Senior Inspector of Environmental Health to the 
slightly higher status level afforded him on
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account of the extra work, responsibility and 
acting seniority associated with being co-ordinator 
of HAT. This is status which, partly, he gives 
to himself but which seems to be reinforced by 
the reactions of the people that work with and 
around him.
(e) Increased income; from the step up in grade that 
accompanies the position.
R apparently associates these occupational attributes 
with his job as viewed as a whole rather than linking 
them specifically with individual cases. However, 
particular cases seem to serve these interests to the 
extent that they either result in 'successful* outcomes, 
in R's terms, and/or are inherently interesting to 
him as pieces of working life. R found it difficult 
when asked to place these interests in an order of 
priority or to assign them any kind of importance 
weighting, but he did agree that the way that he views 
his working world is significantly affected by an 
important preoccupation which essentially seems to 
combine both job satisfaction and status. He articu­
lated this as followsI
"It's good to feel as though you're achieving something 
and having an effect that people can recognise. I'm no 
more or less concerned about status really than anyone
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else in this department, less than most probably, but 
I like to think that what I'm doing is being taken 
seriously by the people here and by the public outside."
We now examine these identified interests in greater 
detail and reflect upon some of the comments that R 
has made about each.
Job Satisfaction
R is by temperament lively and active. He likes things 
to be happening and likes to be busy himself. He is 
not a prevaricator and when faced with a list of jobs 
to do against a deadline, which he often is, he presses 
on and works his way steadily through them. He will 
ring someone now rather than wait until 'later on' - 
he will dictate a letter while he thinks of it, rather 
than piling work up in his 'in' tray. As regards the 
main business of the Housing Assessment Team, he prefers 
to see results in the short term rather than the 
longer term, to see some action taken which works 
rather than to prolong debate about alternatives.
He is a kind of pragmatist, a seeker of quick compromise.
At the same time R does not take precipitate action 
before having thought implications through carefully 
and he also takes some satisfaction from contemplating 
the complexity of some of the cases that come his way.
He is aware of and almost relishes conflicting criteria
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and conflicting needs and he sees it as being the job 
of HAT to mediate sensibly and steer a 'middle course' 
between the requirements of different interested 
parties. In this connection, R has noted:
"When a HAT case comes up, the first thing we are 
normally trying to do is to maintain the housing 
stock level. This can happen in a variety of ways 
but there may be conflicts between us and the owners, 
or between owners and tenants or between co-owners 
who want to do different things with the property.
Then there are conservationists who will have a 
different view again. Even on the team, there are 
differences between the members. J (the senior 
planning member) would sometimes be prepared to save 
houses that would cost a fortune to keep in a habitable 
condition, but then his business is the heritage of 
the city more than anything else. Sometimes I disagree 
with D. His background is in Estate Agency and he 
still tends to look at properties in terms of their 
open market potential. But I am mostly concerned 
with providing as many acceptable housing units as 
possible as economically as possible."
R is clearly operating with the assumption that the 
various parties in a case will, in general, have 
different starting points and views of the situation. 
But he regards that as part of the interest of his
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job rather than as a 'complication' to the smooth 
running of things. He derives satisfaction from 
handling such cases and bringing them to some kind 
of successful conclusion. But this is a more 
'intellectual' satisfaction than the immediate 
gratification that he appears to derive from action, 
from getting things done. The first might be said 
to be connected with his image of himself in his 
work setting. So that wherever he is, whatever he 
is doing, whether he is at work or not, he will be 
able to regard himself as someone who does this kind 
of job and who is concerned with these kinds of things 
This is a more or less permanent picture of his work 
situation which he can 'take out' and look at anytime 
and gain some satisfaction from. It is almost a 
savouring of his position in the scheme of things.
The second, shorter term, satisfaction is rather a 
Conative-Affective than a Cognitive phenomenon in 
Maslow's (op. cit.) terminology. It is associated 
with immediate taste, with more serious gratification 
than the more reflective pleasure to be obtained from 
appreciating a particular view of the world and one's 
place within it. R himself noted that :
"There's a difference between enjoying something 
during the day and then looking at the total picture 
from the comfort of your armchair in the evening."
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Internal Promotion
R is not at the moment particularly keen to move a-way 
from the Bath/Bristol area, although he says that he 
■would do so if an attractive job 'came up’ . He is 
comfortably settled in his home, his wife is working 
at a job she enjoys and their two children are getting 
on well at the schools that they're attending. R would 
prefer to take promotion within the Bath City Council 
itself . He views HAT as possibly helping towards such 
a promotion because:
(a) There is scope for the team itself to be developed 
as a permanent entity which requires management 
and resources i.e. as a modest example of empire 
building.
(b) HAT, under R's guidance, can achieve some 
obviously beneficial results, and such success 
can itself be officially recognised and also 
noticed outside Local Government.
(c) As co-ordinator of HAT, R gets the opportunity 
to move within a wider circle of potentially 
influential people - Local Government Officers, 
elected council members and influential members 
of the public e.g. local solicitors, chairmen 
of local groups, etc. who have personal connec­
tions with both the council members and the 
upper Local Government echelons.
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(a ) Empire Building
The Housing Assessment Team was established in 1975, 
following upon Local Government Reorganisation and the 
introduction of 'Corporate Management’ practices.
However, the Team was originally conceived as a short­
term working party with a limited life set up to do 
a particular job of work. What has since become clear, 
over the period of its life however, is first that 
the original task of dealing with a list of marginal 
properties is taking longer than was then anticipated, 
but also that the list was capable of considerable 
extension even at the start and needed to be added to 
in any case as time progressed, more properties became 
marginal and therefore required attention. In order 
to maintain HAT as a going concern in the future, R 
has not only to demonstrate this last point but also 
that he is achieving successes with the original list.
It is partly for this reason, as well as for the 
reasons of job satisfaction mentioned earlier, that R 
likes to 'press on' and bring cases to an early and 
satisfactory conclusion. To be seen to be achieving 
results is of some importance if HAT is to be kept on 
the road with R in the chair. He commented that;
"I suppose you might call it a bit of a numbers game. 
Anyone who doesn't really know what we've been doing 
but is still trying to evaluate the work will be strongly 
influenced by the number of properties we've dealt with.
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They won't see all the things that we had to think 
about. They won't know about the quality of each 
job."
(b) Recognition of Results
If HAT, regardless of what form it takes in the future, 
is seen to have been responsible for producing some 
'good* results, then these results may of themselves 
gain R kudos. His immediate boss, E, will in turn be 
regarded with some favour by the Chief Executive if 
some progress appears to have been made on the problem 
of restoring Bath's marginal housing. A pressure for 
success does seem to be passed down to R, although 
what really counts as success higher up is not at all 
clear. R pointed to the difference between a careful 
and considered evaluation of results and a rough and 
ready appraisal that is satisfied so long as something 
appropriate seems to be happening either often enough 
or in large enough quantities. It is by and large 
this last kind of measure which is perforce applied 
by senior executives or council members to HAT's 
output.
(c) Influential Circle
Being co-ordinator of HAT means that R comes into 
contact with a much wider circle of people than he 
would as a senior officer of environmental health, his 
normal designation otherwise. This is true both
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because of the interdisciplinary/interdepartmental 
nature of the work, but also because R is often meeting 
members of the public, or their representatives such 
as solicitors, accountants and estate agents. He 
obtains two types of benefit from this. First, a 
straightforward and immediate benefit because he quite 
simply enjoys meeting different types of people. This 
makes, R says, the working day more congenial, and 
gives him a sense of greater significance. But it 
also allows him the potential to move into prominence 
and to escape from the relative obscurity of the 
Department of Environmental Health into a somewhat 
wider net of Local Government affairs. He made the 
following observation about this issue;
"If you can get out of the office a bit and meet a 
few people who are prominent in the town it seems to 
me that there's a greater chance of opportunities 
coming your way. But if you just swim in your own 
particular little pond then you're likely to stay 
there, even if you eventually rise to the top of it. 
Besides, you can then get talked about to people who 
are controlling your position in the pond and this can 
be a way of filtering good P.R. into the system."
There is a certain pathos in this rather optimistic 
suggestion that by exposing himself to a wider circle 
of people engaged in local affairs R will somehow
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increase his chances of doing better within his career. 
Presumably, some opportunity or other 'might turn up'.
Increased Job Mobility
R has said that he regards the experience he has obtained 
from working with HAT as potentially valuable if he 
ever decided to move from Local Government (probably 
an unlikely event) into administration or management 
in some different organisational context. He sees 
this value as deriving principally from two connec­
ted aspects. First, that he has now accumulated some 
inter-departmental experience, some knowledge of 
planning, of estates management and building surveying 
and engineering practices. Second, that he is able 
to say that he has been operating as manager of an 
interdisciplinary working team, responsible for co­
ordinating its work and controlling its output.
Increased Organisational Status
The question of status did not often arise in discussion 
with the people who work in the Department of Environ­
mental Health where R is based. There are four other 
environmental health officers, one senior and three 
junior to R. The atmosphere surrounding the workplace 
has a distinctive Local Government flavour. It is one 
of rather unexciting but homely respectability. Yet 
one thing that R apparently obtains from his somewhat 
novel position as co-ordinator of HAT is just a hint
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of a different world, a world of appointments, meetings, 
debate, deadlines - a world of ’management'. R gets 
a taste of the life of the 'executive', on a small 
enough scale, but nonetheless as a real enough feeling.
He has taken on certain mannerisms which are more 
'businesslike' than the normal, rather languid Local 
Government style. Crisp phone calls to elicit information 
from obscure clerks, meeting minutes dictated and 
produced in short time, use of the intercom to give 
instructions to his secretary when it would actually 
be quicker to put his head round the door and talk to 
her.
Thus R has somehow elevated his position and changed 
his image by becoming involved with the management 
of this team. It is not only his image to himself 
that he has changed in this way but also the impression 
that he conveys to other people. One of the members 
of the office staff has noted;
"R was always tidy and organised but he has become 
even more businesslike since he became seriously 
involved with HAT. We pull his leg about it sometimes."
When I asked R about any possible change of status 
resulting from his involvement with the Housing 
Assessment Team, he replied that;
230
"It doesn't make any difference really. Nobody worries 
much about that sort of thing here. People would soon 
pull you down from a high horse."
And yet the image he has of himself in his job is
clearly important to R. It is not status based in a
competitive way, but rather in a more absolute sense 
in that he prefers to see himself as making a useful 
contribution to the world at large rather than as a 
bureaucratic paper-pusher.
Increased Income
R has improved his position on the Local Government 
salary scale by taking on the extra responsibility of 
co-ordinating HAT. Welcome though this slight gain 
doubtless is to a family man whose salary is in any
case modest, this aspect of the job appears to be of
less significance than any of the others. R may be 
ambitious, up to a point and within the limited confines 
of his particular area of Local Government, but the 
relatively small differentials that apply to different 
managerial grades are unlikely to be serious motivators 
in themselves. What he seems to be more concerned 
with is his competence and self-respect.
R commented on the fact that, because the Housing 
Assessment Team had reached something of a turning
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point in its life, he had been thinking more about what 
he wanted from his job just recently:
"You see, when the inquiry came up and also this 
review being due, I suddenly realised that I wouldn't 
like to revert to the pre-HAT days. That would be 
pretty dreary. So I'm doing everything possible to 
see that it continues."
We move on now to look at how some of E's interests 
came to the surface in the course of the discussions 
thrown up by event of the public inquiry.
(ii) E« Some Dimensions of Personal Interest
E is in his early sixties and was due to retire some 
eighteen months after the time that this case was 
current. He has been in Local Government almost all 
his working life and is a highly experienced committee 
man. Despite his longevity of service, however, he 
appears to be rather nervous, seems to lack self- 
confidence and is cautious about making final decisions 
He is known to his staff as an arch prevaricator and 
is famed for sitting on the fence. E is an exponent 
of planned procrastination, a devotee of masterly 
inactivity in cases of doubt. His over-riding ambition 
is to arrive safely at retirement without any organis­
ational disasters occurring. However, the particular 
case that provided the stimulus for this chapter also
232
proved to be something of a threat to the smooth 
running of his affairs. It involved the public airing 
and hopeful reconciliation of two contradictory view­
points taken by E and his department at different 
points in time. The cottages that are the subject 
of this case were recommended by the Bath City Council 
for demolition largely on E ’s say so, in 1970. Quoting 
again from the proceedings of the public inquiry:
"In December 1970 the City Council received and 
accepted the official representation of the Medical 
Officer of Health ... that
(a) the houses in the area were unfit for human 
habitation
(b) the most satisfactory method of dealing with the 
conditions in the area was the demolition of all 
the buildings in the area.
The City Council accordingly declared a Clearance 
Area and made a Compulsory Purchase Order under the 
Housing Acts ..."
The administration necessary to complete that order 
took so long to operate that its final appearance was 
preceded both by reorganisation and by an official 
change in local government housing policy. This was 
introduced by a white paper in 1974 which exhorted 
urban councils to make the most of existing housing
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properties and to rehabilitate and convert rather than 
demolish and build afresh. The Housing Assessment 
Team was eventually instituted in Bath as a direct 
result of this policy change. The fate of the 
cottages which had once been recommended for demolition 
was thus once again up for review, this time under the 
new Housing Assessment procedures and their stated 
objective of finding an economical^ acceptable way 
of converting them back into housing units. The 
properties were duly "processed* and accepted as being 
economically convertible. R had negotiated a scheme 
with an interested development company. Shortly 
afterwards, Avon County Council re-proposed the road 
widening scheme which necessitated demolishing the 
cottages on Prior Park Road. Bath City Council was 
then put in the difficult position of having to defend 
in public the retention of the cottages that it had 
previously recommended be demolished. This incon­
sistency could in principle be easily rationalised by 
the policy change that had taken place in the interim, 
but E, who had been involved in the earlier case and 
was now giving evidence on behalf of HAT, was nervous 
about the situation. He knew how these things tended 
to be looked at. He commented to me thati
"It*s never a question of rational reasoning in these 
situations. People are always suspicious when you 
change your mind. It smacks of indecisiveness and
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incompetence. You are assumed not to have thought 
things through carefully in the first place. It's 
a great pity really. If officers felt more able to 
change their minds I'm sure we'd have less really 
major cock ups. Still, we all have to survive the 
way things are."
Although E would undoubtedly be able to make a sound 
and sensible case for the apparent change in viewpoint 
of his department, he knew that something else would 
rub off on them. When I asked him whether he was 
seriously concerned about that, he replied that it 
didn't matter much, particularly at his stage of the 
game. I wasn't sure that he believed what he said though;
"Well it won't affect me really. I'll be retiring in 
a year or two anyway. I'm quite secure until then.
I've got quite a fair track record you see."
That fact that E referred at all to the question of 
security seemed indicative of a certain edginess.
He also mentioned his 'track record' to me, a confidence 
I was rather surprised at. His staff had always told 
me that E was basically good at his job, but was 
forever worried about putting a foot wrong. In my 
discussions over this case I had expected him therefore 
to be rather reserved. In fact he told me a great deal 
about how he saw his job. In particular, three factors
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kept coming up which could be interpreted as personal 
interest that E would always bear in mind when over­
seeing the work of HAT. They were:
(a) Providing competent output for the Housing Committee 
as and when required.
(b) Making sure that members of the public were never 
upset to the extent of generating bad publicity.
(c) Making sure that the Department of Environmental 
Health kept its end up with respect to other 
departments represented on the team.
Acceptable Output
The Housing Committee, comprising a small group of 
councillors, meets approximately every month. Recom­
mendations made by the Housing Assessment Team are 
put to this committee for action. E sees it as being 
important to maintain a steady flow into this committee 
as an indication that work is being continuously 
carried out. He commented to me that:
"The Councillors need to see that we are processing 
the business. They don't know what we do really. But 
they're all puritans at heart and like to think that 
the taxpayer is getting value for money. Unfortunately 
that is often measured in quantity rather than quality."
Thus, when E is overseeing R, which he does on a
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weekly basis, one of his important objectives as the 
monthly committee meeting draws near will be to see 
that HAT comes up with sufficient material for that 
meeting, either in the form of recommendations or at 
least a progress report in the case of work or nego­
tiations in process. This pressure drives R ’s work 
along, so that quick and ready solutions to housing 
cases are preferred to solutions which require lengthy 
negotiations through correspondence or where there 
are extensive external alterations proposed that 
necessitate delicate, time-consuming, planning 
applications.
Keeping the Public Happy
There are two significant sub-sets of the public at 
large that can interact closely with HAT in the normal 
course of housing cases. These are;
(i) Individuals directly concerned with particular 
cases, e.g. occupiers, owners, estate agents, 
bank managers, solicitors, property developers, 
contractors.
(ii) Members of local conservation and planning groups 
who are acting continually as watchdogs on the 
Council, on property developers and the environ­
mental changes that they may bring about.
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With the first group E exhibits a strong profession­
alism. He is careful how he treats them. This is 
not always the same thing as being concerned about 
their welfare. Rather, he treats them so as not to 
infringe any rules of conduct in that situation, is 
cautious in the construction of letters, for example, 
or about what he says at meetings. He has learned in 
a long career in local government not to promise what 
cannot be achieved, to be circumspect in the quoting 
of figures and cautious in estimating deadlines and 
the time required for any particular piece of work to 
be carried out. R differs from E in the extent of 
such caution. He is more likely to open his mouth 
in order to move the business on, even at the risk of 
offending someone or at the risk of being misquoted.
At the same time he is aware of E*s circumspection 
and this is apt to affect his selection of courses of 
action. R has noted;
"E is very careful when he is dealing with people 
outside the Department. I suppose I do a lot of things 
that he wouldn't, but at least I try and move things 
along. But sometimes I'm aware that I will have to 
explain to him some course of action I'm thinking of 
taking and then I tend to fall into his way of thinking."
On the same subject, E confided to me that;
238
"R is very good at getting things done, but he sometimes 
gets carried away. He’s been lucky so far, but if 
you don’t cover your tracks very carefully, you can 
come unstuck when dealing with the public. When 
things go wrong, they will lay into the bureaucrats 
without any mercy at all.’’
Over a period of time, R has picked up something of 
this circumspection, E*s wish to keep a clean record 
and his consequent caution have their effect, through 
R, upon Housing Assessment outcomes. R, because of 
E*s operating style, tends to watch out for potentially 
serious brushes and conflict with the members of the 
public he is dealing with. Rather, he attempts as 
far as possible to maintain smooth external relations.
With the conservation groups, E is more relaxed;
"They're more a part of the system really, they 
know the procedures, know how to behave. Some of 
them have some very strong views of course, and they 
can put them over too. But they never play dirty, 
not in my experience. So long as you keep them 
informed and listen to what they have to say."
Representing the Department
Three other Departments apart from Environmental Health 
are represented on HAT. The Planning Department, the
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Estates Management Department and The Building Engineers 
There are rivalries between these Departments, and 
particularly between Planning and Environmental Health. 
This is partly because of a certain overlapping of 
professional concerns. Both are concerned with 
evaluating buildings against certain criteria and there 
are occasions when those criteria come into conflict. 
Planning people tend to regard environmental helath 
people as rather conservative, unimaginative and 
pedantic, stolidly adhering to a fixed list of rather 
'down-to-earth* requirements for buildings e.g. location 
of WC's, size of doorways, amount of sunlight, and so 
on. Environmental Health people tend to regard planners 
as arty, impractical and over-liberal, often not 
having sufficient recognition of the 'constraints of 
real life'.
E is somewhat intimidated by his opposite numbers in 
the Planning Department. He is by nature very reserved, 
almost shy and, although he is overall a competent 
administrator, he seems to find the social aspects of 
meetings and committees difficult to handle. The 
Planners, by virtue of the kind of people they are, 
find such interaction entirely non-problematic and so 
have a continuous process edge over E . E often responds 
by retreating back to make or defend a particular 
point, hanging onto this idea doggedly and thus 
tending to enhance the caricature of Environmental
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Health officers that the Planners hold. Nevertheless, 
he is always trying in such meetings to keep his 
department's flag flying, to ensure that his staff 
are seen to be making a competent contribution and 
to retain, as it were, the mandate to be co-ordinating 
HAT'S activities.
E observed to me that:
"My people are good at their jobs and I always try 
and represent what they do as well as possible. The 
Planners are inclined to put us down, of course.
They see us as a load of stodgy public health 
inspectors. But R will often take a much broader 
view than they do so they have to look to their 
laurels."
E clearly relies upon R to keep his Department's image 
fresh and up with the competition. Although he 
is sometimes nervous about R's propensity for action, 
he is pleased that R is able to get things done and, 
also, that he puts up a good show in relation to the 
Planners.
6.4 Some Observations on a Personal Interest Model
The foregoing discussion has dealt with some examples 
of two sets of individual interests that were high­
lighted during the course of a particular HAT case.
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We have not been concerned with the events of the case 
itself except insofar as they have triggerd comments 
that increase our knowledge about the preoccupations 
that members of the team take to their work and to 
their interactions with each other. We are interested 
here in the manifestation of the concept of personal 
interest and how the idea might or might not help us 
to understand the processes involved in group decision­
making .
By personal interest, we have been implicit^ referring 
to some kind of drive in an individual to look after 
himself within an organisational context. An extreme 
model of this form would presumably view such a team 
as HAT as a forum for all out competition between the 
members, in which they were each continually struggling 
to come out best, whatever they might each mean by that 
It is quite clear, however, that in HAT this process 
is not happening in any strongly competitive way. We 
must somehow refine the concept if it is to have any 
useful explanatory power.
What might be described as the units of personal 
interest are apparently highly idiosyncratic. We have 
seen in this case something of the diversity in 
dimension of the aims recognised and pursued by R, 
and how E is a very different sort of person with 
different concerns. But even if there did exist some
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commonality of concepts between such individuals, 
the value that each might place on the ideas could 
presumably vary considerably. Two people may each 
be able to construe the notion of 'maximising annual 
salary', but one might put a high value on this as 
an activity while another, a devout Christian perhaps, 
might actively attempt not to improve his financial 
well-being at the expense of other organisation members.
In this example, though, do we then go on to say that 
the salary-chaser is highly self-interested while 
his more public-spirited colleague is the very anti­
thesis of this, or do we suppose that each defines 
his own self-interest in a very particular way?
Maslow (op. cit.) would contend that simple definitions 
of self-interest in this sense are in any case 
impossible*
"We should give up the attempt once and for all to 
make atomistic lists of drives or needs. For several 
different reasons such lists are theoretically unsound. 
First of all they imply an equality of the various 
drives that are listed, an equality of potency and 
probability of appearance. This is incorrect because 
the probability of any one desire emerging into 
consciousness depends on the state of satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction of other prepotent desires.
There are great differences in probability of appearance
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of the various particular drives.
"Secondly such a listing implies an isolatedness 
of each of these drives from each of the others.
Of course they are not isolated in any such fashion.
"Third, such a listing of drives, since it is usually 
made on the behavioural basis, neglects completely 
all that we know about the dynamic nature of drives."
From a research point of view, it is important to 
distinguish between what a person will state as a 
personal objective and what can be implied from his 
behaviour. D, the Estates Management representative 
on HAT, is often to be heard espousing an ambition 
to earn lots of money. He will make this point with 
apparent seriousness and it does sometimes seem as 
though part of the image that he likes to portray to 
the outside world includes the possibility of his 
being able to become a 'financial success'. Yet his 
actions and strategies within his own department do 
not always match those of a man determined to get to 
the top and, indeed, the fact that he is relatively 
securely employed in Local Government rather than 
doing battle in private practice 'outside' might give 
some indication of other objectives that are at least 
as important.
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Implied by identifying the notion of personal interest 
is the existence of concepts which reflect other kinds 
of interest. Concerns about the working group, for 
example, concerns about other individuals in the 
organisation, concerns for the institution itself, 
concerns for one’s family, concerns for a particular 
political cause are other possible components in 
the mix of criteria for adjudging the goodness of 
ideas or events. The definitional question raised 
earlier applies here too. That is, if an individual 
is to be regarded as being driven by any such preoccupa­
tion, is it reasonable to say that he is acting in 
his own self-interest, this being defined in a 
different way, or might there rather exist some kind 
of trade-off between personal interest and *other* 
interests or sometimes even the complete sublimation 
of personal interest in favour of some other cause.
The question of the moral judgements that people make 
about the pursuit of individual interests is important 
in an organisational context. There is often a curious 
ambivalence within commercial or administrative 
organisations concerning the 'proper* pursuit, for 
example, of ambition. Thus, whilst it might be 
recognised and generally accepted by the staff of a 
local government department that it is a good thing 
for a junior officer to be hardworking, competitive 
and concerned about his career, there are normally
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quite fine social limits applied to this trait and 
a point may be reached when other staff members will 
start to make perjorative evaluations about an individual 
who is seen to be exclusively concerned with himself 
and not enough about his colleagues or the work group 
or the institution or the public or whatever else.
That is, there are clearly more or less socially 
acceptable ways of pursuing one's own interests within 
the confines of an organisation.
Different individuals will have different ideas about 
what those limits are and, moreover, will be constrained 
by them in different ways and in differing degrees. 
Whatever the philosophical issues, too, that surround 
the reification of concepts such as 'organisation', 
'committee* or 'department', there is no doubt that 
individuals working within an organisation will often 
have quite strong ideas about the extent to which they 
feel that they ought to have individual freedom and 
the extent to which the organisation ought to prevail 
in given sets of circumstances. This sense of balance 
derives partly from the fact that the individual is 
himself party to at least an economic contractual 
relationship with the organisation, partly from a 
long process of socialisation which will have constantly 
reaffirmed the idea that there is a time and a place 
for everything and that the individual often has to 
subordinate himself to a larger or somehow more
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important cause, and partly from authority relationships 
and rules of behaviour that exist within the organis­
ation and that are commonly deemed to be proper to 
the business of working for a living.
So that while an individual may perceive for himself 
a particular personal objective and see ways in which 
that aim could be fulfilled, he may also be constrained 
from following the strategy through by the belief that 
he ought not really to be doing that sort of thing and 
that the collective of which he is a part ought properly 
to have a prior call upon his loyalties.
In this connection, there was a rather singular meeting 
of the Housing Assessment Team that took place during 
the late summer of 1978. The first hour of the morning 
was entirely given over to the discussion of where 
everyone had been or was planning to go on holiday.
R*s visit to Wales, J*s trip to Brittany, G*s tour 
of Italy, D*s proposed camping holiday and the author's 
recent sailing weekend kept everyone fully absorbed 
until R finally remarked:
"We really ought to start working through this agenda, 
less exciting though that probably will be!"
Then the team settled down 'to business', interactions 
became more formal and more carefully phrased and the
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team members became more serious as they once again 
started to carry out their organisational duty.
As far as HAT is concerned, there appear to exist 
levels of interaction at which it is difficult to 
conceive of any kind of significant personal interest 
as being able to have an effect upon the outcome 
of a meeting. When, for example, the technical details 
of a proposed property conversion are being discussed, 
there is precious little scope for individuals to 
cunningly turn affairs to their own advantage. The 
stages are low and conversation turns upon the width 
of a staircase, the state of the plaster in a kitchen 
or the condition of the stone in an adjoining wall.
There does exist some kind of pressure for contributions 
to be competent; that is, to be coherent, germane, 
articulate and timely. A certain amount of off-the- 
track rambling is allowable, but there is a close 
consensus about when that limit is reached.
An important question now to ask is, in what sort of 
way do the 3d.nds of category of personal interest 
that we have identified for R and E relate to the 
typical sequence of discourse and events that constitutes 
a housing assessment case. It has already been made 
clear that we do not consider that attempts to con­
struct formal models that aspire to the status of 
system specifications or simulation algorithms are
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the most effective way to throw light upon the workings 
of a social group such as HAT. Our intention has 
rather been to draw out and elaborate from case 
material gleaned from a long association with the 
group, well-formed concepts which can contribute, 
in a similar way as would any relevant ideas or 
experience from other sources, to insight into its 
workings.
We have therefore identified five different areas of 
uncertainty that could possibly be reduced by con­
sideration of a developed concept of personal 
interest; that is to say, five classes of knowledge 
which can be derived from the findings. These are:
(i) Knowledge about the psychological make-up of 
particular individuals - that is, what they are 
like as people.
(ii) Knowledge about the kinds of ways in which 
particular individuals are likely to react to 
and treat a particular topic for discussion.
(iii) Knowledge about the likely reactions of indi­
viduals to simple turning points.
(iv) From these first three points, knowledge about 
likely outcomes in dialogue discussion or two- 
person meetings.
(v) Knowledge about the nature of particular group 
outcomes.
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We now examine these ideas individually
(i) Knowledge about what individuals are like
One of the first things that a researcher does, quite 
naturally, when starting to look at a particular social 
situation, is to build up a picture of what sort of 
people the participants are. At the very first 
meeting he will use whatever information is available 
(and it might be very sketchy) to construct caricatures 
on all kinds of dimensions - background, 'intelligence*, 
occupation (if that is not already clear), 'personality', 
likely outside interests, seniority and so on. These 
initial models are modified and elaborated over time 
as more information is collected about each person and 
each is seen in an increasing number of different sets 
of circumstances and surroundings. As we learn more 
about what individuals are like then we are better able 
to predict what they will do in new situations. We 
tend to presume that this is a monotonically increasing 
relationship - that is, the more that we 'know' about 
an individual the greater our predictive power or, at 
least, the less likely we are to be surprised by his 
actions.
It is difficult to say, however, exactly how such 
knowledge about a number of individuals can be 
'combined' to give us new knowledge about the overall 
characteristics of a group. What commonly happens.
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it seems, is that the group is reified and treated 
rather as a single operating unit. Over a period of 
time anyone studying a group with some consistency 
of membership will build up a model of what the group 
is like, and how it, collectively, is likely to react 
to new sets of circumstances. Knowledge about indi­
vidual members is clearly an important part of this 
model. More interestingly, concepts or categories of 
behaviour abstracted from the actions of individual 
members in particular groups will have a more general 
value in explaining how other similar groups might 
operate.
What we are saying here is that gaining knowledge 
about individuals in a group is probably the first 
and most effective thing that a researcher can do.
It is relatively easy both to build up and articulate 
that knowledge over time and to classify items of 
behaviour and draw out abstractions. Consideration 
of particular events and the relationship between 
particulars and abstracted categories then improves 
our knowledge about that and other groups. The 
notion of personal interest seems to be a particularly 
useful focus for thinking about that relationship.
(ii) Knowledge about reactions to work material
This is, in a sense, a second order class of knowledge 
following on from (i). That is to say, information
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about the personal interests of an individual member 
of HAT may tell us something about how he is likely 
to relate to his work and react to particular pieces 
of subject matter. We may learn something about both 
his style of treatment and about the likely kind of 
content of his response. So that whilst (i) con­
stitutes knowledge about the individual, we can 
move on further to consider knowledge about the kinds 
of effects he can have. One such class is essentially 
the kind of work that he will generate.
(iii) Knowledge about reactions to simple 'turning points'
Knowledge about the personal interests, motives, aims 
or preferences of an individual group member will give 
us some basis for predicting and understanding how 
he will react to simple choice situations. We use 
the word simple advisedly and should probably restrict 
consideration to yes/no turning points. So that in 
a HAT meeting, when M, the second planning member is 
confronted by the question, 'shall we demolish this 
building?' he will almost always say 'no'. This is 
because he is a staunch, almost fanatical conservation­
ist and will always be able to find a good reason for 
retaining anything, at whatever cost. If this kind 
of simple question comes up in a meeting, we believe 
that we know how he will react. Similarly, D, if 
confronted by the question of whether public or private 
sector finance ought to be mobilised for a particular
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conversion, will always vote for private sector finance.
This is a strong and apparently rather consistent part
of his sytem of political beliefs. What we are saying,
then, is that if certain types of simple decision
questions arise at meetings, knowledge about the
interests of individual members can enable us to predict,
sometimes with a high degree of certainty, particular 
individual reactions.
(iv) Knowledge about dialogue outcomes
Extending the idea of knowledge about effects leads 
us to consider knowledge about how two individuals 
will interact. If we know something about the personal 
interests of two group members, we may be able to go 
on and say something about how those interests will 
interplay in dialogue and what kinds of outcome will 
be more or less likely.
(v) Knowledge about the nature of particular outcomes
We refer here not to the content of group output, but 
rather to how we think it has been derived. That is, 
there is clearly a difference between saying that a 
particular HAT decision is the result of a group of 
professionals conscientiously devoting themselves to 
the task of finding the best solution to a housing 
problem and saying that it is primarily the result 
of a personal battle between a couple of particularly 
careerist members. Knowledge of members’ personal
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interests will help us to appreciate what kind of 
result the team has produced.
These five classes represent different ways in which 
we believe that observations based upon an elaborated 
concept of personal interest can contribute to under­
standing about the workings of a group such as the 
Housing Assessment Team. In this chapter we have 
outlined a case in which the personal interest of the 
leaders of HAT came to the fore, mainly because a 
public inquiry took place and E and R were principally 
concerned with producing and making representations 
to the inquiry. We have attempted to articulate 
these interests and to illustrate how they can relate 
in general to incidents in particular meetings. We 
have also suggested some elaborations and problematics 
associated with the idea of personal interest as an 
explanatory concept. In this way, it was intended to 
lend further perspective to the notion of strategy 
and group interest discussed earlier in this thesis.
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7 A SATISFICING MODEL OF GROUP DECISION-MAKING
7.1 Intreduction
In this chapter we examine a model of group decision­
making based upon the notion of satisficing, developed 
by March and Simon (1958). Satisficing is associated 
with intentionally sub-optimising choice behaviour 
and we discuss instances of such behaviour which 
occurred in the course of a Housing Assessment Team 
case. We review the concept of satisficing and consider 
some aspects of the nature of the relationship between 
satisficing and its parent concept, optimising.
7.2 A Summary Case History
The Housing Assessment case that is outlined here 
has been unfolding over a period of several years.
It centres upon a small family business - a petrol 
filling and service station - and upon a terrace of 
five now crumbling 19th Century artisan cottages 
adjoining the garage itself. Early in 1974 these 
cottages, along with many other properties in the 
City of Bath, were listed for preservation as a result 
of an inspection exercise carried out by the Department 
of the Environment. The process of listing confers 
statutary obligations upon the owner of the property.
It becomes illegal for the property to be demolished 
and anyone who does wish to take down a listed 
building has to apply to the Department of the
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Environment for formal consent. The owner of a listed 
property is also obliged to maintain the building 
in sound structural and externally decorative order.
Set against these restrictions, the owner may apply 
for a variety of grants to help finance necessary 
maintenance work.
In 1975, the proprietor of the filling station, Mr B, 
who also owns the two terrace cottages immediately 
alongside, submitted to the City Planning Department 
proposals to demolish the end cottage and to thereby 
extend his garage frontage and forecourt. Planning 
permission for this project was refused on the grounds 
that the cottage was a listed building and also because 
it was thought that any increased traffic through the 
garage that might follow the enlargement of the fore­
court would adversely affect the living conditions 
for the residents in the remaining cottages. Mr B, 
however, decided to pursue the matter further and, 
after taking legal advice, submitted an application 
to the Department of the Environment for listed 
building consent to demolish the end terrace. This 
application resulted in a public inquiry and, in due 
course, the Inspector found in favour of the cottage 
being retained. Mr B*s plans, therefore, were 
thwarted again and he continued to run the garage 
using the existing facilities. Meanwhile, his two 
cottages steadily fell into a state of disrepair
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and soon became unfit to be used as living accommodation 
The general ambiance of the site was, in any case, 
hardly congenial for residential purposes, the 
properties being subject to noise from the garage 
workshops at the rear, to engine noise and exhaust 
fumes from cars using the filling station forecourt 
and from the considerable volume of traffic using the 
busy London Road on which the cottages and the garage 
stand.
The external condition of the cottages deteriorated 
further until it was in contravention of the standards 
laid down in the listed building legislation. It was 
at this stage, early in 1977, that the cottages first 
came to the formal attention of the Department of 
Environmental Health and, hence, of the Housing 
Assessment Team. The complete terrace was then added 
to the Housing Assessment Action List.
Thus began a drawn out series of discussions and 
negotiations primarily between R, the co-ordinator 
of the Housing Assessment Team, Mr B himself and 
Mr B*s solicitors. Mr B still hoped eventually to 
be able to pull down the deteriorating end terrace 
and extend his garage premises, but as R was continually 
pointing out, the public inquiry had found in favour 
of the cottages' retention and the law was the law.
R, meanwhile, had the task of trying to persuade
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Mr B to renovate the two cottages to an exterior 
standard that satisfied the listed building legis­
lation and, further, as part of the HAT programme, 
of seeing that they were put to good social use, 
preferably as housing.
The case was discussed at a number of HAT meetings 
and several possible uses for the cottages were 
suggested. Principal among these were office accommo­
dation for Mr B or a tenant, student living accommodation, 
temporary (Class 2) living accommodation for the City 
Council and overflow storage space for Mr B*s garage.
It was generally thought by members of the Team that 
the properties were not suitable for permanent living 
accommodation because of their position immediately 
adjoining the garage at the side and also the main 
road at the front. They tended to favour the con­
version of the cottages into offices.
Mr B was not enthusiastic about any of these schemes. 
Having twice been blocked from carrying out his 
original plan and having incurred significant legal 
costs in the process, he was not inclined to be 
especially co-operative with the City Council or 
with the Housing Assessment Team. However, the fact 
still remained that his two cottages were listed 
buildings and the legislation required him to maintain 
them to a certain standard. This legislation is backed
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by the sanction of the possibility of compulsory 
purchase by the Council.
Notwithstanding this sanction, Mr B appeared to be 
unwilling or unable to spend the money necessary 
to bring the cottages up to the required standard, 
even though, as R suggested, costs could be kept to 
a minimum by concentrating effort upon the outside 
of the properties and keeping the insides basic for 
offices or storage space. Indeed Mr B himself, in 
the very early stages of the negotiations, had sugges­
ted to R that he might use the end cottage as an 
extra office for the garage. He has since lost 
interest in the idea and it currently looks as though 
HAT will recommend to the Housing Committee that a 
compulsory purchase order be applied for with a view 
to either forcing Mr B to take some action himself 
or to the Council taking over the cottages and 
carrying out the necessary work itself.
7.3 Satisficing Behaviour
Satisficing is a term originally coined by Simon (1957) 
to refer to that kind of problem-solving behaviour 
characterised by the searching for workable 
rather than optimum solutions. As March and Simon 
(1958) have observed;
"Most human decision-making, whether individual or
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organisational, is concerned with the discovery 
and selection of satisfactory alternatives; only 
in exceptional cases is it concerned with the 
discovery and selection of optimal alternatives."
The analysis of this chapter focuses upon this basic 
idea and we shall be pointing to instances of what 
appears to be satisficing behaviour in the case 
outline in 7.2. But, at the same time, we shall also 
contend that the notion of satisficing is rather 
complex and ought not to be viewed purely in stark 
contradistinction with optimising. March and Simon 
(op. cit.) go on to say;
"... finding the optimal alternative is a radically 
different problem from finding a satisfactory alter­
native. An alternative is optimal if : (1) there 
exists a set of criteria that permits all alternatives 
to be compared, and (2) the alternative in question 
is preferred, by these criteria, to all other alter­
natives. An alternative is satisfactory if: (1) 
there exists a set of criteria that describes 
minimally satisfactory alternatives, and (2) the 
alternative in question meets or exceeds all these 
criteria."
In the current research, we are not concerned to 
prescribe strategies for taking good decisions.
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rather we are attempting to illuminate the processes 
by which people ^  decide, particularly when this 
activity is being carried out by more than one indivi­
dual negotiating together or by a decision-making 
group.
For the great majority of people who have no grounding 
in the analysis of decisions, the concept of best 
outcome is usually rather intuitively formed. Criteria 
for selection between options may exist but will often 
be fuzzy and half-recognised. Where, indeed, there 
is more than one criterion within the set, the process 
of weighing them against each other quickly becomes 
complicated, Ackoff (1962) has said that:
"It is not at all obvious what is meant by the 'best* 
solution to a problem. A final definition of 'best' 
in this context has not yet been attained, and it is 
not likely that it ever will be."
This is underlining a philosophical difficulty of 
deciding what is meant by optimum. Simon's (19 57) 
argument is rather that, whilst it is possible to 
define what it would mean for an individual to take 
a rationally optimum decision, the sheer complexity 
of the required process is usually completely over­
whelming:
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"It is impossible for the behaviour of a single, 
isolated individual to reach any high degree of 
rationality. The number of alternatives he must 
explore is so great, the information he would need 
to evaluate them so vast that even an approximation 
to objective rationality is hard to conceive."
Simon's use of the term objective rationality is 
interesting as a triangulation point, but it doesn't 
move us too far towards a better understanding of how 
decision-makers do actually cope with complexity.
Simon almost views the human incapacity as pathological 
Conversely, it could be argued that it is rather 
amazing how many apparently good decisions do get 
taken in cases where there is little reliable infor­
mation to go on.
There are two particular and very different ways of 
considering the concept of satisfying, both of which 
March and Simon (op. cit.) acknowledge.
The first is simply to regard satisficing as an 
expedient for coping with the pressures of work or 
time that would preclude a full analysis of the 
situation. The model here is that satisficing is 
a kind of second best strategy. It is saying that 
we would like to take a lot more into account if 
only we had the time or the resources, but actually
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we can only manage to pick out a reasonable looking 
option that seems to work and make do with that.
The second way of looking at satisficing is to 
recognise that the very process of analysis has costs 
associated with it and that it is usually possible 
to sense a point of equilibrium at which the marginal 
cost of obtaining further information is equal to 
the likely gain to be obtained from a "more optimal* 
solution. March and Simon (op. cit.) note that;
"In making choices that meet satisfactory standards, 
the standards themselves are part of the definition 
of the situation. Hence, we need not regard these 
as given - any more than the other element of the 
definition of the situation - but may include in the 
theory the processes through which these standards 
are set and modified. The standard-setting process 
may itself meet standards of rationality* for example, 
an 'optimising* rule would be to set the standard 
at the level where the marginal improvement in 
alternatives obtainable by raising it would be just 
balanced by the marginal cost of searching for alter­
natives meeting the higher standard. Of course, in 
practice the 'marginal improvement' and the 'marginal 
cost* are seldom measured in comparable units, or 
with much accuracy. Nevertheless, a similar result 
would be automatically attained if the standards were
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raised whenever alternatives proved easy to discover, 
and lowered whenever they were difficult to discover.
People are often heard to articulate this kind of 
idea in such comments as %
"It's not worth going into too much detail, I reckon 
that would do the job nicely."
or:
"We can't afford to hang around talking about it all 
morning, let's just go for this one and have done 
with it."
There is another reaction to the notion of satis­
ficing that we have not yet mentioned and it has to 
do with people's tastes and capacity for analysis.
Some individuals prefer to take quick decisions on 
the basis of hardly any information as a matter of 
personal style;
"Manoli's sixty-year old body reminds me of some 
ancient boat, cankered and swollen at the seams from 
years of sea-work; yet his heart is in repair still, 
and with it that marvellous natural intelligence 
which is only to be found among the semi-literate.
His daughter reads the newspapers to him. His interest
264
in world-politics is a consuming passion and it is 
wonderful how clearly he reads between the lines of 
a conference or a speech to deduce at once its failure 
or success, its truth or intrinsic falsity ...
'Finland is waking up,* he says oracularly.
'Do you think they will give in to Russia?'
'Naturally.'
'I don't.'
'You are English. They never see things before they 
happen. The English are very slow.'
'And what about the Greeks?'
'The Greeks are fast ... piff ... paff ... They decide.'
'But each one decides differently.'
'That is individualism.'
'But it leads to chaos.'
'We like chaos.'
(Lawrence Durrell, Reflections on a Marine Venus)
By the same token, there are many people who feel most 
uncomfortable if they haven't gone over all possible 
ground before making a choice.
There is a sense in which satisficing may be a more 
common and natural reaction to group decision processes 
than to individual selection. When I asked Mr B 
about the discussions he had had with R about his 
listed cottages, he replied that:
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’’We’ve been going round in ever-decreasing circles. 
Whenever I make a suggestion he says it can’t be done, 
whenever he makes one it doesn't sound any use to me 
at all. When you're trying to work something out 
with someone else, you never seem to get to the point 
somehow. In the end, you go along with something you 
don't really agree with just to get some action."
In this kind of situation, the model that each indi­
vidual has of the problem arena is continually being 
upset by dialogue with the other. Even at best, much 
of the interaction is taken up with trying to communi­
cate each other's point of view and understand how 
the other is thinking and reasoning. What might be 
described as the analytical stage of the process may 
never be reached. Or at least if it is, there are 
probably still two sets of ideas and terminology 
being employed and, for each participant, the concepts 
that go to make up his argument are always being 
imperfectly expressed in the other's terms. In the 
end one of them may agree with the other out of sheer 
fatigue and frustration.
In my initial discussions with Mr B, I tried to obtain 
some idea of how he viewed the alternative ways of 
dealing with his cottages. I first asked him how 
the problem started*
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"Well it all began when the D of E decided to list 
the bloody places at all. It's absolutely crazy.
I mean they’re just a row of old, delapidated, damp, 
unattractive workers’ houses. Why on earth go to 
all this trouble to hold them up. The whole thing 
is a waste of public money."
What had he been going to do with the houses before 
they were listed?
"I wasn’t sure. I had some students living in one 
of them and I was using the nearest as a store. Then 
the students moved out and I never got any to replace 
them. The place got a bit run down I suppose, then 
this inspection was carried out and the list went on. 
Those students would have laughed to know that their 
place had a preservation order on it : I was a bit
too late. After they’d been listed, trade picked 
up quite a bit and I thought it would be an idea to 
extend the forecourt."
Did he think about doing anything else with them?
"Well not really, they’re worth nothing much as living 
accommodation. The students only just covered the 
rates, I couldn’t charge ’em very much you see. It 
seemed easiest to knock them down, or at least one 
of them, and use the space."
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It did not appear that Mr B had considered at all 
systematically the range of possible solutions to his 
cottage 'problem' e.g. renovation and letting for 
habitation, renovation and letting for office use, 
renovation and selling-off for either of these two 
purposes, renovation and use for offices and storage 
space for his own garage - these were all possible 
alternative courses of action. But Mr B seemed to 
prefer the much simpler expedient of demolishing the 
worst cottage, thereby saving the effort and cost 
involved in renovation and avoiding the subsequent 
administration involved in disposing of or renting 
the property. Taking down the cottage would be a 
comparatively cheap operation, would remove a source 
of expense and aggravation and, at the same time, 
provide the garage with more space and frontage.
The significant drawback to this simple plan was that 
all the cottages in the terrace next to the garage 
were now listed, i.e. there was a strong presumption 
in favour of their not being demolished. However,
Mr B went ahead and applied for planning permission 
to demolish the end terrace and waited for the 
Planning Committee's decision. The Committee decided, 
predictably enough, that the cottage should be 
retained. Very soon afterwards, somewhat annoyed,
Mr. B took the very positive step of submitting an 
application to the Department of the Environment to
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have the cottage removed from the preservation list.
He rather resented being told by the planning authorities 
what he could or could not do with his own property 
and therefore put in the application to the Department 
of the Environment more or less as a matter of principle.
B explained to me that*
"This is supposed to be a free country, and yet here 
were these characters telling me what to do with my 
own property. Why the hell shouldn't I take the place 
down if I want to. Anyway, you can only fight them 
on their own ground so I put in an application."
As is usual on these occasions, the Department set up 
a public inquiry to examine the case. Mr B, however, 
was not to receive much support for his project from 
any of the parties giving evidence. R was of the 
opinion that a proposal drawn up in collaboration with 
HAT, for the demolition of the end terrace and the 
renovation of the remainder, could have been successful. 
But the inquiry found against Mr B's proposal and the 
cottages remained on the preservation list. It seems 
here that Mr B was not obviously concerned to optimise 
his strategy for obtaining a demolition order. Having 
decided that he would like to remove the end cottage, 
although this was perhaps not in itself the 'best* 
decision he could make, he did not then devote much
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energy or thought to ensuring that his application 
stood a reasonable chance of success.
When the application did fail, Mr B almost totally 
ignored the cottage which then fell into a complete 
state of disrepair. Again, his apparent lack of will 
to 'optimise* in a given set of circumstances is 
notable. Now that he was not in a position to 
demolish his cottage as he at first intended, he was 
at least free to decide upon his next move. Being a 
listed building, the cottage was eligible for certain 
renovation grants. It could have been regarded as a 
sensible policy for B to try and turn the cottage into 
a source of income in order to offset its own running 
expenses. Part of the property could have been 
converted and rented as office accommodation or 
storage space or, alternatively B could have used the 
office and storage space for his own business, also 
obtaining some tax relief by so doing.
Throughout the long period of his negotiations with R, 
Mr B, it could be argued, had not been serving his own 
interests in the best possible way. He had always 
shown a reluctance to take any decisions or to even 
talk about the future of the cottage, although R had 
tried many times to work out a suitable scheme with 
him. B might have gained much by working with R, who 
is in a position to ease the administrative way with
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regard to renovation grants, to make useful practical 
suggestions about the conversion of the cottage, and 
to advise on what kind of schemes might find favour 
with the planning committee and what they would be 
likely to frown upon.
R, in his turn, has throughout this case tended to 
react to Mr B ’s moves as they were made, rather than 
to try and predict the situation in which they both 
might find themselves and to pre-empt possible problems. 
Although HAT had not officially noticed these cottages,
R knew at the time that Mr B made the application for 
listed building consent to demolish that it was almost 
certain to be turned down, and yet he allowed Mr B 
to go ahead with his fight. Although it was not 
strictly in his brief to do so, R could have saved 
himself considerable trouble later on if he had 
managed to liaise early and off the record with B to 
work out a mutually acceptable and practical future 
for his cottages. This would have involved presenting 
himself as an advisor or consultant rather than as a 
housing inspector, which latter role Mr B quickly 
took exception to. In common with many small 
businessmen, B is inclined to be intolerant of 
'bureaucractic interference* of this kind.
R seemed to be satisficing, then, in so far as that 
when Mr B presented him with a 'new move', R reacted
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to that move and within its own timescale. He appeared 
not to be thinking too far ahead about how events of 
the case might develop. When I asked R about 'best' 
and workable solutions, he said that:
"It's all a question of time really. There are only a 
given number of hours in the day. We do the best we can 
in the time available. But some cases seem easier to 
get on with if you know what I mean. The B 's garage 
business has been dragging on for ages, but I don't 
seem to be able to get him moving. And also, it's a 
funny thing really, I always seem to put him at the 
bottom of my list somehow. It's not too important, I 
suppose, but it's also become a bit of an institution 
for everyone, wondering what the latest on B is."
R is almost playing with the case here. He realizes 
that something will have to be done at some time, but 
it doesn't really matter how long it takes and it's 
quite fun for all concerned to have the discussions 
trickling on. R's notion of satisficing and expedience 
is well-formed, however, and can be perceived through­
out his work. Compromise, do the best you can, get 
something going, practical solutions, these ideas all 
guide the way he sets about his job.
7.4 Summary Conclusions
Satisficing seems to be so pervasive as a mode of
2 72
behaviour in organisational decision-making as to be 
almost a commonplace. Yet, one of its important facets 
is that choice-making carried out in this way with 
limited resources is often perceived as being 'sub-optimal* 
even though the choice-maker concerned might be hard 
pressed to define what he might mean by a best choice.
That is, satisficing can be and is often seen as a 
pathological state.
But, at the same time, individuals like R who live 
with satisficing all the time will have a well- 
rehearsed and oft-repeated view about what 'we can 
ever realistically expect to achieve in practice*.
It is perhaps an important stress-reducing mechanism 
that the organisational decision-maker appears often 
to seek to reduce his official sights, probably over 
a period of time, and then attempt to ensure that 
these achievable standards are circulated as common 
currency within his immediate organisation.
An important part of satisficing behaviour is apparently 
characterised by the use of contingent responses 
rather than of forward planning. Problems tend to be 
dealt with when they arise and not before. In the 
group decision-making sense, issues for discussion 
are attended to sequentially and not strategically.
R and B each had to be stirred into action by a move 
that the other had made.
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The centrality of a particular 'problem' within an 
individual's current set of issues to be dealt with 
appears to be important for the standards that he will 
employ for coping with it. A problem may be despatched 
quickly and sub-optimally if there is something more 
urgent or important that needs attention. Conversely, 
something that seemed to be vital and deserving of 
optimising thinking may get shorter shrift if either 
an even more vital problem turns up or, conversely, if 
the problem solver gets fed up with thinking about it 
and reduces his standards just to 'get shot of it'.
An interesting aspect of R's behaviour was that he was 
keeping the B's garage case going almost because it 
amused him to do so. It did not seem that the standards 
of solution were being relaxed here, but rather that 
the case was moving in and out of the problem arena.
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8 CONCLUSION I Some Determinants of Group Decision Outcomes
8.1 Introduction —
In this chapter we draw together the main findings and 
conclusions about our particular group of decision 
makers. First, there is a section containing some 
important general points about the Housing Assessment 
Team. We then treat the theme concepts individually 
and a section is devoted to the conclusions reached 
or implied by each of the chapters 3 through 7.
8.2 General Observations
Before considering the principal findings that 
have emerged from the examination and application of 
the main theme concepts of this thesis, we set down 
some rather more general observations that have 
relevance to most of the situations we have been 
looking at.
The Organisation within the Individual
Running through all the events that have made up a year 
in the life of one particular decision-making group 
has been a characteristic theme surrounding the 
relationship between the HAT members and different 
aspects of their organisation. Specifically, we 
have encountered the pervasive nature of organisational 
or bureaucratic purpose. However sharply or fuzzily 
this appears to be formally laid down and however
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particular facets are actually perceived by individual 
members, the existence of this concept provides a 
reference point for each individual, lending an orien­
tation to his work and also some of his non-work 
activities. The labels of various organisational 
goals are continually being used as currency in 
bureaucratic interaction, even if those using it are 
not quite sure what the label means or if they disagree
with what they think it does mean.
Cyert and March's treatment of organisational goals 
has provided some insights into this tricky idea. In 
developing their theory of corporate purpose, they 
start by viewing the organisation as a coalition. They 
note that I
"... over a specified (relatively brief) period of 
time we can identify the major coalition members; or, 
for a particular decision we can identify the major 
coalition members. More generally, for a certain 
class of decisions over a relatively long period of 
time we can specify the major classes of coalition 
members. As a result, we will be able to develop
models of organisational decision making (for the short
run) that pay only limited attention to the process 
by which the coalition is changed; but any such 
simplification involves some clear risks when we 
generalise to long-run dynamics."
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One of the interesting aspects of Cyert and March’s 
conception of organisation is the way in which they 
uncover the complication of thinking about a concept 
of corporate purpose, underline the philsophical 
difficulties surrounding the definition of such a 
concept, go some way towards formulating ideas which 
take these problems into account but in doing so seem 
to be employing an epistomolgy which cannot preclude 
the existence of the phenomenon of corporate purpose 
in very much a systems sense. It is significant 
that they refer to "Ihe Problem of Collective Goals", 
a problem, that is, from the theorist's point of view. 
They summarise the 'problem' as*
"1. People (i.e. individuals) have goals; collectivities 
of people do not.
2. To define a theory of organisational decision­
making, we seem to need something analogous - at 
the organisation level - to individual goals at 
the individual level."
In a way, we both agree and disagree with this reason­
ing. We agree, on a purely empirical basis, that there 
is a need for a concept of organisational goal because 
the phenomenon, in some form or other, is absolutely 
pervasive within the world of organisations. The 
notion itself is actually being employed by the 
people out there. But we do not necessarily agree
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with the deductive step that Cyert and March make.
Wnat they are doing is recognising that tie notion of 
corporate goal is problematic and that it is digicult 
to work out what it actually means; but they go on to 
assume a formulation which is exactly analogous to 
the notion of individual goal and bring it a mediating 
model of coalitions to help make it fit. We are not 
saying that this is not illuminating, but it does 
tend to preclude thinking about collective goals 
in different sorts of ways. Even when Cyert and March 
are talking about organisations as setting^ within 
which, per se, there is an inevitable conflict of 
goals, it still seems as though the very process by 
which that concept of conflict is recognised and 
defined depends upon the positing of a 'real' purpose 
somewhere for the organisation that, people being 
people, they cannot get themselves together to work 
towards. Cyert and March go on to say:
"In keeping with virtually all theories of organisations, 
we assume that the coalition represented in an organis­
ation is a coalition of members having different goals.
We require some procedure for resolving such conflict 
(why?). The classic solution is to posit an exchange 
of money from some members of the coalition to other 
members as a way of inducing conformity to a single, 
consistent set of goals - the organisational objective.
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"We propose an alternative concept of organisational 
goals and an alternative set of assumptions about how 
conflict.is resolved. Basically, we have argued that 
most organisations exist and thrive with considerable 
latent conflict of goals. Except at the level of 
nonoperational objectives, there is no internal 
consensus. The procedures for 'resolving' such 
conflict do not reduce all goals to a common dimension 
or even make them obviously internally consistent."
It is not clear here what Cyert and March mean by 
resolving the latent conflict. Are they referring to 
a resolution which must take place conceptually for 
the theorist if he is to be able to explicate 
behaviour in terms of some notion of corporate purpose? 
Or is it more simply that they are arguing that 
conflict cannot continue to exist in practice for 
organisations to exist coherently? If the first is 
the case, does not the fact that the theorist is 
obliged to carry out some kind of conceptual resolution 
imply that he is trying to fit a model that does not 
fit? If the second is true, why do we need to accept 
the idea of an organisation as exhibiting any degree 
of coherence with respect to purpose?
Pettigrew (1973) has pointed out that:
"Cyert and March differ from March and Simon in one
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major respect: the stress that the former give to their 
conception of an organisation as a coalition (p. 27).
To Cyert and March, decision-making is very much a 
political process. Unlike March and Simon, they 
regard conflicts of interest based on sub-goal differen­
tiation as 'normal' parts of organisational life."
Whilst we accept this point, we would contend that the
paradigm upon which Cyert and March's concept of
politics is founded and which leads to their recognition
of conflicts of interests, is one which nevertheless 
accepts the existence of a background and underlying
reason for the organisation to be there. Politics
and conflict are essentially conceived in organisational
terms and the area of discourse is restricted to those
terms.
The present research has not attempted to imply a 
single or set of organisational goals from that which 
members have said or done, but it has found that 
members were always able to say something about what 
they thought the goals of their organisation were.
The concept had salience for all the organisation, 
particularly the HAT members that we talked to and 
their recognition of it appeared to be supported by 
their actions. There was no empirical sense in which 
we could say that the subjects of this study themselves 
regarded their employing body in terms of a coalition.
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We must turn, therefore, to think in terms of models of 
bureaucracy which explain behaviour with respect to 
sets of formalised job roles. We are not necessarily 
arguing that these job roles are in any sense defined 
and disseminated by a purposeful organisation, but 
rather that, however they have come about historically, 
they are definitely extant for our set of organisation 
members, if only as reference symbols in Parsons'
(1951) sense:
"Interactive relationships and the reciprocal roles 
of the parties constitute, on the relevant level, the 
units of which all social systems are composed. But 
certain further considerations come to be involved on 
the higher levels of organisation of collectivities.
With extension of the role system beyond the particular 
interactive relationship, the problem arises of the 
extent to which the expressive symbolism is commonly 
shared within the wider role system. There is further 
the question of whether or not the symbolism is directly 
integrated with the common values which are constitutive 
of the collectivity and may, therefore, be considered 
to be symbols of the solidarity of the collectivity."
Not only are we saying that, for the particular group 
of organisation members of this study, there is a 
strong identification with notions of bureaucratic 
purpose, but also that at least a part of the personal
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interests that were articulated by these individuals 
were also couched in organisational terms. This is 
what we mean by referring to the 'Organisation within 
the Individual’.
The Pathos of Bureaucracy
We have been concerned with trying to understand the 
'decision-making* behaviour of such individuals•and, 
in doing so, would underline a phenomenon that to some 
extent runs counter to the now well-developed and 
popular models of organisations as political forums. 
Here, we refer to a kind of pathos in the extent to 
which notions of organisational purpose have been 
subsumed into the thinking of the members of the group. 
Here is not the keen cut and thrust of career develop­
ment nor the strategic manoeuvring to receive favour 
or an increased control over resources; there is no 
competition for power in any Machiavellian sense, nor 
for fame or recognition. The organisation that provides 
the context for the work of the Housing Assessment 
Team has no history of individual dynamic success and 
progress at the kind of levels that we are talking 
about. The issues that come to HAT for consideration 
are not exciting or earth-shattering. Many of them 
are rather dull, with just the occasional pocket of 
interest. The meetings themselves are often tedious 
for all concerned, and frequent asides are necessary
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to sweeten the pill -of ploughing through them. Yet, 
through all this, there remains a dogged adherence to 
what each individual believes or assumes to be the 
driving purpose of it all. Sometimes they are apt 
to question its strength, often they will disagree 
about what the purpose is. But it is there somewhere, 
they are sure, and it filters down from the organisation 
above them. By the same token, they perceive insti­
tutionally imposed constraints upon their behaviour 
as officials representing the organisation. These 
are not the freely negotiated codes of conduct that 
Coser (1964) has referred to and that Pettigrew (op. 
cit) comments upon:
"Coser (1964) has suggested that the power struggle 
itself may be a very necessary part of achieving a 
new stability of relations between the parties over 
time. Accommodation, he believes, can be reached 
only when the contenders have assessed their respective 
strength in conflict. Eventually 'the parties must 
agree upon rules and norms allowing them to assess 
their respective power position in the struggle.
Their common interest leads them to accept rules which 
enhance their mutual dependence in the very pursuit 
of their antagonistic goals. Such arguments make 
their conflict, so to speak, self-liquidating' (Coser, 
1964; 405)."
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The essentially non-atagonistic relations that we have 
observed as being characteristic of the members of 
our decision-making group are not based upon a balance 
of power. Rather, they derive partly from a sense 
of how 'the organisation' expects them to conduct 
themselves in the course of official business, but 
also from what is essentially a sense of comradeship 
founded upon a recognition that they are all in the 
same organisational boat and that it is more pleasant 
to co-exist as peacably as possible than it is to look 
for reasons for conflict.
This pathos to which we refer might have been described 
by T.S. Eliot:
"No, I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be; 
Am an attendant lord, one that will do 
To swell a progress, start a sence or two.
Advise the prince; no doubt, an easy tool. 
Deferential, glad to be of use.
Politic, cautious, and meticulous ... "
Non-Strategic Behaviour
The concept of strategy in a game-theoretic sense is 
used to describe competitive behaviour characterised 
by (i) the participants within a situation having 
interests which are to some extent incompatible;
(ii) for those divergent interests to be understood
2 84
by each party; (iii) where there is a variety of 
possible outcomes contingent upon the elapsed sequence 
of responses that each party will make to the others 
and (iv) where the likely reaction of each participant 
to these possible outcomes, is known to everyone else. 
This basic formulation is varied by game theorists 
to correspond with different aspects of real-life. 
Bennett’s Hypergame model that we have examined in 
Chapter 3 allows that different participants have 
different perceptions of the total situation and of 
each others perceptions of it.
Outside of game theory, strategy may have a less 
restrictive meaning in that it can refer to essen­
tially non-competitive situations which nevertheless 
involve contingency planning by someone who wants to 
end up somewhere in particular, but who may be hindered 
in this by events over which he has no control and 
to which he must respond in the best possible way.
Hence people may refer to a strategy for launching a 
new product, even where no clear competition is 
involved, or talk about a strategy for getting a 
holiday abroad next year. The term is then taken to 
connote a form of contingency planning.
In the routine course of the work carried out by the 
Housing Assessment Team, significant conflicts of 
interest between the members were difficult to
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identify. Conflicts sometimes seemed to arise amongst 
'external' participants in a case, such as occurred 
in the Bedford Street story. But even in such 
circumstances, theoretical conflict in Vickers' sense 
was not perceived by all participants. Where it was, 
the interests often appeared not strong enough to 
be pursued aggressively and certainly not in terms 
of more than one move ahead. So that the essential 
requirements for strategic responses were generally 
absent in the situations examined.
Further, the prevailing culture both of the team and 
of its parent organisation tended to encourage and 
reinforce co-operation rather than competition and 
tended to discourage symptomatic conflict in Vickers*
sense.
Unmotivated Behaviour
Maslow (1954) has observed that:
"... not all behaviour is motivated. There are many 
determinants of behaviour other than motives. For 
instance, one other important class of determinants 
is the so-called external field. Theoretically, at 
least, behaviour may be determined completely by the 
external field, or even by specific, isolated, external 
stimuli, as in association of ideas, or certain 
conditioned reflexes."
286
It was the principal theme of chapter 5 that certain 
events in the external field of both an individual 
contributor and of the decision-making group of which 
he is a part can cause responses and outcomes that 
appear to have no underlying direction and are 
difficult to attribute to purposeful behaviour. If 
the participants in a discussion have an official 
brief to decide upon a policy, but the force of the 
purpose behind that brief is weak, there may exist 
a real indifference among the members about the 
outcome of the discussions. There may be a limited 
incentive to move the thinking and conclusions of 
the meeting in one direction rather than another.
In this kind of situation, the linguistic forces' 
provided by the gradually unfolding discourse may 
be the most significant determinants of the position
of the meeting at the close. It may literally be a
question of 'where have we arrived at' come the time
of the summing-up. The ebb and flow of the conver­
sational interaction has essentially determined the 
outcome.
For the members of HAT, there is a perceived bureau­
cratic brief to work to, interpreted variously by 
each of them. Their personal commitment to it is not 
high however. That, taken together with the often 
uninteresting material of the meetings and a general 
feeling that their efforts have a barely noticeable
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impact upon the world at large, can provide this 
condition of entropy within which the words can seem to 
take over.
A Non-Decision Model?
If we begin to de-emphasize the notion of purpose, 
either individual or collective, then we also by 
implication move away from a paradigm of decision­
making for understanding group-generated outcomes.
To the extent that purpose dissolves, then so does 
the utility of the concept of choice. Ackoff and 
Emery (1972) have observed that:
"A purposeful individual can derive (infer) courses 
of action from his model of a problem situation; that 
is, the beliefs incorporated into his model can 
produce a belief about which courses of action are 
possible and which of these will produce a state of 
satisfaction. The derivation may be conscious and 
thus obtained through thought, or it may be unconscious 
and hence be obtained by intuition. On the other hand, 
a course of action may be selected by a guess or be 
chosen arbitrarily (as by a random choice)."
Here, the notion of decision-making requires a purpose 
and a model of a problem situation that presumably 
thwarts that purpose. The individual then makes a
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choice, reasoned, intuitive or at random. The 
nature of the problem situation for members of the 
Housing Assessment Team is difficult to uncover.
We have seen that a significant part of their 
'purpose* derives from bureaucratic interpretations 
of their job roles. That is, each member recognises 
that there is an official task to be completed; but 
the problem element of that appears to be weak and 
there is no clear thwarting of purpose that gives 
rise to choice-making behaviour in Ackoff's sense.
Partial Explanation and Multiple Models 
It is important for both consumers and producers of 
social research to understand the partial nature of 
the findings that they deal with. We recall Popper's 
(op. cit.) comment*
"... history must be selective unless it is to be 
choked by a flood of poor and unrelated material.
The attempt to follow causal chains into the remote 
past would not help in the least, for every concrete 
effect with which we might start has a great number 
of partial causes... "
Not only do chains of causality quickly branch and 
multiply into a myriad strands, but there is also a 
near infinity of concepts and ideas that can be 
overlaid onto observed events to give them different
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shades and facets of meaning. Bring an idea close 
to another idea and you will generate a third which 
both derives from the first two but also adds further 
meaning to them. We have seen from the present study 
that, not only can we look at the events of decision­
making cases in slightly different ways in order to 
gain perspective and generate new possibilities for 
explaining what happened; the individual participants 
themselves are also able to do the same kind of thing. 
The process of collecting data from people who hadn't 
given much thought themselves to the emerging issues 
of a case or to the reasoning behind their own behaviour 
is a real example of knowledge in the making.
Our intention throughout this research has been to 
illuminate empirical events by the use of a particular 
set of concepts and, at the same time, to elaborate 
the concepts by bringing them close to data. The 
process is one of conceptual triangulation, such as 
Webb (1966) has referred to:
"... no method (with its own built-in limitations) is 
used exclusively or in isolation; different techniques 
are combined to throw light on a common problem.
Besides viewing the problem from a number of angles, 
this 'triangulation' approach also facilitates the 
cross-checking of otherwise tentative findings."
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We use the notion of traingulation in a slightly 
different sense from Webb. It is not just that we are 
hoping, by employing different concepts quite consciously, 
to 'catch the data out' and to reveal inconsistencies 
and gaps that would otherwise be missed; the traingu­
lation is also applied to the meaning of each of the 
concepts that we use and to the findings that emerge 
from their use. So that what is meant by personal 
interest is given further meaning by considering 
the concept of corporate purpose; what is meant by 
optimising is informed by thinking about the process 
of satisficing. This is a not dissimilar idea to that 
of elaborating a system of constructs (Kelly, 1955).
We move on now to consider, more specifically, the 
findings that have emerged from having offered up 
the concepts that comprise the themes of the five 
analysis chapters to some of the real events of group 
decision-making behaviour.
8.3. The Utility of Hypergame Analysis 
The Presumption of Conflict
Tedeschi, Schlenker and Bonoma (1973) have concluded 
that %
"Interdependence of outcomes and at least partially 
opposed interests appear to be ubiquitous in social 
relationships; hence conflict (of greater or lesser
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degree) sets the problem for human interactions. The 
solutions for such social problems often require the 
use of various modes of communications. These modes 
include threats, promises, warnings, and mendations, 
all of which can be contingent or non-contingent, 
more or less explicit or tacit, and may refer to 
specific types and magnitudes of reinforcements, 
including sensory stimulation, rewards or costs, 
provision of gains or deprivation of expected gains, 
and social rewards or punishments."
The two senses of Vickers* use of the concept of 
conflict are fused here. Tedeschi et al"subsume 
within their meaning both a demonstrable incompati­
bility of interests and also the forms of behaviour 
intended to gain advantage. Competition is another 
term widely used in the literature, with meanings 
variously over-lapping that of conflict. Deutsch (1969) 
has defined competition much as others have defined 
conflict, as:
"an opposition in the goals of the interdependent 
parties such that the probability of goal attainment 
for one decreases as the probability for the other
increases."
Deutsch then uses the term conflict to refer to 
incompatible activities rather than incompatible goals.
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Game-based models of strategic interaction might be 
said to be founded upon a paradigm of conflict.
Although mixed-motive and co-operative behaviour has 
been examined under the auspices of game theory, they 
have been treated rather in terms of deviation from 
conflict behaviour than as positions in their own right. 
Many writers on game theory have pointed to what 
Rapoport (1964) has called its 'inherently non-co­
operative tendencies' (also, e.g. Schelling, 1958,
1963; Sandberg, 1976). The dangers of the analyst 
seeing conflict where there was none have to some 
extent been recognised, but, even the conflict paradigm 
has spilled over into many of the more subtle and 
'real-life' treatments of organisational politics.
The application of Hypergame concepts to the group 
processes of the Housing Assessment Team resulted 
in a degree of 'mis-match'. with the empirical con­
clusions that could be drawn from the data. Although 
the notion of different players' different perceptions 
of other significant parties and their aims was 
illuminating when considered against events, it was 
not clear that there was any significant strategic 
behaviour being employed in the particular case being 
examined. Although the various parties made observations 
about their own objectives and those of significant others, 
we were unable to identify instances of premediated 
attempts by 'players' to further their objectives
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by consciously constructing a plan of campaign against 
the prospect of other players' attempts to further their 
own. The analysis therefore could not proceed beyond 
the phase of identifying the various participants' 
perceptions of the other parties in the case. To 
have moved further into the realm of constructing 
strategy matrices for each player would have been to 
produce what could be described as a 'hyperanalysis' 
of the situation.
Intrinsic Value of the Core Concepts 
We argue empirically that formulating the essential 
concepts of a Hypergame, appreciating the relation­
ship between them and then setting these against 
the data provides a greater insight than any possible 
manipulation of strategy matrices. In any case, by 
far the most problematic and significant part of 
constructing a model in practice is the attribution 
of aims, perceived outcomes and preferences to the 
players.
Bennett himself (1979) has said that the problems of 
matrix manipulation become prohibitively complex 
beyond two-player hypergames. He has also implied 
that the commentary that precedes and surrounds the 
mathematical analysis is probably more important than 
the 'analysis' for understanding the dynamics of the 
situation. This must especially be true if the former
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is able to take account both of what individuals 
have said about the events in which they have partici­
pated and, also, some deeper knowledge about what they 
are like as people. Bauman (1978) has observed that*
"Social phenomena, since they are ultimately acts of 
men and women, demand to be understood in a different 
way than by mere explaining. Understanding them must 
contain an element missing from the explaining of 
natural phenomena* the retrieval of purpose, of 
intention, of the unique configuration of thoughts 
and feelings which preceded a social phenomenon and 
found its only manifestation, imperfect and incomplete, 
in the observable consequences of action."
This is essentially a hermeneutic view of understanding 
which depends upon a degree of personal insight into 
the character of those involved. This insight doesn't 
necessarily need to be obtained through direct contact 
with them although this is almost certainly the best 
way. The hypergame analyses that have been conducted 
by Bennett et al (op. cit.) have been relatively poorly 
informed by this kind of data and sometimes not 
informed at all. The attribution of aims, perceived 
outcomes and strategies at a considerable 'distance* 
has resulted in arguably rather tenuous links between 
model and reality. Subsequent manipulation of the 
parameters of the model to provide further 'analyses*
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then seem to be academic in the worst colloquial 
sense of the word.
On the other hand, brirting the essential concepts of 
the model close both to the events of a case and to 
what the participants themselves said about those 
events is enlightening, especially if that process is 
informed by a reasonable personal knowledge of those 
participants. Here, the idea of triangulation is 
invoked and the strategic components of the hypergame 
throw the material into perspective. This perspective 
may be gained by an observed correspondence between 
the model and the data, or by the opposite, where a 
definite non-matching seems to pertain, or by identi­
fiable degrees of correspondence somewhere between the 
two. The process runs something akin to the following 
simple example.
"Well, what colour was it?"
"Difficult to say really. Lightish I suppose."
"Was it a kind of blue?"
"Yes, but not exactly, more greenish than blue."
"More like a turquoise?"
"That's it. It was a light turquoise."
In this example there is a strong correspondence
between the starting concept offered up to an ’event*
in order to provide a triangulation point for understanding.
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and the real character of the data. This character 
was finally referred to the original notion of blue 
and somewhere along a scale of lightness and of 
greenness. This is analogous to the process that 
we have been adopting throughout this thesis and it 
is a process in which the Hypergame can undoubtedly 
be of considerable explanatory value.
Definition of Player Sets
This research has indicated the need for a further 
conceptual extension of the theory of Hypergames.
It is not only intentions, preferences, payoffs and 
strategies that are subject to individual interpretation 
It is also clear, empirically, that the various 
parties to a strategic interaction will, in general, 
have individual interpretations of who the rest of 
the 'players' are. There need not exist any overlap 
of each players perceived set of opponents although, 
in practice, there will usually be considerable 
congruence.
In a Hypergame analysis that would account for this 
additional complexity, the analyst would presumably be 
forced to make a judgement about the constitution of 
the set that he would like to work with. It is 
possible that the evidence might support the inclusion 
of a player or players that none of the 'other' 
participants recognize in their own sets. Closing
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off inclusions such as this may, in the end, be a 
somewhat arbitrary matter.
Definitions of the Situation
Probably the most important contribution that Bennett's 
model makes to the gaming and conflict literature is 
to highlight the idea that different participants 
within a conflict will, in general, have different 
definitions of the situation. Although this is a 
well developed notion in Sociology and Social Psychology 
(see, for example, Berger and Luckman, 1967; Kelly,
1955, 1969; Deutscher, 1973; Harre and Secord, 1973; 
Cicourel, 1973), strategy analysts have only relatively 
recently started to operate this precept in practice.
Although Luce and Adams (1956) said that:
"A basic assumption of the theory of games is that each 
player correctly perceives the payoff functions of the 
other players. This assumption seems highly unrealistic, 
and it is dropped in this paper and replaced by the 
assumption that each player has a perception of the 
payoff functions of each of the other players; these 
perceptions may be incorrect ..."
Yet they still constrain their analysis to consideration 
of a single strategy matrix which they presume the 
subjects to agree upon. Much later, Schlaim (1976)
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made the point that;
"Images, which may be defined as the organised 
representation of an object in an individual's 
cognitive system, play an all-important part in the 
process of making intelligence evaluations. Actors 
do not respond to the 'objective' facts - whatever 
that might mean - but to their individual perceptions 
of reality. Any assessment they make of a situation 
is bound to be affected in varying degrees by a series 
of personal images they hold, notably the image of the 
antagonistic out-group they are combatting."
Schlaim's specific concern was with the competition 
between national intelligence systems and hence his 
operating paradigm is one of conflict in all possible 
senses. Nevertheless, he realised that, in order to 
predict the behaviour of participants, it was vital 
for the analyst to understand their own definitions 
of the situation.
Bennett’s beginnings of a bridge building effort 
between the game analysts and the various disciplines 
associated with perception and meaning are welcomed. 
Interestingly, what he has found himself is that 
pursuance of this line takes him further and further 
from mathematical definition and. manipulation and 
increasingly closer to the disciplines concerned. It
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is likely that this trend will continue if the models 
that are constructed are required to demonstrate 
strong correspondences with the empirical world.
8.4 Some Dimensions of Collective Purpose 
Bureaucratic Interpretations
It was found in the course of this research that 
images of collective purpose amongst members of the 
Housing Assessment Team appeared to derive principally 
from bureaucratic interpretations of their job roles.
The group members were well imbued with the èthos 
of their parent organisation and were inclined to take 
their direction from it. We are here using 'bureau­
cratic* in the Weberian sense (Weber, op. cit.) in 
which, within a bureaucratic structure;
"... each member of the staff occupies an office with 
a specific delimitation of powers and a sharp segre­
gation of the sphere of office from his private affairs . 
The different offices are organised in terms of a 
stringent hierarchy of higher and lower levels of 
authority in such a way that each lower level is 
subject to control and supervision by the one immediately 
above it. This control and supervision above all 
includes the power of appointment, promotion, demotion, 
and dismissal over the incumbents of lower offices."
Despite the limitations of this traditional model
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of organisation, with its emphasis on efficiency 
and 'rationality* and its lack of attention to 
individual interests and politics, it is nevertheless, 
we ar^e, a very powerful model of institutional life; 
powerful, not because of any strong support from 
contemporary organisational theorists, nor yet because 
it has particular empirical strength as an explanator 
of behaviour. The principal power of this model is 
that it represents a pervasive view of how people 
within organisations perceive their membership of 
them. To that extent, notions of bureaucracy might 
be regarded as a self-fulfilling system of concepts. 
Pettigrew (1973) has noted that;
"The formal structure of power and legitimacy is 
regarded as problematic ... authority requires to 
be fortified in interaction. A position may give a 
leader authority, but the exercise of authority 
requires interaction. It is at this point that the 
1eader's pro blems begin."
Whilst we accept the point of these observations, our 
own data suggest that, in the case of HAT, the formal 
structure of power and legitimacy is the major source 
of those two commodities. According to our interpret­
ation of the various comments of the team members,
'the organisation' and institution of Local Government 
provides most of the direction that can be discerned
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in their work. The members themselves also believe 
that this ought to be the case.
Sub-Bureaucracy
The Housing Assessment Team came to be regarded by 
its members as a kind of Sub-Bureaucracy in its own 
right. It was seen to have an official brief that 
was partly explicit and partly implicit, and each of 
the members perceived a formal role for himself 
relative to that brief. It was also possible to 
identify, for most of the members, a conceptual 
separation between himself 'the individual' and his 
membership of the Sub-Bureaucracy. There was a 
distance between the man and the role.
This conceptual separation or distance was not sharply 
defined, however; the two 'persona' were blurred at 
the overlap. They also overlapped with allegiances 
to each member's departmental activities, the total 
enterprise of local government and the professional 
body with which each was associated.
The Sub-Bureaucracy of the Housing Assessment Team 
wielded less authority over the Team members than did 
their own individual departments. Although conflicts 
of interest between the departments were barely 
identifiable at the level of HAT, save for some more 
or less good-natured rivalry, the members (except for
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R ) were not completely at ease with having apparently 
two directions of responsibility and authority. The 
operation of the team was made possible by an agreement 
between Heads of Department that staff time would be 
made available for this inter-disciplinary activity.
The members were of course aware of this agreement, 
but were still not inclined to spend too much time 
and energy on a task which was seen as essentially 
extra-curricula. When the pressure of their own 
departmental work was high, the demands of the Sub- 
Bureaucracy that was HAT took a definite second place.
By the same token, the nature of R*s 'authority* 
was tenuous. He was designated the Co-ordinator 
of the team and that was very much the role that he 
played, with considerable skill and perspicacity.
He was aware that he had no formal authority over the 
members, yet he was anxious that HAT should achieve 
results. In this, he managed to succeed, employing 
a combination of enthusiasm, diplomacy, gentle cajoling, 
an apparent belief in the cause and a demonstrable 
willingness to get on with work himself. It was 
mainly through his efforts that what was initially a 
rather weakly held together committee became a recognized 
Sub-Bureaucracy, with an authority of its own and a 
generally recognized official function.
Professional Membership
The links that the individual members had with their
303
own professions added stability to the Housing Assessment 
Team at the same time that they tended to reduce its 
apparent coherence. These various professional 
identities allowed members to participate with 
a sense of independence, of security and with the 
belief that they each had something unique to contribute 
to the discussions. Thus was generated a feeling of 
detached voluntariness which added, paradoxically, to 
the strength of the group. It could be described not 
so much as a balance of power, but rather the power that 
commonly derives from an essentially amateur involvement 
with an enterprise in which there is not too much work 
involved and nothing much to lose.
As we have noted, this sense of voluntariness was 
by no means total since HAT also developed a degree 
of 'legal* authority in its own right. It is interesting 
that these two intuitively opposing characteristics 
somehow remained co-existent.
Non-Bureaucratic Collective Purpose
The cohesion of the team also increased at certain 
points of interaction with outside parties, notably 
with the Housing Committee (the official consumer of 
HAT output) and with 'The Public' (the ultimate clients 
of the facility the team was set up to provide). Both 
these groups appeared as common 'adversaries' for the 
HAT members and generated an occasional sense of
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solidarity.
Various definitions of group cohesion, strength, 
collectiveness and solidarity have been proposed.
Many of these bear upon the question of the satisfaction 
that may or may not exist for the individual in being 
a member of the group. Zander (op. cit.) has noted 
that :
"If a member is to be concerned about the achievement 
of a group that faces a challenging task he must 
perceive the presence of at least three conditions:
(a) that a social unit exists, (b) that he is within that 
unit rather than outside it, and (c) that events in 
the group are likely to be relevant to his satisfaction 
with that group. If these three are present for a 
person, one may assume that he will be more interested 
in the outcome of the collective's effort than when 
they are absent. When these conditions exist for 
members, the group is said to be strong, one that has 
unity ..."
This is rather a diffuse definition of group strength 
because it rests upon other difficult definitions.
A challenging task, perhaps, is one that can be 
achieved to the satisfaction of a strong group, if 
we care to reorganise the ideas somewhat. Yet we can 
recognise the essence of what Zander is trying to say.
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One of the characteristics of the Housing Assessment 
Team that seems central to how its members behave, 
however, is that the tasks that it has to carry 
out are not particularly challenging by any definition 
that the team members would use. This aspect of the 
performance of groups is unfortunately given very 
limited attention in the literature. Much is written 
about conflicts of interests within groups and the 
gleeful, strategic pursuit of individual aims; much 
emphasis is laid upon the efficiency of groups faced 
with a well-defined task, motivation and satisfaction, 
trade-offs between individual and group purpose, 
solidarity and alienation. But relatively little 
attention has been paid to that most pervasive quality 
surrounding organisational working units - indifference. 
We have argued in chapter 5 that in a situation where 
there is strictly limited concern about the outcomes 
of a group activity, except within the broadest of 
parameters, then what actually does transpire may be 
highly contingent upon the ways in which the discussion 
unfolds and the whims of the individuals on the day.
Yet, even in such circumstances, it is often not 
possible to assert that the group is acting in a 
completely purposeless way. The indifference is never 
all-pervasive, but becomes a dominating mode which 
contributors drift in and out of as the interest and 
the content of the meeting ebbs and flows. Bureaucratic
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interpretations of collective purpose come to the fore 
as and when the subject matter dictates, but so does 
another kind of aim that has to do with getting the 
business done and drawing the meeting to a generally 
acceptable conclusion. When that stage is reached, 
the members of HAT who are still conversationally 
active are scanning the content of the contributions 
for some method of closure, perhaps some further 
information that *is required' before they can proceed, 
a necessary visit to inspect the properties concerned, 
a phone call to someone or other that one of the members 
ought to make or, occasionally, a clear agreement 
about the recommendations to put forward to the 
committee. As a morning or long afternoon draws on, 
most of the members will become involved in this 
collective effort to reach the end of the meeting.
Collective Purpose and Personal Interest 
The scope for the personal advancement of members of 
the Housing Assessment Team is not significantly 
affected by the activities of the Team. The structure 
and interdepartmental nature of the relationship 
with the parent organisation do not leave room for 
political advantage and there is, therefore, no real 
reason for political manoeuvring.
Individual competition appeared to be manifest only 
insofar as it related to the competence of contributions
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to specific meetings. The dimension of personal 
interest apparently operating in such cases was a 
concern to put on a good performance during the course 
of the discussions. Competition in this respect was 
not at all strong, however, and it could not be said 
to represent a major component of the dynamics of the 
team.
A coincidence of personal interest and collective 
purpose appeared to be represented by the members* 
recognition that the business of HAT was something that 
they were all landed with and that it was in all their 
interests that it be conducted as quickly and pleasantly 
as possible with a minimum of heated disagreement.
Zander (op. cit.) has observed that*
"There has been a long standing interest in explaining 
why a member attends to the goodness of his group's 
effort. With few exceptions ... these explanations 
have been based on the assumption that he personally 
will benefit if his group performs well. Many studies 
therefore have attempted to identify conditions that 
facilitate individual gains for a member or make him 
believe these gains will occur ... Yet, it is easy 
to think of instances in which a person works hard for 
his group when there is not the slightest possibility 
of personal gain and even, in the extreme case, when
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such effort may reduce or eliminate rewards he might 
have received. It is difficult to understand the 
intentions of such members without assuming some form 
of motivation that is primarily focused on the outcomes 
of the group - a more or less selfless concern with 
the achievement of the group as a unit."
The present research has indicated the operation of 
motives, if such they can be called, which are neither 
totally self-interested nor whole-heartedly 'groupy*. 
Principal amongst these has been a willingness to 
attend to the bureaucratic definitions of what the 
group 'ought* to be doing. Commitment to these 
definitions is not absolute however, and boredom and 
indifference can set in with rather unpredictable 
effects upon the group outcomes. We consider now some 
of the conclusions that can be drawn about the 
determinants that can come into play when this occurs.
8.5 The Leader-Driver; Some Dimensions of Non-Purpose 
In chapter 5, we formulated some categories of discussion 
dynamics that help to explain certain kinds of outcome 
generated by decision-making groups when their sense of 
direction is rather weak. These categories were;
(i) Critical Elapsed Sequences





Critical Elapsed Sequences were conceived as strings 
of contributions in which the probability of each 
element being introduced appears to be strongly 
determined by the contribution or contributions 
immediately preceding it.
Stock Polarities are special cases of this phenomenon 
in which particular pairs of contributions are apt 
to turn up together, often representing either polarised 
views or concurrent views.
Discounted Standpoints were taken to denote discussion 
cliches, peculiar to the group, that tend to be 
disregarded or to carry much reduced impact by virtue 
of their familiarity.
Novel Standpoints were seen to represent the obverse of 
Discounted Standpoints, being contributions that 
appeared to carry extra weight by virtue of their 
newness.
Extraordinary Commitment was said to be present when 
a special enthusiasm from one of the members stood out 
against a characteristic background of ennui and 
thereby carried discussion off in its own direction.
All of these propositions have been suggested by a 
prolonged involvement with the meetings of the Housing
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Assessment Team and are supported by particular examples 
They are argued to represent some of the 'internal 
forces' of a discussion and to be particularly 
potent when other, essentially external, determinants 
relating to purpose are not operating strongly or at 
all.
The model of discussion upon which such notions are 
implicitly founded resembles, in simplistic terms, 
a game of dominos in which each player has a limited 
set of pieces that he can set down, but these can only 
be played when certain other pieces are laid by 
someone else. Bales (1950) has classified different 
types of contribution that can be made in small 
problem-solving groups and he links some of these 
behaviours as likely to occur together. But what 
we are suggesting here is that the content matter 
of discussion may be serially determined by association.
Separating the effects of intentions from this kind 
of process is an almost impossible task in practice 
and, indeed, a certain class of intentions could be 
said to operate even in driving this sequencing. Such 
intentions relate to the support of particular points 
of view, opinions and ideas rather than to the satis­
faction of more tangible goals. Critical Elapsed 
Sequences sometimes occur, for example, to bend the 
meaning attributed to a particular contribution
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towards a different meaning preferred by the respondent 
Similarly, Stock Polarities may represent opposing 
positions adopted by two contributors and Stock 
Agreements may indicate two strong beliefs in the 
same principle.
Extraordinary Commitment is a category which is 
dimensionally distinct from the other four. In a 
sense, it could be said to represent pockets of 
enthusiasm which stand out against the background of 
relative non-purpose that accentuates the appearance 
of the other, language-based categories. This 
enthusiasm can still be unintentional, however, 
generated by a particular juxtaposition of ideas, a 
sudden mood, a whim, a burst of inspiration or merely 
a desire to relieve a prevailing level of boredom.
An important finding of this research has been a 
recognition of the surprisingly high levels of 
'un-intention* that can exist during the process of 
meetings of decision-making groups such as HAT. We 
argued in chapter 5 that models of group interaction 
based upon political formulations of objectives and 
behaviour need to be applied judiciously, particularly 
at the lower levels of organisation hierarchies.
Indeed, it could be said that the 'political' position 
and, conversely, one that takes a more undirected 
view of organisational interaction are each based 
upon fundamentally different paradigms concerning
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how individuals relate to their working lives.
Implicit in the first model is an essentially 
materialist view of occupational satisfaction, whereas 
the second recognizes that the contract that an 
individual may strike with his organisation does not 
anticipate or necessarily value the successes or 
advantages that can be derived from 'political' 
awareness and competence.
Although we are not concerned here with the ethics 
of organisational behaviour, we are interested in 
the values adopted by those who engage in analysis 
and commentary upon organisations. This is an important 
part of tracing the lineage of the concepts that they 
use and the conclusions that they draw. For those 
that would follow and interpret the results of the 
present research, it is important to realise that we 
would incline to emphasize what we have referred to
as the pathos of organisational life as much as, and
probably more than, the potential rewards of the cut
and thrust of its politics.
8.6 Some Characteristics of Personal Interest
Whilst we have argued in chapter 6 that Personal 
Interest could take many forms for the individual, 
the results of our empirical study indicate the import­
ance of organisationally oriented definitions. We have 
found that aspects of an individual's purpose-directed
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behaviour that have to do with satisfactions, relating 
to himself rather than to 'goals* of the organisation 
may nevertheless be expressed in terms of his well­
being within that organisation. We have alluded to 
this characteristic in considering 'the pathos of 
bureaucracy', a feeling that the paid official is 
never really able to liberate himself from the 
definitions of himself provided by and through his 
involvement with his organisation.
This became apparent when we were able to obtain data 
on both R's and E's views on their own interests with 
respect to the continuing operation of the Housing 
Assessment Team. The categories expressed were, 
almost without exception, dimensions of well-being 
pertinent to their everyday working lives within Local 
Government in general and as part of HAT in particular 
Since these categories were covered in some depth in 
chapter 6, we do not propose to reconsider them here.
A number of more general points stand out for comment 
however.
First, it was clear that the positions of R and E 
with respect to the Housing Assessment Team were 
different, in terms of personal interests, from those 
of the other members. R, in particular, had a 
considerable portion of his job and professional 
identity tied up with the operation of HAT.
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Second, the categories of interest articulated by R 
could be described in the sort of terms normally 
associated with the pursuit of political advantages.
That is, they all had to do with improving his status, 
working standard of life, prospects and salary. In 
all cases the real scope for improvement was slight, 
however, and it is arguable how powerful these factors 
would be in any political action that involved a 
significant degree of personal conflict or unpleasantness.
Third, these personal interest factors only emerged 
for discussion when a public inquiry forced R and E 
to justify some of their recommendations and, also, 
the existence of HAT to parties outside the usual 
circle of their work. Significant for R was the 
possibility of HAT being discontinued at the end 
of its experimental term and he was forced, therefore, 
to consider the disagreeable implications of this 
possibility.
Finally, despite R's particular interest in the 
continuation of the team, he always conducted the 
business and his handling of the other members on a 
co-operative basis and not obviously as leader or 
manager. Whether that policy stemmed from an intuitive 
or considered notion of the most effective likely 
approach or whether it was merely part of the gentlemanly 
culture of Local Government Officers was difficult to
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say. It was never apparent within the meetings, 
hovever, that R had any particular axe to grind.
The balance of attention that is deemed to be 'proper* 
to devote to the pursuit of personal well-being is an 
interesting issue. The economic contract that indi­
viduals make or imply with their organisation, the 
extent to which they feel dependent upon that, the 
Puritan Ethic pervasive as a background presence 
within the world of organisations, all lend a kind of 
schizophrenia to organisation man which is usually 
deeply imbedded. When you come to ask him about his 
aims and aspirations and about the objectives of his 
part of the institution, these ideas merge and blend 
in the reply. Ambitions are perhaps at first expressed 
in the jargon of career progression, then later, and 
more tentatively, might be an admission of some 
more personally material goal, a small cottage in 
the country, a caravan in which to get away from 
whatever it all is, a holiday in Greece. On the one 
hand, is a natural aspiration for these 'just compen­
sations', at the same time there is often a hint of 
a layer of guilt for mentioning them out loud. The 
problem for the researcher is that a person will 
normally take a considerable time to reveal what it is 
that keeps him driving along, or rather what he thinks 
some of his important motives are. The situation is 
of course desperately complex. Maslow (op. cit.) has
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observed that :
"Man is a wanting animal and rarely reaches a state 
of complete satisfaction except for a short time. As 
one desire is satisfied, another pops up to take its 
place. When this is satisfied, still another comes 
into the foreground, etc. It is a characteristic of 
the human being throughout his whole life that he is 
practically always desiring something. We are faced 
then with the necessity for studying the relationships 
of all the motivations to each other and we are 
concomitantly faced with the necessity of giving up 
the motivational units in isolation if we are to 
achieve the broad understanding that we seek for."
What we have observed in this study is not only that 
the aims and motives operating within the context of 
a particular decision-making group are difficult to 
separate, but also that two seemingly important 
dimensions, collective purpose and personal interest, 
merge in a complex way. More specifically, the 
Personal Interest that often underpins 'political* 
models of organisational behaviour may be conceived 
by the individual in terms of what he does and what he 
can do within the organisation rather than what he 
might imagine being able to do as a hypothetical 
free agent outside it. It is in this sense that 
corporate purpose and individual purpose may not be at
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odds. The limits of discourse and possibility can be 
similar in both cases. The irony of the political 
analysis, though, is that it tends to attribute degrees 
of freedom to the individual as he cunningly manoeuvres 
his way through the maze of the institution. The cage 
outside the cage, unfortunately, our very modest, 
modern, Machiavelli may not be able to see.
8.7. Satisficing Behaviour
Our research has shown that, in one sense, satisficing 
behaviour could be said to characterise most decision­
making situations of complexity, since there is 
rarely the time or the resources to be able to amass 
all the data that could have a bearing upon the outcome 
This was true of the standards that the members of the 
Housing Assessment Team applied to their cases and it 
was a well-accepted principle that they were always 
looking for workable solutions to the Housing problems 
that came before them.
There was a difference between the members' acceptance 
of this principle and the way in which satisficing 
appeared to be regarded by a 'non-professional' 
decision-maker involved with the case outlined in 
chapter 7. The latter tended to view sub-optimal 
choice as a pathological state even though he was 
not in a position, and had no inclination, to work
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out the 'very best' plan to follow. However, the 
professional decision-makers had, perforce, come to 
terms with what they could practically hope to achieve 
and had learned to promulgate amongst significant 
others the acceptance of standards that could easily 
be met. Their working set of values was so arranged 
that, for the most part, they were seen to be getting 
useful things done rather than to be always falling 
short of what could in theory be done.
The amateur decision-maker, Mr. B, did not perceive 
in the same way that he could exercise control over 
the standards of achievement. As a small business 
man, perhaps, he had more reason to judge choice 
selection against an abstract ideal. To some extent 
better decisions for him would mean better progress. 
Neither did he have the background of operating within 
an organisation in which judgements are apt to be 
evaluated by peers as a matter of course. This 
exposure develops the kind of caution and the ability 
to define standards that the HAT members take for 
granted.
An important characteristic of the satisficing behaviour 
that we have observed has been a tendency to respond 
to problematic events contingently rather than 
strategically. As part of the acceptance of sub- 
optimal standards there is often a tendency to put 
problems off until later and wait to see what happens.
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Optimising behaviour, on the other hand, might dictate 
a more proactive stance in which difficult situations 
were predicted and pre-empted, or else a sound strategy 
for their disposal drawn up in good time. In the case 
of B*s garage, both Mr B and R were quite happy to 
leave events to determine their actions and to wait 
until the other had responded before they thought about 
what to do next.
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9 FINAL THOUGHTS
We have tried, in the course of this thesis, to 
develop a number of distinct yet interlocking themes.
In a sense, these serve to chart the progress of 
incremental thinking that has taken place over a number 
of years, thinking that has led off in various direc­
tions as important issues and questions have made 
themselves felt. Ours has been essentially a dual 
concern, but in the end the duality has come together 
to provide a coherent, even scientific basis for 
some propositions about the nature of certain aspects 
of decision-making behaviour in groups at work.
This duality reflects concurrent interests in both 
the process of social research and the substantive 
content of ideas that can derive from it. An important 
argument of this thesis has been that these two areas 
are inextricably linked in a number of important ways. 
Perhaps the most significant point could be summarised 
by saying that we believe that in order to say that 
we have knowledge about a particular subject of research 
then we must have access to both the ideas and language 
that constitute the research output and, also, the 
process that generated the output. This is not to say 
that any particular method of inquiry is valued, per se, 
more highly than any other, although we would certainly 
be prepared to make some judgements on that subject.
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The argument is rather that we do not know the essence 
of the product of research if we do not know something 
about both the method and the mind that gave rise to 
it. It is in these terms that our notion of a scien­
tific inquiry has come to be based.
This is a well established position in the philosophy 
of science, but it is interpreted variously in the 
natural sciences and even more variously in the social 
sciences. We have intentionally steered away from 
much of this debate, except that surrounding those 
specific issues that seem to be important as a 
foundation for our own chosen methodology and model of 
knowledge. The debate is endless, in any case. All 
good researchers should engage in it from time to 
time to sharpen, develop and update their ideas about 
what it is they believe they are doing. But none 
should let a realisation of the tenuous nature of the 
castle of part-formed precepts and assumptions that 
contains his knowledge prevent him from going out and 
getting some more. There is much to discover and 
communicate, no more so than in the world of organisations
Indeed, at no time has it been more important that 
knowledge about organisations be readily accessible 
to those that participate within them. This is true 
whether you are arguing from the point of view of 
efficiency and productivity, whether you are concerned
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to make organisations better places in which to live 
or whether you are supporting a plea for a greater 
egality that depends upon an improved access to knowledge 
about the structure of their organisational world for 
those destined to live out their lives there.
Our own presentation has been intended to be both 
academic and accessible. By presenting some of the 
raw material of empirical data alongside the commentary 
and discussion, we have hoped to make more explicit 
the origins of the conclusions that have been drawn.
We have also hoped to convey knowledge of a different 
kind than that we have put together by reasoning, 
knowledge that rests upon the reader being able to 
pick out some instant truth from the stories we have 
presented.
Damian Grant (1970), writing about realism, has observed 
that:
"Truth may be seen as either scientific or poetic; 
discovered by a process of knowing or created by a 
process of making. The first is technically referred 
to as the correspondence theory, and the second as 
the coherence theory.
The correspondence theory is empirical and epistemo- 
logical. It involves a naive or common-sense realist
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belief in the reality of the external world (as 
expressed in Dr. Johnson's kicking a stone to prove 
that matter exists) and supposes that we may come to 
know this world by observation and comparison. The 
truth it proposes is the truth that corresponds, 
approximates to the predicted reality, renders it with 
fidelity and accuracy ...
In the coherence theory, on the other hand, the 
epistemological process is accelerated or elided by 
intuitive perception. Truth is not earned by the 
labour of documentation and analysis but coined, a ready 
synthesis, and made current - as in any currency - by 
confidence, 'the confidence of truth.' Evidence is 
replaced by self-evidence."
In Grant's terms, the basis of the knowledge obtained 
from our own research depends upon both the corres­
pondence theory and the coherence theory. On the one 
hand, the only way in which we can examine the efficacy 
and insight provided by a particular set of concepts 
is to try and establish a correspondence between the 
concepts and the events that constitute our empirical 
data. Yet, in the end, the links between particular 
pieces of data and things that are said about them will 
only be evaluated by coherence. A different commentator 
might disagree with particular links, and assert, for 
example :
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"I don't think that's true. What R's comment suggests 
to me is that ..."
At the same time, if we consider Grant's interpretation 
of the concept of coherence to have some truth, then 
the presentation of some of the data in the form of 
conversations and quotations may give new meaning to 
the reader beyond the scope of the discussion that we 
have provided. We have had both these intentions in 
mind.
Turning now to the substantive findings of this research, 
let us reconsider the part-formed hypothesis that 
started it all off. An important concern in devising 
the present programme was to try and illuminate some 
of the more humdrum, unspectacular determinants of 
group decision-making. This was, in part, a reaction 
to some of the political and strategic analyses of 
organisational life that were themselves reactions 
to the unreal models proposed by various forms of 
systems analysis. These dry formulations tended to 
reify the organisations they described, they assumed 
a broad congruence of purpose for the participant 
individuals and concerned themselves with notions of 
efficiency and productivity.
But everybody knew that there was more to organisations 
than that, and so models were developed which accounted
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for conflict, ambition, power, politics and all those 
facets of real life which investigators recognised as 
important, but didn't think it quite proper to theorise 
about.
The result, in our view, was a swing in the other 
direction. The cut and thrust models seemed to miss 
out the routine dreariness, the limited commitment, 
the 9 to 5 syndrome, the pathos of all the millions of 
organisation people doing their bit in return for a 
meagre salary and doing it to the best of their ability 
when their mind was not wandering somewhere else, or 
they were getting bored, or just waiting for the 
weekend to come. It is a part of that ordinary yet 
pervasive context that we have been concerned to 
examine. We have attempted not to go overboard with 
this theme and have chosen to consider a spectrum of 
concepts that bear upon both strategic and non- 
strategic behaviour. We highlight the incidence 
of conflict in some cases and de-emphasise or refute it 
in others. We have paid attention to situations where 
there are relatively strong intentions and where there 
hardly appear to be any at all. We have looked at 
dimensions of corporate purpose and of personal interest
An important guiding principle for our method of 
research has been to become partly involved with the 
work of the Housing Assessment Team and to get close
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enough to the members over a long enough period of 
time so as to be able to understand some of the meanings 
that they give to the behaviour of others and which, 
we presume, informs their own action. We agree with 
Goffman (1961), who summed up the process rather 
neatly:
"It is my belief that any group of persons - prisoners, 
primitives, pilots or patients - develop a life of 
their own that becomes meaningful, reasonable and 
normal once you get close to it, and that a good way 
to learn about any of these worlds is to submit oneself 
in the company of the members to the daily round of 
petty contingencies to which they are subject."
Perhaps the only way to really understand a piece 
of action is to participate in it yourself. But, to 
theorise about it, you also have to be able to see 
what you have been doing. It has been our intention 
to steer some kind of middle course between involvement 
and distance. In the same way, we have hoped to 
achieve a balance between correspondence and coherence, 
science and history, strategy and non-strategy, conflict 
and harmony. We have examined a number of different 
points of view which, in the end, all depend upon each 
other for their meaning.
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10 GENERAL THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND SOME DIMENSIONS 
OF PROCESS AND CONTEXT
10.1 Conclusions for Group Decision Making
Our research connects with a number of important traditions 
of thinking about decision-making in groups and organisations. 
Perhaps the most established is the social psychological 
body of knowledge, rooted firmly in experimental investi­
gations. Many of these have been based upon the social 
and linguistic dynamics that operate in decision-making 
groups attempting to reach a consensus (Black, 1948;
Burnstein and Vinokur, 1975; Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; 
Festinger, Schachter and Back, 1959). Particularly 
important concepts have been attitude changed (Anderson 
and Farkas, 1973; Gough and Fraser, 1972; Moscovici and 
Zavalloni, 1969; Schonback, Gollwitzer, Stiepel and Wagner, 
1981), exchange theory (Homans, 1958; Chadwick-Jones, 1976), 
the structure of argumentation (Thorndike, 1938; Vinokur 
and Burnstein, 1974; Axelrod, 1976), reactions to risk 
(Vinokur, 1969, 1971), linguistic style and persuasion 
(Festinger and Thibaut, 1950; Sandell, 1977; Vinokur,
Trope and Burnstein, 1975) and various measures of group 
shifts (Burnstein and Vinokur, 1973; Kogan and Wallach,
1967; Stoner, 1968; Vinokur and Burnstein, op.cit.).
Many of the results in this field have been derived 
empirically from the study of groups engaged in variations 
of the theme of 'problem-solving'. Recently, however,
Davis and Hinsz (1982) have observed that:
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"Almost any area of research having to do with the 
collective performance of a set of persons working at 
a task was at one time called 'group problem solving'. 
According to at least one system of group task classifica­
tion (Davis, 1969a), problem solving tasks emphasize the 
processing of information in order to formulate an answer, 
and may be contrasted with decision-making tasks which 
emphasize less a construction of some response than a 
specification of one alternative out of several defined 
by the task. Such a system, of course, is largely a matter 
of convenience and cannot easily be maintained in strict 
logical form."
Davis and Hinsz's last point is important and we would 
also argue that any distinction between problem-solving 
and decision-making is difficult to draw in practice.
The two might be said to be paradigms for analysis rather 
than empirically observable categories of behaviour. In 
these terms, our own work has perhaps been grounded more 
firmly in the problem paradigm than the decision paradigm, 
even though it is a concept of 'group decision' that we 
have been concerned to investigate and develop.
The location of sources of intention for group members 
has been given little explicit coverage in the social 
psychological literature. The authority for and rightness 
of problem-solving or decision-making tasks has tended to 
remain an assumption of group studies rather than be
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treated as an important explanatory variable. Our own 
research, on the other hand, has been concerned to high­
light how members of a problem solving group construe 
both the content and the source of the issues set before 
them. The pervasive nature of bureaucratic models of 
organisational purpose has been demonstrated and some of 
the substance of such models elaborated.
Another important finding of the present research is that 
for decision-making groups concerned with relatively non- 
traumatic tasks, a process of 'content manufacturing' is 
often central to their activities. That is, in response 
to a bureaucratic demand to address a particular work 
issue, group members at a meeting will begin to generate 
material in the form of ideas, comments, arguments, pros 
and cons, notes agendas, timetables, tasks and so on.
The resulting web of content not only develops a life and 
coherence of its own, but may also inspire standards and 
criteria for its evaluation. This important process of 
manufacture has been neglected in social psychology.
Content has tended to be regarded as given in experimental 
group studies and treated as the subject matter for 
processes which they have attempted to uncover.
This concept of manufacture has also received scant 
attention in the literature of organisation theory.
Perhaps the closest approach to it has been the formulation 
proposed by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972). They have
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viewed organisational decision-making as an anarchic kind 
of process;
"Although organisations can often be viewed conveniently 
as vehicles for solving well-defined problems or structures 
within which conflict is resolved through bargaining, they 
also provide sets of procedures through which participants 
arrive at an interpretation of what they are doing and what 
they have done while in the process of doing it. From this 
point of view, an organisation is a collection of choices 
looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for 
decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions 
looking for issues to which they might be the answer and 
decision makers looking for work."
Cohen, March and Olsen develop a model of organisational 
decision-making which is characterised by the idea of 
there being an abundance of content to begin with. They 
argue that series of decision situations that arise within 
an organisation can be seen as 'garbage cans' that attract 
issues and participants according to the identifying labels 
that they come to acquire. Cohen, March and Olsen stress 
the idea of a stream process in which elements that end up 
in one garbage can are not then available to be placed in 
any of the others.
This model is simplistic in a number of ways. A central 
assumption is that organisations in which this kind of 
decision-making occurs are essentially anarchic. Cohen,
331
March and Olsen see organisational behaviour as fragmented, 
where participants operate on the basis of a variety of 
ill-defined and inconsistent preferences, where its own 
operating processes are not understood by its members and 
where these members vary considerably in the amount of 
time and effort that they devote to different issues. 
Accordingly:
"... the boundaries of the organisation are uncertain and 
changing; the audiences and decision makers for any 
particular kind of choice change capriciously."
Much of the research upon which the garbage can model has 
been based was carried out within Universities. These 
are organisations notable for the high degrees of freedom 
perceived by their members to define rules and standards 
of behaviour. They are therefore highly likely to exhibit 
certain anarchic characteristics. Concentration upon 
this idea draws attention away from much stronger percep­
tions of order to be found in many other kinds of organisation 
The reference concept of an organised anarchy is inappropriate 
for many decision making situations.
The present research has pointed to the importance of 
bureaucratic interpretations of organisational purpose 
and meaning, the very antithesis of anarchy. Within the 
middle ranks of Local Government, meanings relating to job 
roles and corporate direction are handed down to the officers
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from above, handed down and also accepted, for the most 
part, as being official, validated by those that are 
presumed to know what they are doing and where they are 
going. Participants within the organisation realise that 
policy is not always clearly set out; they can recognise that 
inconsistencies and stupidities can and do occur - after 
all, people are only human - they observe that those 
above them can sometimes be argued to be incompetent and 
self-interested. But, through all this, there still 
remains a constant, underlying belief in the rightness and 
officialness of it all. There is a strong sense of duty 
to the objectives of the organisation, whatever particular 
individuals believe them to be. Our middle ranking decision­
makers have been seen to operate with a highly Weberian 
notion of organisation.
A second important weakness of the garbage can model of 
corporate decision-making lies with its tenet that the raw 
material of the process is somehow there to start with 
and that issues are gradually settled as this content 
is sorted under the various headings. This is to ignore 
the manufacturing of content that is such a fundamental 
part of group decision-making and that our research has 
brought out for consideration.
Within another view of the organisational theory literature, 
Bachrach and Baratz (1963) have been concerned to highlight 
political processes by which community and policy issues
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are effectively decided at a high level through the manage­
ment of publicly accessible meaning (Pettigrew, 1977) so 
that consumers of outcomes are not even aware that a 
decision as such has been taken. Bachrach and Baratz 
observed that :
"Many investigators have also mistakenly assumed that 
power and its correlatives are activated and can be 
observed only in decision-making situations. They have 
overlooked the equally, if not more important area of 
what might be called 'nondecision-making', i.e. the 
practice of limiting the scope of actual decision-making 
to 'safe' issues by manipulating the dominant community 
values, myths, and political institutions and procedures. 
To pass over this is to neglect one whole face of power."
Bachrach and Baratz refer to a state of 'false consensus' 
in which members of a given population appear to stand 
in agreement about the rightness of the current state of 
affairs without being aware that an opportunity existed 
for a different state to pertain. This is a similar idea 
to the Marxian notion of false consciousness and to Lukes' 
Three-Dimensional View of Power which focuses upon the 
way in which political agendas may be controlled (Lukes, 
1974).
The uncritical acceptance by Local Government officers 
of bureaucratic interpretations of corporate purpose
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might be said to represent a particular example of false 
consensus. However, it can also be argued that this 
concept is rather difficult to validate. Merelman (1968) has 
criticised what he refers to as the Neo-Elitist Critique 
of Community Power exemplified by Bachrach and Baratz 
(op.cit.), Schattschneider (1960), Vidich and Bensman 
(1960) and Oppenheim (1961). He argues that:
"The argument on the problem of 'false consensus', as 
it is presently stated, is not an empirical argument, 
though it makes certain dubious empirical assumptions.
Rather, it is a purely deductive, tautological theory 
which, if one accepts its empirical assumptions, does not 
admit of empirical proof or disproof . . . the argument 
does not allow us to distinguish between 'real' and 
'false' consensuses."
Whether or not false consensus is a viable concept is 
not our concern here, however. The present research has 
not attempted to trace the lineage of particular images 
of organisations held by participants. Rather, a widely 
held view of how a corporate enterprise functions has 
emerged as we have examined the case studies of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, it was our intention to investigate the 
relative applicability of bureaucratic and politically 
oriented models of organisation, particularly at middle 
management levels within the hierarchy. On this question, 
Pfeffer (1981) has noted:
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"Distinguishing between the bureaucratic and political 
models of organisation may be somewhat more difficult.
After all, if the distribution of power is stable in the 
organisation, which is a reasonable assumption, particularly 
over relatively short time periods, and if power and 
politics determine organisational decisions, then 
organisational choices will be relatively stable over 
time. But this stability is also characteristic of the 
use of precedent in decision-making, which is one of the 
hallmarks of bureaucratic organisations.”
Pfeffer here makes the mistake of assuming that bureau­
cratic and political explanations of organisational 
behaviour need to be kept separate. He also frames his 
analytical terms from his, the analyst's, point of view.
One of the important arguments of this thesis has been 
that it is vital to consider the models of their organisation 
being used by the members themselves.
So that, whatever systemic structure or political 
characteristics might be attributed to this particular 
section of Local Government from the outside, we have 
attempted to uncover the inside view. We have shown that 
bureaucratic models of their institution are widely held 
by the members, particularly away from the higher, 
discretionary levels of management and particularly 
where the members also belong to a profession which tends 
to emphasize community and vocational values.
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We have also endeavoured to contrast these essentially 
Weberian representations of members' participation in 
decision-making with various political models which lay 
stress upon individuals' self-interest and the scope for 
competition, conflict and the diverse interpretation of 
goals. Such models can, in certain circumstances, mislead 
from what is, fundamentally, a strong sense of cohesion.
At the same time, we have pointed out that real commitment 
to organisational goals can in practice be severely 
limited and that routine decision-making tasks in particular 
may be accompanied by high levels of boredom and marked 
indifference to the outcomes. In recognizing such indiffer­
ence, we have pointed to a kind of non-decision making 
that is fundamentally different to that conceived by either 
Cohen, March and Olsen (op.cit.) or Bachrach and Baratz 
(op.cit.). It is a process in which the participants are 
themselves aware that they are engaged in a kind of 
decision-making task for their organisation, this aalf- 
subsuming institution to which they owe a duty and which 
has corporate goals which they are more or less clear about 
and which they believe themselves to be more or less 
agreed upon.
By non-decision making in this context, we mean to say 
that the process is not characterised by the rational 
enumeration and comparison of alternatives, and their 
systematic evaluation against well-formulated criteria;
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nor by the stream sorting of issues into garbage cans. 
Rather is one in which decision-making type content is 
manufactured 'on site' in response to an official call 
for choice, and in which a group such as HAT will generate 
contributions, ideas, arguments and options as it goes 
along. This process will exhibit a degree of serial 
dependence and what is generated at any point in time 
will be inextricably linked to what has gone before.
10.2 Decision-Making in the Local Government Setting
In the analysis and presentation of our research, the 
context to the decision-making has been considered through 
the auspices, as it were, of the participants themselves. 
We have, through the variety of data obtained and employed, 
attempted to build up a picture of how the individuals in 
particular cases perceived the immediate and wider situ­
ation of which they were a part. A number of specific 
issues, however, peculiar perhaps to the Local Government 
context, can be identified for particular consideration. 
These largely have to do with an essentially structural 
view of the decision-making process.
Ranson, Minings and Greenwood (1980, 1982) have been 
amongst those who have chosen to concentrate upon the 
analysis of organisational structure and its relationship 
with the generation of events. In particular, they have 
adopted what is essentially an evolutionary model of
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organisation in which, over time, institutions adapt to 
and are contingent upon the circumstances that they have 
encountered in history. Ranson, Minings and Greenwood 
(1980) point out that:
"The concept of structure is usually understood to imply 
a configuration of activities that is characteristically 
enduring and persistent; the dominant feature of organisa­
tional structure is its patterned regularity. Yet 
descriptions of structure have typically focused on
very different aspects of such patterned regularity. Some
have sought to describe structure as a formal configuration 
of roles and procedures, the prescribed framework of the 
organisation. Others have described structure as the 
patterned regularities and processes of interaction ...
The continual counterposing of framework and interaction
is unhelpful because of its implicit and inaccurate
opposition of 'constraint' to 'agency'. The recent works 
of Bourdieu (1971, 1977, 1979) and Giddens (1976, 1977) 
suggest a more fruitful perspective, focusing upon the 
interpenetration of framework and interaction as expressing 
a relationship that is often mutually constituting and 
constitutive."
This relationship essentially exists in the idea that 
interaction can only take place between individuals, 
that these individuals have perceptions of the structure 
that surrounds them and that they attribute various 
meanings to what they perceive. We have, in the present
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research, highlighted a particular way that members of 
an organisation perceive structure. We have also pointed 
out that, whatever the empirical, predictive validity 
of a structural, Weberian model of organisational partici­
pation, the fact of participants believing in many of 
its essential characteristics reinforces bureaucratic 
behaviour. However, Ranson et al (op.cit.) seem more 
inclined to think of structure as a strictly analytical 
device to which the participants are in no sense party*
"The properties of structural frameworks have important 
consequences for the organisation's effectiveness: the 
extent of functional differentiation, the degree of inte­
gration, connectedness, and 'coupling', the centralisation 
and concentration of authority, the formalisation of rules 
and procedures, etc. will influence the effectiveness 
of control."
This is essentially a Weberian analysis from the analyst's 
point of view. We argue, however, that bureaucratic 
models are also important for those being analysed and, 
hence, have an important impact upon the nature and detail 
of organisational interaction. It is in this way that 
structure eventually has its determining effect upon 
action. Ranson et al go on to say that*
"Much comparative research in organisational analysis 
has in fact examined the contextual determinants of 
structural variability in organisations. This has
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become known as the 'argument from contingencies'
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) which suggests that the 
relationship of structural characteristics to be found 
in any organisation - the particular constellation of 
rules, differentiated labour and hierarchy, for example - 
arises because of the pressure of contingent or situational 
circumstances."
Here, apparently, is another level of cause and effect, 
where that which is deemed by the analyst to lie outside 
the organisation he is looking at provides a determining 
force upon the structure of the organisation itself. But 
how does this evolution take place? Not, presumably, by 
a mysterious, impersonal process of osmosis. Contingency 
forces are activated by individuals within the organisation 
who are able to gauge the extent of any perceived mismatch 
between what they might regard as the external environment 
and the structure of the system of which they are a part.
It is the subjective delineation of context and the meaning 
it assumes that will eventually result in changes of 
structure.
Of course, for Local Government in particular, certain 
elements of context are strongly established both by 
statute and tradition. Friend and Jessop (1969) have 
observed that ;
"Any form of planning activity by a local authority must
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take place within a procedural setting which is laid down 
in the standing orders of Council, and in the more specific 
instructions to individual committees. Although each 
local authority has a measure of autonomy in developing these 
procedures within the legal constitution of the local 
government system, no local rules of procedure can in 
themselves do more than provide a basic framework within 
which groups and individuals can act. Inevitably, certain 
patterns of behaviour and expectation evolve which tend to 
become an integral part of the local government system even 
though they have no official procedural basis."
This is another structuralist argument of a similar genre 
to that of Ranson, Minings and Greenwood (op.cit.), 
although with an explicit reference to the particular way 
in which legal forces can determine behaviour. There is 
a presumption here that the scope for interpretation and 
construction of such institutions as standing orders is 
slight. Nevertheless, the vital process by which partici­
pants derive meaning from the structures that they perceive 
is not examined.
Saunders (1979) is more thorough in this respect*
"It has become a sociological cliche that the formal 
structure of an organisation does not necessarily indicate 
what actually goes on within it, and there is no reason 
to expect that local authorities constitute an exception 
to this. Both functionalist (eg Blau, 1963) and
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interactionist (eg Silverman, 1970) approaches to the 
sociology of formal organisations have stressed the need 
to examine how members routinely accomplish their ’roles*, 
and it follows that the analysis of the formal organisational 
framework of local authority decision-making can only be 
a first step in understanding how policies come to be made.”
The present research has considered the context to the 
decision-making of the Housing Assessment Team in essen­
tially the same way as other kinds of data. Analytical 
categories that might be otherwise subsumed under the 
general heading of context have emerged and been treated 
in the accounts collected from members. We pick out a 
few of these categories here for specific consideration.
First, it was an important part of Housing Policy that 
conversion of marginal properties was to be preferred to 
new construction. This factor was apt to place constraints 
upon the range of options that could be considered by HAT 
members to be feasible. This policy of renewal had its 
roots both in financial and arcHtectural issues. It had 
historically been the case that the improvement of existing 
buildings was normally a cheaper option, unit for unit, 
than demolishing and reconstructing from scratch. This 
practice had lingered on, even in the face of the relative 
increase of labour costs over material costs which now 
meant that, in some instances, new construction would be 
a less expensive alternative to adopt.
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Overlaid upon the simple budget questions were issues of 
quality. There was, and still is a strong presumption in 
most quarters of Local Government in the city - amongst 
officers, councillors of all parties, the public at large - 
that the conservation of the city's architectural and cultural 
heritage was fundamentally, per se, a good thing. Which 
parts of the heritage are deemed to be valuable and which 
of lesser significance is a more contentious question, 
but the general acceptance of the policy of conservation 
works against demolition and favours the practice of 
conversion. There is also the point that with smaller 
conversion schemes, it is often relatively easy for ways 
to be found of mobilizing private capital, which is another 
important working principle within the Housing Department.
A.second important contextual factor was a gradual diminution 
in the real value of the housing budget. This tended 
to work against large, ambitious construction plans in 
favour of relatively inexpensive piecemeal conversions.
The time horizon of the work was also being gradually 
reduced as a matter of policy; that is, standards of 
construction were being pared and building work was being 
carried out that had a shorter and shorter life expectancy.
As is often the case when budgets are under pressure, the 
long term had started to become less important than the 
short term.
A third important element of context for the decision-
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making of the Housing Assessment Team was the existence, 
and continuing strength, of local conservation pressure 
groups. One of these in particular was well organised 
and run by articulate people who had access to professional 
skills and technical advice of all kinds. The presence 
of such groups was a determinant of the range of 'solution' 
options that members of HAT felt able to raise.
Finally, we point again to the kind of organisation we were 
looking at and the location of the HAT members within its 
hierarchy. There is a clear difference between the culture 
and constitution of, say, a University and that of a Local 
Government department. There is a tradition within 
Universities of freedom in how members interpret their 
job roles. This is not the case within Local Authorities. 
Our subjects for this research were all middle management 
officers, also, and not accustomed to the more discretionary 
behaviour that is to be found higher up the scale.
Recognizing as we do the importance of considering 
contextual variables in the analysis of organisational 
decision-making, our focus in the present research has 
been with the process of decision-making interaction 
and we have treated context, along with the other data, 
through the meanings attributed to it by the participants 
concerned. In this we differ from most other analysts 
of Local Government decision-making. Structuring context 
variables around the central issues of this thesis, however.
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would not change the outcomes of the research as it was 
conceived and designed.
In the next and last section, we move on to consider 
briefly some theoretical questions which finally set 
our research in the context, so to speak, of a range of 
possible systems of analysis.
10.3 Some Analytical Questions 
Pettigrew (1979) has argued that;
"In the pursuit of our everyday tasks and objectives, it 
is all too easy to forget the less rational and instrumental, 
the more expressive social tissue around us that gives 
those tasks meaning. Yet in order for people to function 
within any given setting, they must have a continuing sense 
of what that reality is all about in order to be acted 
upon. Culture is the system of such publicly and collectively 
accepted meanings operating for a given group at a given time. 
This system of terms, forms, categories and images interprets 
a people * s own situation to themselves. '*
We have not, in the present research, been concerned 
explicitly with the concept of culture. We have, however, 
been interested in uncovering meanings accepted by a 
particular decision-making group, meanings that relate 
to the members' sense of direction with respect to the
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perceived goals of the organisation of which they are a 
part. We have attempted to define empirically and to 
elaborate a number of important concepts that bear upon 
a sense both of individual and corporate direction.
The case study chapters of the thesis have each dealt with 
a particular concept. In developing the notion of the Hyper­
game in chapter 3 we focused upon some aspects of strategic 
conflict. We considered the efficacy and authenticity 
of models of strategy in the particular context of the 
case. Strategic behaviour was differentiated from non- 
strategic behaviour and conflict juxtaposed with co-operation.
In treating the idea of Collective Purpose in chapter 4, 
we aimed to uncover some of the ways in which corporate 
goals could be formulated by a particular group of 
organisation members. This development built upon the 
previous chapter to the extent that dimensions of Collective 
Purpose had been seen to operate within the frame of a 
Hypergame.
The Leader-Driver model in chapter 5 was a formulation 
to explain the phenomenon we have referred to as the 
manufacture of decision-making content. In this model 
we de-emphasize the importance of intention and instead 
posit a situation in which discussions in response to 
an official call for choice develop a life and logic of 
their own.
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In looking at the concept of Personal Interest in chapter 
6, we aimed to take further one of the important elements 
of strategic interaction, comparing it at the same time 
with the ideas on Collective Purpose developed in chapter 4. 
Our contention has been that it is not possible to under­
stand the notion of, for example. Personal Interest 
without reference to other kinds of interest such as 
Collective Purpose.
The final case in chapter 7 was concerned to investigate 
the concept of satisficing originally proposed by Simon 
and forming such an important adjunct to the idea of 
optimising implied by strategic formulations of organisational 
interaction.
Our intention, then, has been to develop a web of important 
ideas, each of which represents in itself an important 
facet of behaviour and each adding further dimensions 
of meaning to the others. The process has been an 
empirical one to the extent that our starting point for 
fleshing out these core concepts has been the actual 
behaviour of a particular group of decision-makers.
The continuing interplay between the group members' ideas 
of self and corporate direction has also reflected an 
interest in the relative utility in particular cases of 
bureaucratic and political models of organisational 
behaviour. Our findings for the group concerned show
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that bureaucratic models and images of organisational 
structure and purpose are pervasive amongst the middle 
management participants. Earlier in this chapter we have 
referred to a distinction between categories of analysis 
that are solely accessible to analysts and those that also 
have currency for the subjects of analysis. We have 
found that although, for example, the full depth and 
implication of Weber's theories of bureaucracy are only 
available to analysts and not, commonly, to 'citizens', 
its essentials are nevertheless well accepted by many 
citizens.
In chapter 2 of this thesis, we argued that the semantic 
links between social data and derived commentary could 
be said to imply a gradually unfolding theoretical 
position for the observer. We also argued that such 
theory can be regarded as scientific to the degree that 
these links can be identified and explained. The 
particular medium of the case study has been employed 
for this purpose, incorporating as it does two distinct 
levels of language use - that of description and that 
of reflection upon what has been described.
The concepts or variables that we have chosen to focus 
upon have related more to the social processes of group 
decision-making than to any system or structure that 
could be said to contain those processes. Hence, our 
concern with Weberian bureaucracy has not had to do with
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any formal, functional analysis of the machinery of Local 
Government within which the Housing Assessment Team is 
located. Rather, our interest has been with the ways 
in which the participants themselves have articulated 
and appeared to understand their own situation and its 
relationship with the organisation. We have attempted 
to develop and elaborate explanatory concepts that 
illuminate decision-making processes by understanding 
different aspects of the decision-makers* points of view.
This is in distinction to any kind of systems analysis 
or to any of the theory fitting procedures of the 
structuralist schools of Sociology. To pursue a geo­
graphical analogy, we have focused attention upon the river 
of process as it has flowed through the landscape of 
structure. We have not been concerned with the landscape 
qua landscape, juxtaposed against the path of the river. 
Rather, we have been intent upon the fluid dynamics of 
the river itself and, perforce, particular features of the 
landscape that have seemed to have affected the rate and 
direction of flow.
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